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Abstract. A canonical interpretation of an infinitely repeated game is that of a
“dynastic” repeated game: a stage game repeatedly played by successive generations of
finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences. These two models are in fact equivalent
when the past history of play is observable to all players.
In our model all players live one period and do not observe the history of play
that takes place before their birth, but instead receive a private message from their
immediate predecessors.
Under very mild conditions, when players are sufficiently patient, all feasible payoff
vectors (including those below the minmax) can be sustained as a Sequential Equilibrium of the dynastic repeated game with private communication. The result applies
to any stage game for which the standard Folk Theorem yields a payoff set with a
non-empty interior.
Our results stem from the fact that, in equilibrium, a player may be unable to
communicate effectively relevant information to his successor in the same dynasty. This,
in turn implies that following some histories of play the players’ equilibrium beliefs may
violate “Inter-Generational Agreement.”
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Introduction

1.1.

Motivation

The theory of infinitely repeated games is a cornerstone of modern economic analysis. Besides
its tremendous effect on the theory of games itself, it has pervaded economic applications that
stretch from industrial organization, to political economy, to development economics.
However, it seems self-evident that an infinitely repeated game cannot be interpreted
literally as a stage game played infinitely many times by infinitely-lived players.
One interpretation that does not collide directly with the obvious fact that players are
finitely-lived is that of repeated play that terminates in every period with (say constant)
positive probability. The repeated interaction eventually ends with probability one, and
hence does not require the players to literally live forever.
The stochastic termination interpretation is also hard to take literally, however. First of
all, it requires that players live indefinitely long, albeit with vanishingly small probability.
Second, it is at odds with a common limit operation that is carried out in the analysis of
repeated games; namely that the players get closer and closer to becoming infinitely patient.
Unless the context warrants interpreting this limit as an ever increasing frequency of play,
it corresponds to a termination probability that shrinks to zero, and yields a life expectancy
for the players that becomes unboundedly large.
A more compelling interpretation of a repeated game is that of “dynastic” repeated game:
a stage game repeatedly played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic
preferences. Whether the length of players’ lives is stochastic or deterministic, the model
does not extend outside the bounds of the physically possible. Even the case of almostinfinite patience in the standard model is re-interpreted as a world with almost-complete
altruism (towards successors in the same dynasty) and hence may seem more or less plausible,
depending on circumstances.
Suppose that the altruistic component of players’ preferences replicates the temporally
discounted preferences of infinitely-lived players. Suppose also that all players observe the
past history of play. Then dynastic repeated games are an extremely robust way to reinterpret the standard model. An application of the one-shot deviation principle is enough to
show that the standard repeated game and the dynastic game are equivalent, both in terms of
Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) strategies and consequently of equilibrium payoffs. This
is so regardless of the “demographic structure” of the dynastic game. In other words, the
equivalence holds regardless of the process governing birth and death of successive generations
of players, provided that extinction of any dynasty is ruled out.
Given the appeal of the dynastic interpretation of the standard model, it is clearly important to question closely the plausibility of the basic structure of the dynastic game with
“full memory” described above. In our view, the feature of the model that stands out as
deserving skepticism is the full memory of the players. Why should the players be able to
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observe the history of play that took place before their birth (or more loosely, before they
began participating in the game)? At best they will be able to observe a “footprint” of the
previous history of play which will inevitably fall short of full precision. At worst, they will
observe nothing at all, and will have to rely on communication with their predecessors for
information about what happened in the past.
In fact, in many situations of economic interest, postulating that communication is the
only way to convey information about the past seems a compelling assumption. For instance,
if the dynasties are competing firms in an oligopolistic market, whose behavior is controlled
by successive generations of managers it hardly seems plausible that the current managers
would have access to a physical record of the past history of play. They may of course have
access to accounts and a host of other past records. But it seems compelling to say that these
are better modeled a messages from past players, rather than direct observation of the past.
In this paper we characterize the set of Sequential Equilibria (SE) of dynastic repeated
games in which all players live one period, and have to rely on private messages from their
immediate predecessors about the previous history of play. Our results would remain intact
if public messages were allowed alongside private ones.
Of course, one would like to know what happens when the demographics of the model
are generalized, and what would be the effects of the presence of an imperfect but non-null
physical footprint of the past history of play, which we assume away. We return to these and
other issues in Section 10 below, which concludes the paper.
1.2.

Results

The Folk Theorem of repeated games is a stubbornly robust result. For instance, to cite
but a few contributions, the result survives more or less intact when incomplete (Fudenberg
and Maskin 1986) or imperfect public (Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin 1994) information is
allowed, or when the players have bounded memory (Sabourian 1998).
Considerable effort has gone into introducing considerations that reduce the equilibrium
set of a repeated game. For instance, depending on the stage game, the set of equilibrium
payoffs is known to shrink by varying degrees when complexity costs are (lexicographically)
taken into account (Rubinstein 1986, Abreu and Rubinstein 1988, Piccione 1992, Piccione
and Rubinstein 1993), when strategies and beliefs are restricted to be Turing-computable
(Anderlini and Sabourian 1995, Anderlini and Sabourian 2001), or when asynchronous choice
is allowed (Lagunoff and Matsui 1997).
In all the contributions of which we are aware, the equilibrium set of the repeated game
share a common feature.1 It is never the case that a player’s equilibrium payoff can be below
his minmax value. By contrast, we show that, under very general conditions, in a dynastic
1

With the notable exception of Takahashi and Wen (2003) whose benchmark “effective minmax” is determined by the fact that they consider asynchronously repeated games.
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repeated game with private communication there are equilibria that yield the players (possibly
even all players) a payoff below their minmax value. In short, we find that in a very broad
class of games (which includes the n ≥ 3-player version of the Prisoners’ Dilemma), as the
players become more and more altruistic (patient), all (interior) payoff vectors in the convex
hull of the payoffs of the stage game can be sustained as a Sequential Equilibrium of the
dynastic repeated game with private communication. Of course, if the stage game is not
symmetric the possibility that one or more players’ payoffs be below their minmax value may
well imply that for other players some payoffs that are above what can be sustained in the
standard model are in fact sustainable as part of a Sequential Equilibrium of the dynastic
repeated game.
A closer look at the Sequential Equilibria that prove the assertion we have just made
reveals an interesting fact. There is an obvious sense in which, following some histories of play,
in equilibrium, beliefs are “mismatched” across players of the same cohort. This phenomenon,
in turn, can be traced back to the fact that following some histories of play, the structure of
the equilibrium does not permit a player to communicate to his successor some information
about the past that is relevant for future play. This may happen while the other players do
not face the same difficulty, and hence generate the mismatch in beliefs. Below, we formalize
this notion via a condition that we term “Inter-Generational Agreement.” The mismatch
in beliefs is equivalent to saying that a Sequential Equilibrium violates Inter-Generational
Agreement.
We are able to show that the mismatching phenomenon we have just described characterizes fully the difference between the set of Sequential Equilibria of the dynastic repeated game
and the set of Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of the standard repeated game. Any SubgamePerfect Equilibrium of the standard repeated game can be replicated as a Sequential Equilibrium of the dynastic repeated game that displays Inter-Generational Agreement. Conversely
any Sequential Equilibrium of the dynastic repeated game that yields a payoff vector that
is not sustainable as a Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium of the standard repeated game must
violate Inter-Generational Agreement.
2.

Outline

The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 3 we lay down the notation and
details of the Standard Repeated Game and of the Dynastic Repeated Game. In Section 4
we define what constitutes a Sequential Equilibrium for the Dynastic Repeated Game. In
Section 5 we present our first result asserting that all payoffs that can be sustained as SPE
of the Standard Repeated Game can be sustained as SE of the Dynastic Repeated Game.
Section 6 is devoted to our first “extended” Folk Theorem for the Dynastic Repeated Game.
This result applies to the case of three or more dynasties. In Section 7 we present our second
“extended” Folk Theorem. The result we state there applies to the case of four dynasties
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or more. In Section 8 we report a result that completely characterizes the features of an
SE of the Dynastic Repeated Game that make it possible to sustain payoff vectors that are
not sustainable as SPE of the Standard Repeated Game. Section 9 reviews some related
literature, and Section 10 concludes.
For ease of exposition, all proofs are confined to a set of five appendices, labeled A through
E. In the numbering of equations, Lemmas, Theorems etc. a prefix of “A,” “B,” “C,” “D”
or “E” means that the item is located in the corresponding Appendix.
3.
3.1.

The Model

A Standard Repeated Game

We first describe a standard, n-player repeated game. We will then augment this structure
to describe the dynastic repeated game with communication from one cohort to the next.
The standard repeated game structure is of course familiar. We set it up below simply to
establish the basic notation.
Since in our main results below we will make explicit use of public randomization devices
we build these in our notation right from that start.
The stage game is described by the array G = (A, u; I) where I = {1, . . . , n} is the
set of players, indexed by i. The n-fold cartesian product A = ×i∈I Ai is the set of pure
action profiles a = (a1 , . . . , an ) ∈ A, assumed to be finite. Stage game payoffs are defined by
u = (u1 , . . . , un ) where ui : A → IR for each i ∈ I. Let σi ∈ ∆(Ai ) denote a mixed strategy
for i, with σ denoting the profile (σ1 , . . . , σn ).2 The symbol σi (ai ) represents the probability
of pure action ai given by σi , so that for any a = (a1 , . . . an ), with a minor abuse of notation,
we can let σ(a) = Πi∈I σi (ai ) denote the probability of pure action profile a that σ induces.
P
The corresponding payoff to player i, is defined in the usual way: ui (σ) = a∈A σ(a)ui (a).
Dropping the i subscript and writing u(σ) gives the entire profile of payoffs.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we denote by V the convex hull of the set of payoff
vectors from pure strategy profiles in G. We let intV denote the (relative) interior of V .3
We assume that all players observe the outcome of a public randomization device. We
model this as a random variable x̃ taking values in a finite set X, so that its distribution is a
point in ∆(X). Each player can condition his choice of mixed strategy on the realization of
x̃, denoted by x.4 Player i chooses a mixed strategy σi ∈ ∆(Ai ) for each x ∈ X.
2

As standard, here and throughout the paper, given any finite set Z, we let ∆(Z) be the set of all
probability distributions over Z.
3
We use the qualifier “relative” since we will not be making explicit assumptions on the dimensionality of
V ; although the hypotheses of many of our results will imply that V should satisfy certain dimensionality
conditions that we will point out below. Of course, when V has full dimension (n) the relative interior of
V coincides with the interior of V . In general, intV is simply the set of payoff vectors that can be achieved
placing strictly positive weight on all payoff vectors obtained from pure action profiles in G.
4
It should be made clear at this stage that at no point in the paper do we assume that mixed strategies
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In the repeated game, time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . The pure (realized)
action profile played at time t is denoted by at . In each period there is a new public randomization device x̃t . These devices are i.i.d. across periods; we write x̃ to indicate the
random variable of which all the x̃t s are independent “copies.” We refer to x̃ as the actionstage correlation device.5 A history of length t ≥ 1, denoted by ht , is an object of the form
(x0 , a0 , . . . , xt−1 , at−1 ). The “initial” history h0 is of course the “null” history ∅. The set of
t
all possible histories of length t is denoted by H t , while H = ∪∞
t=0 H denotes the collection
of all possible histories of play.
A strategy for player i in the repeated game is denoted by gi and can be thought of as a
collection (gi0 , gi1 , . . . , git , . . .) with each git a function from H t × X into ∆(Ai ). The profile of
repeated game strategies is g = (g1 , . . . , gn ), while g t indicates the time-t profile (g1t , . . . , gnt ).
Given a profile g, recursing forward as usual, we obtain a probability distribution over
action profiles a0 played in period 0, then a probability distribution over profiles a1 to be
played in period 1, then in period 2, and so on without bound, so that we have a distribution
over the profile of actions to be played in every t ≥ 0. Of course, this forward recursion yields
a probability distribution P(g) over the set of all possible sequences (a0 , . . . , at , . . .) (which
can be seen as a probability distribution over the set of possible actual histories of play H).
The players’ common discount factor is denoted by δ ∈ (0, 1). Given a profile g, player
i’s expected payoff in the repeated game is denoted by vi (g) and is given by6
(
(1 − δ)

vi (g) = EP(g)

∞
X

)
δ t ui (at )

(1)

t=0

Given a profile g and a particular finite history ht , we recurse forward as above to find the
distribution over infinite sequences (a0 , . . . , at , . . .), this time conditional on history ht and
the realization xt having taken place. We denote this distribution by P(g, ht , xt ). This allows
us to define the continuation payoff to player i, conditional on the pair (ht , xt ). This will be
denoted by vi (g|ht , xt ) and is given by
(
t

t

"
t

t

t

vi (g| h , x ) = (1 − δ) ui (g (h , x )) + EP(g,ht ,xt )

∞
X

#)
δ

τ −t

τ

ui (a )

(2)

τ =t+1

are observable. Whatever (mutually independent) devices the players use to achieve a desired randomization
among pure actions in G, given a realization of x̃, remain unobservable to other players.
5
Throughout, we restrict attention to action-stage correlation devices that have full support. That is, we
assume that x̃ takes all values in the finite set X with strictly positive probability. This seems reasonable,
and keeps us away of a host of un-necessary technicalities.
6
Clearly, the continuation payoff vi (g) depends on δ as well. To lighten the notation, this will omitted
whenever doing so does not cause any ambiguity.
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As before, dropping the subscript i in either (1) or (2) will indicate the entire profile.
At this point we note that, as is standard, given (1) and (2) we know that the continuation
payoffs in the repeated game follow a recursive relationship. In particular we have that

vi (g| ht , xt ) = (1 − δ) ui (g t (ht , xt )) + δ Egt (ht ,xt ),x̃t+1 vi (g| ht , xt , g t (ht , xt ), x̃t+1 )

(3)

where (ht , xt , g t (ht , xt ), x̃t+1 ) is the (random) history generated by the concatenation of (ht , xt )
with the realization of the mixed strategy profile g t (ht , xt ) and the realization of x̃t+1 . The
expectation is then taken with respect to the realization of the mixed strategy profile g t (ht , xt )
and of x̃t+1 .
A Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium, g ∗ , for the repeated game is defined in the usual way: for
each i, and each finite history (ht , xt ), and each strategy gi for i, we require that vi (g ∗ | ht , xt ) ≥
∗
vi (gi , g−i
| ht , xt ).7
We denote by G S (δ, x̃) the set of SPE strategy profiles, and by E S (δ, x̃) the set of SPE
payoff profiles of the repeated game when correlation device x̃ is available and the common
S
discount factor is δ. We also let E S (δ) = x̃ E S (δ, x̃) with the union being taken over the set
of all possible finite random variables that may serve as correlation devices.
The standard model of repeated play we have just sketched out may be found in a myriad
of sources. See, for example, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) and the references contained
therein. Hereafter, we refer to the standard repeated game model above as the standard
repeated game.
We conclude our discussion of the standard repeated game noting that the one-shot deviation principle gives an immediate way to check, subgame by subgame, whether a profile g ∗
is an SPE. Since it is completely standard, we state the following without proof.
Remark 1. One-Shot Deviation Principle: A profile of strategies g ∗ is in G S (δ, x̃) if and only
if for every i ∈ I, ht ∈ H, xt ∈ X and any σi ∈ ∆(Ai ) we have that
∗
vi (g ∗ |ht , xt ) ≥ vi (σi , gi−t∗ , g−i
|ht , xt )

(4)

where, in keeping with the notational convention we adopted above, gi−t∗ stands for the profile
(gi0∗ , . . . , git−1∗ , git+1∗ , . . .).
3.2.

The Dynastic Repeated Game: Full Memory

The first dynastic repeated game that we describe is a straw-man. It turns out to be equivalent, in both payoffs and strategies, to the standard repeated game. It fulfills purely an
expository function in our story.
7

As is standard, here, and throughout the rest of the paper, a subscript or a superscript of −i indicates
an array with the i-th element taken out.
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Assume that each i ∈ I indexes an entire progeny of individuals. We refer to each of
these as a dynasty. Individuals in each dynasty are assumed to live one period. At the end of
each period t (the beginning of period t + 1), a new individual from each dynasty — the date
(t +1)-lived individual — is born and replaces the date t lived individual in the same dynasty.
Hence, ui (at ) now refers to the payoff directly received by the date t individual in dynasty i.
Each date t individual is altruistic in the sense that his payoff includes the discounted sum
of the direct payoffs of all future individuals in the same dynasty. The weight given to his
own direct payoff is 1 − δ, while the weight given to the discounted sum of payoffs of his line
of offsprings is δ. All cohorts in all dynasties can observe directly the past history of play.
So all individuals in cohort t, can observe ht = (x0 , a0 , . . . , xt−1 , at−1 ). It follows that git as
above can now be interpreted as the strategy of individual i in cohort t (henceforth, simply
“player hi, ti”) in the full memory dynastic repeated game.
Therefore, in the full memory dynastic repeated game, given a profile of strategies g (now
interpreted as an array giving a strategy for each player hi, ti) the overall payoff to player
hi, ti conditional on history (ht , xt ) can be written exactly as in (2) above.
Denote by G F (δ, x̃) the set of SPE strategy profiles, and by E F (δ, x̃) the set of SPE payoff
profiles of the repeated game when the correlation device x̃ is available and the common
discount factor is δ. Now observe that from Remark 1 we know that a profile g constitutes an
SPE of the standard repeated game if and only if when we interpret g as a strategy profile in
the full memory dynastic repeated game, no player hi, ti can gain by unilaterally deviating.
Hence the equilibrium sets of the standard repeated game and of the full memory dynastic
repeated game must be the same. Purely for completeness we state the following formally,
but we omit any further proof.
Theorem 0. Dynastic Interpretation of the Standard Repeated Game: Let any stage game
G, any δ ∈ (0, 1) and any correlation device x̃ be given. Then the standard repeated game
and the full memory dynastic repeated game are equivalent in the sense that G S (δ, x̃) =
G F (δ, x̃) and E S (δ, x̃) = E F (δ, x̃).
3.3.

The Dynastic Repeated Game: Private Communication

We are now ready to drop the assumption that individuals in the t-th cohort observe the
previous history of play. The players’ dynastic preferences are exactly as in the full memory
dynastic repeated game described in Subsection 3.2 above.
Anderlini and Lagunoff (2004) analyzed the case in which each individual in the t-cohort
has to rely on publicly observable messages from the previous cohort for any information
about the previous history of play.8
8

See Section 9 below for a brief discussion of the results in Anderlini and Lagunoff (2004) and other related
papers.
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In this paper, we assume that each player hi, ti receives a private message from player
hi, t − 1i about the previous history of play. It should be noted at this point that our results
would survive intact if we allowed public messages as well as private ones. All the equilibria
we construct below would still be viable, with the public messages ignored. We return to this
issue in Section 10 below.9
For simplicity, the set of messages available to each player hi, ti to send to player hi, t + 1i
is the set H t+1 of finite histories of length t + 1 defined above.10 The message sent by player
t
hi, ti will be denoted by mt+1
i , so that player hi, ti is the recipient of message mi .
We also introduce a new public randomization device in every period, which is observable
to all players in the t-th cohort at the stage in which they select the messages to be sent to
the t + 1-th cohort.11
We let a finite random variable ỹ t taking values in a finite set Y be realized in every
period. A typical realization of ỹ t is denoted by y t . We take these random variables to be
mutually independent across any two time periods. We write ỹ to indicate the finite random
variable of which all the ỹ t are independent “copies,” and we refer to ỹ as the message-stage
correlation device.12
To summarize, we take the time-line of events, observations and decisions within each
time period t to be as follows. At the beginning of each time period t, each player hi, ti
receives a private message mti ∈ H t from player hi, t − 1i.13 Next, the random variable x̃t is
realized. Its realization xt is observed by all players hi, ti in the t-th cohort. After observing
xt , each hi, ti in the t-th cohort selects a mixed strategy σit ∈ ∆(Ai ) for the stage game G.
9

Dealing explicitly with both private and public messages would be cumbersome, and make our results
considerably less transparent. Analyzing the model with private messages only is the most economical way
to put our main point across, and hence this is how we proceed.
10
As will be apparent from our proofs, smaller messages spaces — even ones that stay bounded in size
through time — would suffice for our purposes. Taking the message spaces to coincide with the sets of
previous histories of play seems the natural canonical modeling choice.
11
Three points are worth emphasizing at this stage. First of all, in general, we consider the availability
of a correlation device (a publicly observable finite random variable) a weak assumption in just about any
game. To reiterate an obvious fact, the device simply has to be available for the players to observe; whether
or not the players decide to condition their play on its realization is an attribute of the equilibrium of the
model. Second, the assumption we are now making that a second correlation device is available seems a
natural one in the model we are setting up. The players in the t-th cohort each take two successive decisions:
what to play and then what to say. Given that a correlation device is available when play is decided, it seems
natural, in fact compelling, that the circumstances should be the same when messages are sent to the next
cohort of players. Third, and most importantly, all our theorems survive literally unchanged (with the proof
of Theorem 2 being the only one that needs modification) if we assume that both correlation devices are
simultaneously observable to all players in the t-th cohort at the time they are called upon to choose their
actions in the stage game. In this case, clearly a single correlation device would suffice.
12
Throughout, we restrict attention to message-stage correlation devices that have full support. That is,
we assume that ỹ takes all values in the finite set Y with strictly positive probability. See also footnote 5
above.
13
When t = 0, we assume that player hi, 0i receives the “null” message m0i = ∅.
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These choices are simultaneous. Subsequently, all players hi, ti in the t-th cohort observe the
realized action profile at , which is of course the realization of the mixed strategy profile σ t .
After the profile at is observed, the random variable ỹ t is realized and all players hi, ti in the
t-th cohort observe its realization y t . Finally, after observing y t , each player hi, ti in the t-th
cohort selects a probability distribution φti ∈ ∆(H t+1 ) over messages mt+1
in the set H t+1 .
i
The realized message from this distribution is then sent to player hi, t + 1i, who observes it.14
In terms of notation, we distinguish between the action strategy of player hi, ti, denoted by
t
gi , and the message strategy of player hi, ti, denoted by µti . Since we take the space of possible
messages that player hi, ti may receive to be H t , formally git is exactly the same object as in
the standard repeated game of Subsection 3.1 and the full memory dynastic repeated game
of Subsection 3.2 above. In particular git takes as input a message mti ∈ H t and a value xt ∈
X and returns a mixed strategy σit ∈ ∆(Ai ).
The message strategy µti of player hi, ti takes as inputs a message mti , the realization xt ,
the realized action profile at , the realized value y t , and returns the probability distribution φti
over messages mt+1
∈ H t+1 . In what follows, we will often write µti (mti , xt , at , y t ) to indicate
i
the (mixed) message φti ∈ ∆(H t+1 ) that player hi, ti sends player hi, t + 1i after observing the
quadruple (mti , xt , at , y t ).
In denoting profiles and sub-profiles of strategies we extend the notational conventions we
established for the standard repeated game and the full memory dynastic repeated game. In
other words we let gi denote the i-th dynasty profile (gi0 , gi1 , . . . , git , . . .), while g t will indicate
the time t profile (g1t , . . . , gnt ) and g the entire profile of action strategies (g1 , . . . , gn ). Similarly,
we set µi = (µ0i , µ1i , . . . , µti , . . .), as well as µt = (µt1 , . . . , µtn ) and µ = (µ1 , . . . , µn ). The pair
(g, µ) therefore entirely describes the behavior of all players in the dynastic repeated game
with private communication. Since no ambiguity will ensue, from now on we refer to this
game simply as the dynastic repeated game.
4.

Sequential Equilibrium

It is reasonably clear what one would mean by the statement that a pair (g, µ) constitutes a
Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (WPBE) of the dynastic repeated game described above.
However, it is clear that the off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs of the players may be crucial
in sustaining a given profile as a WPBE. To avoid “unreasonable” beliefs, the natural route
to take is to restrict attention further, to the set of Sequential Equilibria (henceforth SE) of
the model. This is a widely accepted benchmark, in which beliefs are restricted so as to be
consistent with a fully-fledged, common (across players) “theory of mistakes.” We return to
14
Notice that we are excluding the realized value of y t from the set of histories H t+1 , and hence from the
message space of player hi, ti. This is completely without loss of generality. All our results remain intact
if the set of messages available to each player hi, ti is augmented to include the realized values {y τ }tτ =0 . A
formal proof of this claim can be obtained as a minor adaptation of the proof of Lemma A.1 in the Appendix.
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a discussion of this point in Section 10 below.
The original definition of Sequential Equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982), of course, does
not readily apply to our dynastic repeated game since we have to deal with infinitely many
players.
As it turns out only a minor adaptation of the SE concept is needed to apply it to our
set-up. We spell this out in detail for the sake of completeness and because we believe it
makes the proofs of many of our results below considerably more transparent.
We begin with the observation that the beliefs of player hi, ti can in fact be boiled down to
a simpler object than one might expect at first sight, because of the structure of the dynastic
repeated game. Upon receiving message mti , in principle, we would have to define the beliefs
of player hi, ti over the entire set of possible past histories of play. However, since when player
hi, ti is born an entire cohort of new players replaces the t−1-th one, the real history leaves no
trace other than the messages (mt1 , . . . , mtn ) that have been sent to cohort t. It follows that,
without loss of generality, after player hi, ti receives message mti we can restrict attention to
his beliefs over the n − 1-tuple mt−i of messages received by other players in cohort t.15
Consider now the two classes of information sets at which player hi, ti is called upon to
play: the first defined by a pair (mti , xt ) when he has to select a mixed strategy σit , and the
second defined by a quadruple (mti , xt , at , y t ) when he has to select a probability distribution
φti over the set of messages H t+1 .
The same argument as above now suffices to show that at the (mti , xt ) information set we
can again restrict attention to he beliefs of player hi, ti over the n − 1-tuple mt−i of messages
received by other players in cohort t. Moreover, since all players observe the same xt and this
realization is independent of what happened in the past, player hi, ti beliefs over mt−i must
be the same as when he originally received message mti .
Finally, at the information set identified by the quadruple (mti , xt , at , y t ), we can restrict
attention to the beliefs of player hi, ti over the n − 1-tuple mt+1
−i of messages that the other
players in cohort t are about to send to cohort t + 1. Just as before, since all players are
replaced by a new cohort and time-t payoffs have already been realized, this is all that could
ever matter for the payoff to player hi, ti from this point on.
This discussion motivates the following definition.
Definition 1. System of Beliefs: A System of Beliefs Φ for the dynastic repeated game is an
tE
tB
array {ΦtB
i , Φi }t≥0,i∈I . Each of the elements Φi represents the beginning-of-period beliefs of
player hi, ti, while each of the ΦtE
i represents the end-of-period beliefs of the same player. We
15

It should be made clear that the beliefs of player hi, ti over mt−i will in fact depend on the relative
likelihoods of the actual histories of play that could generate different n − 1-tuples mt−i . What we are
asserting here is simply that once we know the player’s beliefs over mt−i , we have all that is necessary to
check that his behavior is optimal given his beliefs.
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t
t
write ΦtB
i (mi ) to indicate the probability distribution over n−1-tuples m−i that describes the
t
t t t
beliefs of player hi, ti after receiving mti . We write ΦtE
i (mi , x , a , y ) to indicate the probability
distribution over n − 1-tuples mt+1
−i that describes the beliefs of player hi, ti after observing
t
t t t
the quadruple (mi , x , a , y ).

During the proofs of our main results, we will also need to refer to the (revised) end-ofperiod beliefs of player hi, ti on the n − 1-tuple of messages mt−i after he observes not only
t
t t t
mti , but also (xt , at , y t ). These will be indicated by ΦtR
i (mi , x , a , y ).
For the sake of completeness again, we define the meaning of “completely mixed” strategies
for the game at hand.
Definition 2. Completely Mixed Strategies: A profile of strategies for the dynastic repeated
game (g, µ) is said to be completely mixed if and only if the following holds.
For every i ∈ I and every t ≥ 0, and for every mti ∈ H t and every xt ∈ X, the probability
distribution git (mti , xt ) assigns strictly positive probability to every action ai ∈ Ai .
For every i ∈ I and every t ≥ 0, and for every mti ∈ H t , every xt ∈ X, every at ∈ A, and
every y t ∈ Y , the probability distribution µti (mti , xt , at , y t ) assigns strictly positive probability
to every message mt+1
in H t+1 .
i
As is standard, the next step is to define “consistent” beliefs.
Definition 3. Consistent Beliefs: Let a strategy profile (g, µ) and a system of beliefs Φ for
the dynastic repeated game be given. The triple (g, µ, Φ) is referred to as an assessment.
We say that the assessment (g, µ, Φ) is consistent if and only if there exists a sequence
of completely mixed profiles {g(k), µ(k)}∞
k=1 with limk→∞ (g(k), µ(k)) = (g, µ), and limk→∞
Φ(k) = Φ, where Φ(k) is the system of beliefs obtained from the completely mixed profile
(g(k), µ(k)) using Bayes’ rule.
Finally, of course, an SE is just an assessment which is sequentially rational and consistent.
Definition 4. Sequential Equilibrium: An assessment (g, µ, Φ) constitutes a Sequential Equilibrium (SE) for the dynastic repeated game if and only if (g, µ, Φ) is consistent, and for
t
every i ∈ I and t ≥ 0 strategy git is optimal for player hi, ti given beliefs ΦtB
i , and strategy µi
is optimal for the same player given beliefs ΦtE
i .
We denote by G D (δ, x̃, ỹ) the set of SE strategy profiles, and by E D (δ, x̃, ỹ) the set of
SE payoff profiles of the dynastic repeated game when the correlation devices x̃ and ỹ are
S
available and common discount factor is δ. As previously, we let E D (δ) = x̃,ỹ E D (δ, x̃, ỹ),
with the union ranging over all possible pairs of finite random variables x̃ and ỹ.
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A Basic Inclusion

The first question we ask is whether all SPE of the standard repeated game survive as SE of
the dynastic repeated game. The answer is affirmative.
We pursue this question separately from our limiting (as δ → 1) Folk Theorems for the
dynastic repeated game presented below for several distinct reasons.
First of all Theorem 1 below does not require any assumptions on the stage game. Second,
it asserts that the SPE of the standard repeated game survive as SE of the dynastic repeated
game regardless of the discount factor δ. Third, Theorem 1 asserts that the actual strategies
that form an SPE in the standard game will be (the action component of) some SE of the
dynastic repeated game, thus going beyond any statement concerning equilibrium payoffs.
Theorem 1 also fulfils a useful expository function. Running through an intuitive outline
of its proof helps an initial acquaintance with some of the mechanics of the SE of the dynastic
repeated game. Before going any further, we proceed with a definition and a formal statement
of the result.
Definition 5. Truthful Message Strategies: A communication strategy µti for player hi, ti in
the dynastic repeated game is said to be truthful if and only if µti (mti , xt , at , y t ) = (mti , xt , at )
for all mti , xt , at and y t .16 The profile µ is called truthful if all its components µti are truthful.
Theorem 1. Basic Inclusion: Fix a δ, an x̃ and any profile g ∗ ∈ G S (δ, x̃). Then for every
finite random variable ỹ there exists a profile µ∗ of truthful message strategies such that
(g ∗ , µ∗ ) ∈ G D (δ, x̃, ỹ).
It follows that the set of SE payoffs for the dynastic repeated game contains the set of
SPE payoffs of the standard repeated game. In other words for every δ ∈ (0, 1) we have that
E S (δ) ⊆ E D (δ).
The argument we use to prove Theorem 1 in Appendix B is not hard to outline. Begin
with an action-stage strategy profile g ∗ ∈ G S (δ). Now consider a message-stage strategy
profile µ∗ that is “truthful” in the sense of Definition 5.
Now suppose that each player hi, ti, upon receiving any message mti , on or off the equilibrium path, believes that all other time-t players have received exactly the same message as
he has. Then it is not hard to see that since the action-stage strategy profile g ∗ is an SPE of
the standard repeated game, it will not be profitable for any player hi, ti to deviate from the
prescriptions of either git∗ or µt∗
i in the dynastic repeated game.
16

Notice that we are defining as truthful a message strategy that ignores the value of y t . This is consistent
with the fact that we are excluding the realizations of ỹ t from the set of possible messages. As we remarked
before, all our results would be unaffected if these were included in the players’ message spaces. See also
footnote 14 above.
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So, why should player hi, ti hold such beliefs in a Sequential Equilibrium? Suppose for
instance that player hi, ti receives a message that specifies a history of play that is “far away”
from the equilibrium path, say a node that requires 1, 000 past action-stage deviations to be
reached. Of course he needs to weigh the possibility that he really is at such node against,
for instance, the possibility that his immediate predecessor has deviated from µt−1∗
and has
i
sent him the message he observes, but no action-stage deviation has ever occurred.
In a Sequential Equilibrium, these relative likelihood considerations are embodied in the
sequence of completely mixed strategies that support the beliefs, in the limit, via Bayes’ rule.
The core of the argument behind Theorem 1 is to show that the sequence of completely mixed
strategies converging to the equilibrium strategies, can be constructed in such a way that the
likelihood of a single past deviation from equilibrium at the message stage compared to the
likelihood of all players in every previous cohort deviating at the action stage shrinks to zero
in the limit. Of course, there is more than one way to achieve this. Our argument in Appendix
B relies on “trembles” defining the completely mixed strategies with the following structure.
The probability of deviating at the message stage stays constant (at ε → 0) through time.
On the other hand, the order of the infinitesimal of the probability of n deviations at the
action stage decreases exponentially through time. In this way it is possible to ensure that
the probability that all players in every cohort deviate at the action stage shrinks to zero
faster than does the probability of a single-player deviation at the message stage. Hence, the
beliefs we have described above are consistent, and Theorem 1 follows.
6.

Three Dynasties or More

In this Section we present our first result asserting that the set of payoffs that are possible
in a SE of the dynastic game is larger than the set of SPE payoffs of the standard repeated
game, in the limit as δ approaches 1. The increase is in fact quite dramatic.
We postpone any further discussion and proceed with a formal statement of our next
result and a couple of remarks on its scope. The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix C.
Theorem 2. Dynastic Folk Theorem: Three Dynasties or More: Let any stage game G with
three or more players be given. Assume that G is such that we can find two pure action profiles
a∗ and a0 in A with
ui (a∗ ) > ui (a0 ) > ui (a∗i , a0−i )

∀i ∈ I

(5)

Then for every v ∈ intV there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that δ > δ implies v ∈ E D (δ).
Remark 2. Boundary Points: The statement of Theorem 2 is framed in terms of interior
payoff vectors v ∈ intV mostly to facilitate the comparison with the statement of Theorem 3
below dealing with the case of four dynasties or more.
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From the proof of Theorem 2 it is immediately apparent that a stronger statement is in
fact true. The condition that v ∈ intV can be replaced with the weaker requirement that v
is any weighted average of payoff vectors that are feasible in G, which gives strictly positive
weight to u(a∗ ). Clearly, depending on the position of u(a∗ ) within V this may include vectors
that are on the boundary of V .
Remark 3. Generalized Prisoners’ Dilemma: Whenever the stage game G is a version of
the n-player Prisoners Dilemma (with n ≥ 3), Theorem 2 guarantees that all interior feasible
payoff vectors can be sustained as an SE of the dynastic repeated game, provided that δ is
near 1.
To see this, observe that if we label Ci the “cooperate” action and Di the “defect” action
for player i, in an n-person Prisoners’ Dilemma we obviously have that ui (C) > ui (D) >
ui (Ci , D−i ) for every i ∈ I. Hence identifying a∗ and a0 of the statement of Theorem 2 with
the profiles C and D respectively, immediately yields the result.
Moreover, notice that Theorem 2 applies equally immediately to any stage game that is
“locally” like an n-person Prisoners’ Dilemma. In other words, the result applies to any stage
game G in which we can identify any pair of profiles C and D as above, regardless of how
many other actions may be available to any player, and of which payoff vectors they may
yield.
Before outlining the argument behind Theorem 2, it is necessary to clear-up a preliminary
issue that concerns both the proof of Theorem 2 and the proof of Theorem 3 below.
For simplicity, in both cases, we work with message spaces that are smaller than the
applicable set of finite histories H t . As Lemma A.1 demonstrates, enlarging message spaces
from the ones we use in these two proofs back to H t will not shrink the set of SE payoffs. This
is because we can “replicate” any SE of the dynastic repeated game with restricted message
spaces as an SE of the dynastic repeated game with larger message spaces by mapping each
message in the smaller set to a finite set of messages in the larger message space. A choice
of message in the smaller message space corresponds to a (uniform) randomization over the
entire corresponding set in the larger message space. A player receiving one of the randomized
messages in the larger message space acts just like the corresponding player who receives the
corresponding message in the smaller message set. It is then straightforward to check that the
new strategies constitute an SE of the dynastic repeated game with larger message spaces,
provided of course that we started off with an SE of the dynastic game with restricted message
spaces in the first place.
In the SE that we construct to prove Theorems 2 and 3, player hi, t − 1i may want to
communicate to player hi, ti that dynasty i is being punished for having deviated, but will be
unable to do so in an effective way. Given that in both cases we work with message spaces
that are smaller than H t , one may be tempted to conclude that this is due to the fact that
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player hi, t − 1i “lacks the message” to communicate effectively to his successor hi, ti that
he should respond in an appropriate way. This is misleading. When the message spaces
coincide with H t , it clearly cannot be that this inability to communicate is due to a shortage
of possible messages. Given the argument (the proof of Lemma A.1) that we sketch out above
the correct interpretation is that in equilibrium there is no message (in H t ) that player hi, ti
might possibly interpret in the way that hi, t − 1i would like.17
We are now ready for an actual outline of the proof of Theorem 2. The intuition can be
divided into two parts. First, we will argue that if δ is close to one, it is possible to sustain
the payoff vector u(a∗ ) as an SE of the dynastic repeated game using u(a0 ) as “punishment”
payoffs. Notice that u(a∗ ) could well already be below the minmax payoff for one or more
players. We call this the “local” part of the argument. Second, we will argue that via a
judicious use of the action-stage correlation device it is possible to go from the local argument
to a “global” one and sustain every feasible payoff vector as required by the statement of the
theorem.
Our construction relies on every player hi, ti having a message space with three elements.
So, set Mit = {m∗ , mA , mB } for every i and t. Notice also that the assumptions made in
Theorem 2 obviously guarantee that a∗i 6= a0i for every i ∈ I.
We begin with the local part of the argument. So, suppose that δ is close to one and that
we want to implement the payoff v = u(a∗ ) as an SE of the dynastic repeated game. The
strategy of every player hi, 0i at the action stage is to play a∗i . The strategy of each player
hi, ti with t ≥ 1 at the action stage is to play a∗i after receiving message m∗ and to play action
a0i after receiving message mA or message mB . If no player deviates from the prescriptions
of his equilibrium strategy at the action and message stages, then play follows a path that
involves the message profile (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) and the action profile a∗ in every period. Moreover,
even after deviations, if the message profile ever returns to being equal to (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ), then
the path of play returns to being as above. We call this the equilibrium phase.
Play starts in the equilibrium phase. Suppose now that some player deviates to playing
action a0i (deviations by two or more players are ignored). This triggers what we call the
temporary punishment phase. During the temporary punishment phase all players hi ∈ I, ti
condition the messages they send to their successors on the realization y t of the message-stage
correlation device. The message-stage correlation device takes value y(1) with probability γ(δ)
and value y(0) with probability 1 − γ(δ). If y t = y(1) then all players send message m∗ , and
hence play returns to the equilibrium phase. If on the other hand y t = y(0) then all players
send message mA , and play remains in the temporary punishment phase. That is all players
now play a0i , and continue to coordinate their messages as we just described. Play remains
17

At this point it is legitimate of course to wonder whether the concept of “neologism-proof” equilibrium
(Farrell 1993) has any impact on what we are saying here. The answer is that it simply does not apply. We
return to this point at some length in Section 10 below.
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Figure 1: Three Phases of Play
in the temporary punishment phase until the realization of the message-stage coordination
device is y(1), at which point play goes back to the equilibrium phase.
Any other deviation, taking place in either the equilibrium phase or in the temporary
punishment phase, triggers the permanent punishment phase. Suppose that any player hi, ti
deviates to playing any action ai different from both a∗i and a0i during the equilibrium phase
or that he deviates from playing a0i during the temporary punishment phase (deviations by
two pr more players are again ignored). Then all players hi ∈ I, ti send message mB to their
successors. From this point on the prescriptions of the equilibrium strategies are that all
subsequent players should send message mB , and that they should play action a0i . Figure 1
is a schematic depiction of the three phases of play we have outlined.
To check that the strategies we have described constitute an SE of the dynastic repeated
game, the players’ beliefs need to be specified. All players in the t = 0 cohort of course have
correct beliefs. All other players, after receiving message m∗ believe that all other players
have also received message m∗ with probability one. Similarly, after receiving message mA all
time-t ≥ 1 players believe that all other players have received message mA with probability
one. So, when play is either in the equilibrium phase all players believe that this is indeed
the case, and the same is true for the temporary punishment phase. Not surprisingly, it is
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possible to sustain these beliefs via a sequence of completely mixed strategies using Bayes’
rule, as required for an SE.
After receiving message mB all time-t ≥ 1 players have non-degenerate beliefs as follows.
With probability β(δ) they believe that play is in the equilibrium phase so that all other
players have in fact received message m∗ . With probability 1 − β(δ) they believe that play
is in the permanent punishment phase, so that all other players have received message mB .
So, when play is in the permanent punishment phase the players’ beliefs assign positive
probability to something that is in fact not taking place. Why is this possible in an SE? The
intuition is not hard to outline. Upon receiving message mB , player hi, ti needs to compare
two possibilities: am I receiving message mB because some action-deviations have occurred
that triggered the permanent punishment path, or is it simply the case that play is in the
equilibrium phase and my immediate predecessor has sent message mB when he should have
sent m∗ ? Clearly the answer depends on the probability of a message-deviation relative to the
probability of action-deviations that could have triggered the permanent punishment phase.
By a careful use of infinitesimals of different orders in the sequence of completely mixed
strategies, it is then possible to sustain the beliefs we have described via Bayes’ rule.
Given the beliefs we have specified, we can now argue that no player has an incentive do
deviate, either at the action or at the message stage, from the strategies we have described.
We distinguish again between the three phases of play identified above.
If play is in the equilibrium phase it is not hard to see that no player hi, ti has an incentive
to deviate. If he adheres to the equilibrium strategy, player hi, ti gets a payoff of ui (a∗ ). Since
δ is close to 1, and player hi, ti takes the strategies of all other players (including his successors)
as given, any deviation may produce an instantaneous gain, but will not increase the overall
payoff of player hi, ti.
If play is in the temporary punishment phase and player hi, ti does not deviate then
play will eventually go back to the equilibrium phase. Hence, since δ is close to one, the
dynastic payoff to player hi, ti in this case is close to (but below) ui (a∗ ). Therefore, the same
argument as for the equilibrium phase applies to show that he will not want to deviate during
the temporary punishment phase.
Suppose now that play is in the permanent punishment phase. Begin with the action
stage. Recall that at this point, that is after receiving message mB , player hi, ti has the
non-degenerate beliefs we described above giving positive probability to both the event that
play is the equilibrium phase and to the event that play is in the permanent punishment
phase.
If play were in the equilibrium phase, since δ is close to one, for an appropriate choice of
γ(δ), player hi, ti would prefer taking action a∗i to taking action a0i , and would prefer the latter
to taking any other action ai different from both a∗i and a0i . This is because his continuation
payoff (from the beginning of period t + 1 onwards) is highest in the equilibrium phase than
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in the temporary punishment phase, and lowest in the permanent punishment phase. Notice
that if γ(δ) were too close to one, then the continuation payoff in the equilibrium phase and
in the temporary punishment phase could be so close as to reverse (via an instantaneous gain
in period t from playing a0i ) the preference of player hi, ti between a∗i and a0i . On the other
hand if γ(δ) were too low, then the continuation payoff in the temporary punishment phase
and in the permanent punishment phase could be so close as to reverse (via an instantaneous
gain in period t from playing some action ai different from both a∗i and a0i ) the preference of
player hi, ti between a0i and some other action ai .
If play were in the permanent punishment phase then clearly player hi, ti would prefer
taking action a0i to taking action a∗i . This is simply because by assumption ui (a0 ) > ui (a∗i , a0−i ).
Of course, it is possible that some other action(s) ai would be preferable to a0i .
So, in one of two cases that player hi, ti entertains with positive probability after receiving
message mB action a∗i is preferable to action a0i which in turn is preferable to any other action,
while in the other case action a0i is preferable to a∗i , but some other action(s) may be preferable
to both. What is critical here is that there is no action (a∗i or any other one) that is preferable
to a0i with probability one. As it turns out, this is sufficient to show that for some value of
β(δ) action a0i is in fact optimal for player hi, ti. Therefore he does not want to deviate
from the equilibrium strategy we have described at the action stage during the permanent
punishment phase.
Finally, consider the choice of player hi, ti at the message stage when play is in the
permanent punishment phase. Notice that after receiving message mB , player hi, ti will
discover that play is in the permanent punishment phase during the action stage of period t.
This is so even if some other time-t player were to deviate from his prescribed action in period
t. The reason is our assumption that n ≥ 3. The fact that n − 2 or more players hj, ti play
a0j is sufficient to tell player hi, ti that play is in fact in the permanent punishment phase.18
Clearly, it is at this point that player hi, ti would like to “communicate effectively” to player
hi, t + 1i that play is in the permanent punishment phase but is unable to do so, as in our
discussion above concerning message spaces. In fact a0i could be very far from being a best
response from a0−i in the stage game.19 Yet, given the strategies of all other players, inducing
all his successors to play a myopic best-response to a0−i is simply not an option that is open
to player hi, ti even after he discovers that play is in the permanent punishment phase. Given
that, by assumption, ui (a0 ) > ui (a∗i , a0−i ) the best that player hi, ti can do at this point is to
18
If we had n = 2 players the following problem would arise with our construction. Suppose that each player
were to monitor the action of the other to decide whether play is in the equilibrium phase or in the permanent
punishment phase. Then, after receiving mB , say for instance player h1, 1i, could find it advantageous to play
a∗1 instead of a01 . This is because this deviation, together with player h1, 1i sending message m∗ , would put
the path of play back in the equilibrium phase with probability one.
19
Note that this would necessarily be the case if, for instance, ui (a∗ ) were below i’s minmax payoff in the
stage game.
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send message mB as required by his equilibrium strategy.
The argument we have just outlined suffices to show that the payoff vector u(a∗ ) can be
sustained as an SE of the dynastic repeated game. We now argue that this fact can be used
as a “local anchor” for our global argument that shows that any interior payoff vector can
be sustained as an SE. Fix any v ∗ ∈ intV to be sustained in equilibrium. Since v ∗ is interior
it is obvious that it can be expressed as v ∗ = qu(a∗ ) + (1 − q)v for some q ∈ (0, 1) and
some v ∈ V .20 The construction we put forward uses the payoffs v 0 = qu(a0 ) + (1 − q)v as
“punishments.” Clearly, vi∗ > vi0 for every i ∈ I.
We use the action stage correlation device to combine the local part of the argument with
the global one. The possible realizations of x̃t are (x(1), . . . , x(||A||)), with the probability
that x̃t = x(1) equal to q.21 Whenever the realization of x̃t is x(1), the action and message
strategies of all players are just as we described above. The action strategies of all players
do not depend on the message received whenever xt 6= x(1). Moreover, the probability law
governing x̃t and the action strategies of all players for the case xt 6= x(1) are such that the
per-period expected payoff (conditional on xt 6= x(1)) is vi for every i ∈ I. Whenever xt 6=
x(1), any deviation from the prescription of the equilibrium strategies triggers the permanent
punishment phase, as described above. It is not hard to verify that the latter is enough to
keep all players from deviating at any point.
One point that is worth emphasizing here is that, in contrast to what happens in the local
argument above, if play is in the permanent punishment phase, so that player hi, ti receives
message mB , and xt 6= x(1), then player hi, ti does not discover from at whether play is in
the equilibrium phase or in the permanent punishment phase. Both at the beginning and at
the end of period t he believes with probability β(δ) that play in is the equilibrium phase,
and with probability 1 − β(δ) that play is in the permanent punishment phase. However,
he does know that any deviation to an action different from the prescribed one will trigger
the permanent punishment phase for sure. Given that δ is close to one, he is then better-off
not deviating. This ensures that the first of his successors who observes a realization of the
action correlation device equal to x(1) will play action a0i , which is in fact optimal given the
beliefs that player hi, ti has.
7.

Four Dynasties or More

We now turn to the case in which the stage game G has four or more players. We need
to introduce some further notation to work towards our next main result. We begin by
constructing what we will refer to as the restricted correlated minmax.
Given a stage game G = (A, u, I), we indicate by Ã ⊆ A a typical set of pure action profiles
20
In fact, depending on the position of u(a∗ ) within V , we may be able to express some v ∗ vectors that are
on the boundary of V in this way as well. See Remark 2 above.
21
See Point of Notation A.1 for our (standard) use of ||·||.
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with a product structure. In other words, we require that there exist an array (Ã1 , . . . , Ãn )
with Ã = ×i∈I Ãi . Given a product set Ã, we let V (Ã) be the convex hull of the set of payoff
vectors that can be achieved in G using pure action profiles in Ã. As before, intV (Ã) will
denote the (relative) interior of V (Ã).
Definition 6. Restricted Correlated Minmax: Let a product set Ã ⊆ A be given. Now let
X
z−i (a−i ) ui (ai , a−i )
(6)
ω i (Ã) = min max
z−i ∈∆(Ã−i ) ai ∈Ãi

a−i ∈Ã−i

where z−i is any probability distribution over the finite set Ã−i (not necessarily the product
of independent marginals), and z−i (a−i ) denotes the probability that z−i assign to the profile
a−i .
We then say that ω i (Ã) is the restricted (to Ã) correlated minmax for i in G.
Roughly speaking, the restricted (to Ã) correlated minmax payoff for i is the best payoff
that i can achieve when he is restricted to choosing an element of Ãi , while all other players
are choosing a profile of correlated mixed strategies with support at most Ã−i .
Remark 4. Standard and Restricted Correlated Minmax: The restricted correlated minmax
of Definition 6 is a “stronger” concept than the standard minmax in the following sense.22
Given any G = (A, u, I), if we let the standard minmax payoff for i be denoted by v i we
obviously have that ω i (A) ≤ v i for every i ∈ I.
Of course, the relationship between the restricted correlated minmax and the standard
minmax also depends on the “size” of product set Ã relative to A. In particular, let two
product sets Ã and Ã0 be given. It is then straightforward to check that if Ã−i ⊆ Ã0−i and Ã0i
⊆ Ãi then ω i (Ã0 ) ≤ ω i (Ã). Therefore, in general, depending on Ã, the value of ω i (Ã) could
be below, equal or above v i .
We are now ready to state our next result. The proof of Theorem 3 is in Appendix D.
Theorem 3. Dynastic Folk Theorem: Four Dynasties or More: Let a stage game G with
four or more players be given. Assume that G is such that we can find a product set Ã
⊆ A and an array of n + 1 payoffs vectors v̂, v 1 , . . . , v n for which the following conditions
hold.
(i) For every i ∈ I, the set Ãi contains at least two elements.
(ii) v̂ ∈ intV (Ã), and v i ∈ V (Ã) for every i ∈ I.
(iii) ω i (Ã) < v ii < v ji and v ii < v̂i for every i ∈ I and every j 6= i.
Then for every v ∈ intV there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that δ > δ implies v ∈ E D (δ).
22

By the “standard minmax” for player i we mean v i = minσ−i ∈Πj6=i ∆(Aj ) maxai ∈Ai ui (ai , σ−i ), where
Πj6=i ∆(Aj ) is the set of (independent) mixed strategy profiles for −i.
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Before any discussion of the argument behind Theorem 3 we proceed with some remarks
concerning its scope.
Remark 5. Theorem 3 and the “Standard” Folk Theorem: Suppose that the stage game G
has four or more players. Suppose further that G is such that the standard Folk Theorem
(Fudenberg and Maskin 1986, Theorems 2 and 5) guarantees that, as δ approaches one,
the standard repeated game has at least one SPE payoff vector that strictly dominates the
standard minmax.23 Then Theorem 3 guarantees that, as δ approaches one, all (interior)
feasible payoff vectors can be sustained as an SE of the dynastic repeated game.
To see this, assume that V contains a payoff vector that yields all players more than their
(standard) minmax v i and that V has full dimension. Next, observe that, by Remark 4, if
we set Ã = A we know that ω i (A) ≤ v i for every i. Therefore, using the full-dimensionality
of V , it is straightforward to see that setting Ã = A all the hypotheses required by Theorem
3 are in fact satisfied.
Remark 6. Role of the Correlated Minmax: Because of the correlation built into the Restricted Correlated Minmax of Definition 6, depending on the stage game G, Theorem 3 may
imply that all (interior) feasible payoff vectors can be sustained as an SE of the dynastic
repeated game as δ goes to one, even when the standard Folk Theorem does not imply any
multiplicity of SPE payoffs.
To see this, consider a stage game G with four or more players, each with at least two pure
actions, and with V of full dimension. Recall that from Remark 4 we know that it is possible
that ω i (A) < v i . If the latter condition is satisfied for all players, it is clearly possible that
no payoff vector in V gives all players more than v i , but at the same time all the hypotheses
of Theorem 3 are in fact satisfied.24
Remark 7. Role of the Restricted Minmax: Because we can take the product set Ã to be a
strict subset of A, depending on the stage game G, Theorem 3 may imply that all (interior)
23

Notice that there is an open set of stage games for which the standard Folk Theorem does not imply
any multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs. To see this, consider, for instance, a game G in which every player
i has a strictly dominant strategy a∗i and such that the standard minmax value is ui (a∗ ) for every i ∈ I.
Clearly, these conditions can be satisfied even when u(a∗ ) is not (weakly) Pareto-dominated by any other
payoff vector in V . Moreover, if these conditions are satisfied, they are also satisfied for an entire open set of
games around G.
24
The example we provided in footnote 23 may prompt the following question. Is it the case that whenever
the standard Folk Theorem does not yield any payoff multiplicity it must necessarily be the case that every
player has a dominant strategy in G? The answer is no. This observation is relevant to the content of Remark
6. This is because if all players have a dominant strategy in G, then the correlated minmax ω i (A) is in fact
the same as the standard minmax v i for every i. Clearly, Remark 6 has real content only when G is such
that the standard Folk Theorem does not yield any payoff multiplicity and it is not the case that all players
have a dominant strategy.
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feasible payoff vectors can be sustained as an SE of the dynastic repeated game as δ goes to
one, even when the standard Folk Theorem does not imply any multiplicity.
To see this, notice that, as in Theorem 2, the necessary conditions listed in the statement
of Theorem 3 are “local.”
In other words, in view of Remark 4, it is clearly possible that no payoff vector in V gives
all players more than v i , but that by excluding one or more pure strategies for one or more
players we obtain a product set Ã for which conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 3 are in
fact satisfied.
Similarly to the case of Theorem 2, the construction we use to prove Theorem 3 relies on
message spaces that are smaller than the appropriate set of finite histories H t . Also similarly
to Theorem 2, it is convenient to divide the argument behind Theorem 3 into a local one and
a global one. As before, we begin with the local part of the argument.
Consider a product set Ã satisfying the hypotheses of Theorem 3. Let V (Ã) be the convex
hull of payoff vectors generated with action profiles in Ã. For simplicity, assume that the
payoff vectors v 1 , . . . , v n can all be obtained from some (pure) profile of actions in Ã. Also
for simplicity, assume that each of the payoffs ω i (Ã) can be obtained from some (pure) profile
of actions in Ã.25 The local part of the argument behind Theorem 3 shows that, for δ close
enough to one the payoff vector v̂ ∈ V (Ã) of the statement of the Theorem can be sustained
as an SE of the dynastic repeated game.
The equilibrium path generated by the strategies we construct consists of n + 1 phases.26
We call the first one the standard equilibrium phase, the second one the diversionary-1 equilibrium phase, through to the diversionary-n equilibrium phase.
If all players hi ∈ I, ti receive message m∗ then play is in the standard equilibrium phase.
For simplicity again we proceed with our outline of the construction assuming that the equilibrium prescribes that the players hi ∈ I, ti play a pure action profile during the standard
equilibrium phase, denoted by a0 . The associated payoff vector is v 0 .
If all players j 6= i in the t-th cohort receive message m̆i , and player hi, ti receives any
message mi,τ in a finite set M (i, t) = {mi,1 , . . . , mi,T } ⊂ Mit , then play is in the diversionary-i
phase.27 Let ai be the vector of actions (pure, for simplicity) for which i receives his restricted
25

Clearly, when ω i (Ã) is achieved via a pure action profile in Ã the restricted correlated minmax is the
same as the standard minmax restricted to Ã. It is still obviously the case that if Ã is a strict subset of A,
then it is possible that ω i (Ã) would be below the standard (unrestricted) minmax v i .
26
The actual proof of Theorem 3 presented in Appendix D actually treats period 0 differently from all
other periods. In period 0, on the equilibrium path the players use the action-stage correlation device to play
actions that yield exactly v̂. This payoff vector is achieved in expected terms on the equilibrium path by the
construction we outline here.
27
In the proof of Theorem 3 presented in Appendix D the set of messages M (i, t) actually does depend on
the time index t because not all messages are available for the first T periods of play. This is so in order to
avoid any message space Mit having a cardinality that exceeds that of H t .
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correlated minmax payoff ω i (Ã). During the diversionary-i equilibrium phase player hi, ti
plays action aii . For all players j 6= i, let ăij be any action in Ãj that is not equal to aij .
Such action can always be found since, by assumption, each Ãj contains at least two actions.
During the diversionary-i equilibrium phase, any player j 6= i plays action ăij . The (perperiod) payoff vector associated with the diversionary-i equilibrium phase is denoted by ŭi .
If in period t play is in any of the equilibrium phases we have just described, and no
deviation occurs at the action stage, at the end of period t all players use the realization y t
of the message-stage correlation device to select the message to send to their successors. The
possible realizations of ỹ t are (y(0), y(1), . . . , y(n)). The probability that y t = y(0) is 1 − η
and the probability that y t = y(i) is η/n for every i ∈ I. Consider now the end of any period
t in any equilibrium phase, and assume that no deviation has occurred. If y t = y(0) then all
players hi ∈ I, ti send message m∗ to their successors, so play in period t+1 is in the standard
equilibrium phase. If y t = y(i), then all players j 6= i send message m̆i to their successors
and player hi, ti sends a (randomly selected) message mi,τ ∈ M (i, t) to player hi, t + 1i. So,
in this case in period t + 1 play is in the diversionary-i equilibrium phase.
The profiles to be played in each diversionary-i equilibrium phase may of course be entirely
determined by the (the need to differ from the) correlated minmax action profiles, so we have
no degrees of freedom there. However, we are free to choose the profile a0 in constructing the
standard equilibrium phase. Recall that we take a0 to be pure solely for expositional simplicity.
Using the action-stage correlation device, clearly we could select correlated actions for the
standard equilibrium phase that yield any payoff vector v 0 in V (Ã). Since v̂ ∈ intV (Ã) we
can be sure that for some v 0 ∈ V (Ã) and some η ∈ (0, 1)
n
η X
v̂ = (1 − η)v +
ŭi
n i=1
0

(7)

So that (modulo our expositional assumption that v 0 = u(a0 )) when play is in any equilibrium
phase the expected (across all possible realizations of ỹ t ) continuation payoff to any player
hi, ti from the beginning of period t + 1 onward is v̂i .
The strategies we construct also define (off the equilibrium path) n punishment phases,
one for each i ∈ I and n terminal phases, again one for each dynasty i. In the punishment-i
phase, in every period player i receives his restricted correlated minmax payoff ω i (ã) payoff,
and the phase lasts T periods. In the terminal-i phase in every period the players receive
the vector of payoffs v i . The transition between any of the equilibrium phases and any of
the punishment or terminal phases is akin to the benchmark construction in Fudenberg and
Maskin (1986). In other words, a deviation by dynasty i during any of the equilibrium, any
of the punishment phases or any of the terminal phases triggers the start (or re-start) of the
punishment-i phase (deviations by two players or more are ignored). The terminal-i phase
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begins after play has been, without subsequent deviations, in the punishment-i phase for T
periods. For an appropriately chosen (large) T , as δ approaches 1, with one critical exception,
the inequalities in (iii) of the statement of Theorem 3 are used in much the same way as in
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) to guarantee that no player deviates from the prescriptions of
the equilibrium strategies.
In Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), during the punishment-i phase player i plays a myopic
best response to the actions of other players. Critically, this is not the case here. During
the punishment-i phase dynasty i plays a best response to the (correlated) strategy of others
restricted to the set of pure actions in Ãi . Clearly this could be very far away (in per-period
payoff terms) from an unconstrained best reply chosen at will within Ai . To understand how
this can happen in an SE we need to specify what message profiles mark the beginning of the
punishment-i phase and what the players’ beliefs are.
Suppose that player hi, ti deviates from the prescriptions of the equilibrium strategy and
triggers the start of the punishment-i phase as of the beginning of period t + 1. Then all
players hj ∈ I, ti send message mi,T to their successors. These messages are interpreted as
telling all players hj 6= i, t + 1i that the punishment-i phase has begun, and that there are T
periods remaining. We return to the beliefs of player hi, t + 1i shortly. In the following period
of the punishment-i phase all players hj ∈ I, t + 1i send message mi,T −1 , then mi,T −2 and so
on, so that the the index τ in a message mi,τ is effectively interpreted (by dynasties j 6= i) as
a “punishment clock,” counting down how many periods remain in the punishment-i phase.
The players’ beliefs in the SE we construct are “correct” in all phases of play except for the
beliefs of player hi, ti whenever play is in the punishment-i phase at time t. Upon receiving
any message mi,τ ∈ M (i, t), player hi, ti believes that play is in the i-diversionary equilibrium
phase with probability one. This is possible in an SE because player hi, ti receives the same
message in both cases and play is in the diversionary-i phase with positive probability on the
equilibrium path, while the punishment-i phase is entirely off the equilibrium path.
Notice moreover that if at time t play is in the punishment-i phase, after the profile at is
observed, player hi, ti will discover that play is in fact in the punishment-i phase, contrary to
his beginning-of-period beliefs, even if a new deviation occurs at the action stage of period
t. This is because, by construction, all players hj 6= i, ti play an action (namely ăij ) in the
diversionary-i equilibrium phase that is different from what they play in the punishment-i
phase (namely aij ). This, coupled with the assumption assumption that n ≥ 4 will ensure
that hi, ti will discover the truth, and the identity of any deviator.28
Therefore any player hi, ti who knows that in period t + 1 play will be in the punishment-i
phase would like would like to “communicate effectively” to player hi, t + 1i that play is in
28

Clearly, if hi, ti could not be guaranteed to discover that play is in the punishment-i phase, or the identity
of any deviator at time t, then we could not construct strategies that guarantee that if hj 6= i, ti deviates
during the punishment-i phase then play switches to the punishment-j phase, as required.
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the punishment-i phase but is unable to do so, as in our discussion above concerning message
spaces. After receiving mi,τ and discovering that play is in the punishment-i phase, sending
any message to player hi, t + 1i that is not mi,τ −1 may cause him, or some of his successors,
to deviate and hence to re-start the punishment-i phase. Sending mi,τ −1 will cause player
hi, t + 1i and his successors to play a best response among those that can be induced by
any available message. This is because aii is in fact a best response to the the correlated
minmax of the other players within the set Ãi . Therefore, given the inequalities in (iii) of the
statement of Theorem 3, given that T is sufficiently large, and that δ is close enough to one,
no profitable deviation is available to player hi, ti.
The argument we have just outlined suffices to show that the payoff vector v̂ of the
statement of the theorem can be sustained as an SE of the dynastic repeated game. Similarly
to Theorem 2, we now argue that this fact can be used as a “local anchor” for an argument
that shows that any interior payoff vector can be sustained as an SE.
Fix any v ∗ ∈ intV to be sustained in equilibrium. Since v ∗ is interior it is obvious that it
can be expressed as v ∗ = qv̂ + (1 − q)v 0 for some q ∈ (0, 1) and some v 0 ∈ V . The “global”
argument then consists of using the action-stage correlation device so that in each period
with probability q play proceeds as in the construction above, while with probability 1 − q
the (expected) payoff vector is v 0 . The latter is achieved with action-stage strategies that do
not depend on the messages received. A deviation by i from the (correlated) actions needed
to implement v 0 triggers the punishment-i phase. With one proviso to be discussed shortly,
it is not hard to then verify that this is sufficient to keep all players from deviating at any
point, and hence that v ∗ can be sustained as an SE payoff vector of the dynastic repeated
game for δ sufficiently close to one.
The difficulty with the global argument we have outlined that needs some attention is
easy to point out. The periods in which the action-stage correlation device tells the players
to implement the payoff vector v 0 cannot be counted as real punishment periods. They in fact
stochastically interlace all phases of play, including any punishment-i phase. However, the
length of effective punishment T has to be sufficiently large to deter deviations. The solution
we adopt is to ensure that the punishment clock does not decrease in any period in which
(with probability 1 − q) the payoff vector v 0 is implemented at the action stage. In effect,
this makes the length of any punishment-i phase stochastic, governed by a punishment clock
that counts down only with probability q in every period.
8.

Inter-Generational (Dis)Agreement

Some of the SE of the dynastic repeated game we have identified in Theorems 2 and 3 above
clearly do not correspond in any meaningful sense to any SPE of the standard repeated game.
This is obvious if we consider an SE of the dynastic repeated game in which one or more
players receive a payoff below their standard minmax value.
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An obvious question to raise at this point is then the following. What is it that makes
these SE viable? To put it another way, can we identify any properties of an SE of the
dynastic repeated game which ensure that it must correspond in a meaningful sense to an
SPE of the standard repeated game? The answer is yes, and this is what this section of the
paper is devoted to.
The critical properties of an SE that we identify concern the players’ beliefs. The first is
that a player’s (revised) beliefs at the end of the period over the messages received by other
players at the beginning of the period should be the same as at the beginning of the period.
This is equation (8) below. The second is that the end-of-period beliefs of a player (over
messages sent by his opponents) should be the same as the beginning-of-period beliefs of his
successor (over messages received by his opponents). This is equation (9) below. In fact we
will be able to show that if this property holds for all players (and all information sets) in
an SE of the dynastic repeated game, then this SE must be payoff-equivalent to some SPE
of the standard repeated game.29 For want of a better term, when an SE of the dynastic
repeated game has the two properties (of beliefs) that we just described informally, we will
say that it displays Inter-Generational Agreement.
Definition 7. Inter-Generational Agreement: Let an SE triple (g, µ, Φ) of the dynastic repeated game be given.
We say that this SE displays Inter-Generational Agreement if and only if for every i ∈ I,
t ≥ 0, mti ∈ H t , xt ∈ X, at ∈ A and y t ∈ Y we have that
t
t t t
tB
t
ΦtR
i (mi , x , a , y ) = Φi (mi )

(8)

and for every mt+1
in the support of µti (mti , xt , at , y t )
i
t+1B
t
t t t
ΦtE
(mt+1
i (mi , x , a , y ) = Φi
i )

(9)

We are now ready to state our last result.
Theorem 4. SE of the Dynastic and SPE of the Standard Repeated Game: Fix a stage game G, any δ ∈ (0, 1), and any x̃ and ỹ. Let (g, µ, Φ) be an SE of the dynastic repeated game.
Assume that this SE displays Inter-Generational Agreement as in Definition 7. Let v ∗ be the
vector of payoffs for this SE.
Then v ∗ ∈ E S (δ).
29

As will be clear from the proof of Theorem 4 we are able to show that there is an, appropriately defined,
strategic equivalence between such SE of the dynastic repeated game and the SPE of the standard repeated
game.
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The proof of Theorem 4 is in Appendix E. Before proceeding with an intuitive outline of
the proof, we state a remark on the implications of the theorem.
Clearly, Theorem 4 implies that if a payoff vector v ∈ E D (δ) is not sustainable as an SPE
so that v 6∈ E S (δ), then it must be the case that no SE which sustains v in the dynastic
repeated game displays Inter-Generational Agreement.
Remark 8. SE and SPE Payoffs: Observe that the SE that we construct in the proof of
Theorem 1 all in fact satisfy Inter-Generational Agreement. In other words, we know that if
a payoff vector v is in E S (δ) then there is an SE of the dynastic repeated game that displays
Inter-Generational Agreement which sustains v.
Together with Theorem 4, this gives us a complete characterization in payoff terms of the
relationship between the SE of the dynastic and the SPE of the standard repeated game as
follows.
Fix any stage game G and any δ ∈ (0, 1). Then a payoff vector v ∈ E D (δ) is in E D (δ)/E S (δ)
if and only if no SE which sustains v in the dynastic repeated game displays Inter-Generational
Agreement.
To streamline the exposition of the outline of the argument behind Theorem 4, make the
following two simplifying assumptions. First, assume that at the message stage the players
do not condition their behavior at the message-stage on the correlation device. The simplest
way to fix ideas here is to consider a message-stage correlation device with a singleton Y (the
set of possible realizations). Second, assume that all message-strategies µti are pure. In other
words, even though they may randomize at the action stage, all players at the message stage
send a single message, denoted µti (mti , xt , at ), with probability one.30
Now consider an SE (g, µ, Φ) of the dynastic repeated game that satisfies Inter-Generational Agreement as in Definition 7. Fix any history of play ht = (x0 , a0 , . . . , xt−1 , at−1 ).
For each dynasty i, using the message strategies of players hi, 0i through to hi, t − 1i, we can
now determine the message mti that player hi, t − 1i will send to his successor, player (i, t).
Denote this message by mti (ht ). Notice that mti (ht ) can be determined simply by recursing
forward from period 0. Recall that at the beginning of period 0 all players hi ∈ I, 0i receive
message m0i = ∅. Therefore, given h1 = (x0 , a0 ), using µ0i , we know m1i (h1 ). Now using µ1i we
can compute m2i (h2 ) = µ1i (m1i (h1 ), x1 , a1 ), and so recursing forward the value of mti (ht ) can
be worked out.
Because the SE (g, µ, Φ) satisfies Inter-Generational Agreement it must be the case that,
after any actual history of play (on or off the equilibrium path) ht , and therefore after receiving
message mti (ht ), player hi, ti believes that his opponents have received messages (mt1 (ht ), . . . ,
mti−1 (ht ), . . . , mtn (ht )) with probability one.
30

Note that we are somewhat abusing notation here. In general, we denote by µti (mti , xt , at ) a probability
distribution over the available messages Mit+1 . See our Point of Notation A.6 below.
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To see why this is the case, we can recurse forward from period 0 again. Consider the end
of period 0. Since all players in the t = 0 cohort receive message ∅, after observing (x0 , a0 ),
player hi, 0i knows that any player hj 6= i, 0i is sending message m1j (x0 , a0 ) = µ0j (∅, x0 , a0 ) to
his successor player hj, 1i.
Equation (9) of Definition 7 guarantees that the beginning-of-period beliefs of player hi, 1i
must be the same as the end-of-period beliefs of player hi, 0i. So, at the beginning of period
1, player hi, 1i believes with probability one that every player hj 6= i, 1i has received message
m1j (x0 , a0 ) as above.
Equation (8) of Definition 7 guarantees that player hi, 1i will not revise his beginningof-period beliefs during period 1. Therefore, after observing any (x1 , a1 ), player hi, 1i still
believes that every player hj 6= i, 1i has received message m1j (x0 , a0 ) as above. But this,
via the message strategies µ1j implies that player hi, 1i must believe with probability one
that every player hj, 1i sends message m2j (h2 ) = m2j (x0 , a0 , x1 , a1 ) = µ1j (m1j (h1 ), x1 , a1 ) to his
successor hj, 2i. Continuing forward in this way until period t we can then see that the
beginning-of-period beliefs of player hi, ti are as we claimed above.
Before we proceed to close the argument for Theorem 4, notice that both conditions
of Definition 7 are necessary for our argument so far to be valid. Intuitively, the forward
recursion argument we have outlined essentially ensures that the “correct” (because all its
members receive a given message m0i = ∅) beliefs of the first cohort “propagate forward” as
follows. At the beginning of period t = 1 each player hi ∈ I, 1i must have correct beliefs
since the end-of-period beliefs of all players in period 0 are trivially correct, and equation (9)
of Definition 7 tells us that the end-of-period beliefs must be the same as the beginning-ofperiods beliefs of the next cohort. Now some pair (x1 , a1 ) is observed by all players hi ∈ I, 1i.
If this pair is consistent with their beginning-of-period beliefs, then clearly no player hi ∈ I, 1i
can possibly revise his beliefs on the messages received by others at the beginning of period
1. However, if (x1 , a1 ) is not consistent with the beliefs of players hi ∈ I, 1i and their action
strategies, some players in the t = 1 cohort may be “tempted” to revise their beginning-ofperiod beliefs. This is because an observed “deviation” from what they expect to observe in
period 1 can always be attributed to two distinct sources. It could be generated by an actual
deviation at action stage of period 1, or it could be the result of one (or more) players in the
t = 0 cohort having deviated at the message stage of period 0. Equation (8) of Definition
7 essentially requires that the t = 1 players should always interpret an “unexpected” pair
(x1 , a1 ) as an actual deviation at the action stage. The same applies to all subsequent
periods. So, while equation (9) of Definition 7 ensures that the initially correct beliefs are
passed on from one generation to the next, equation (8) of Definition 7 guarantees that actual
deviations will be treated as such in the beliefs of players who observe them. The beliefs of
players hi ∈ I, 0i are correct and the end-of-period beliefs of any cohort are guaranteed to
be the same as the beginning-of-period beliefs of the next cohort by equation (9). However,
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without equation (8) following an action deviation deviation from the equilibrium path the
end-of-periods beliefs of some players hi, ti could be incorrect, and be passed on to the next
cohort intact.
Now recall that the punch-line of the forward recursion argument we have outlined is that
if the SE (g, µ, Φ) satisfies Inter-Generational Agreement then we know that after any actual
history of play ht , player hi, ti believes that his opponents have received messages (mt1 (ht ), . . . ,
mti−1 (ht ), mti+1 (ht ), . . . , mtn (ht )) with probability one. To see how we can construct an SPE of
the standard repeated game that is equivalent to the given SE, consider the strategies git∗ for
the standard repeated game defined as git∗ (ht , xt ) = git (mi (ht ), xt ). Clearly, these strategies
implement the same payoff vector that is obtained in the given SE of the dynastic repeated
game. Now suppose that the strategy profile g ∗ we have just constructed is not an SPE of
the standard repeated game. Then, by the one-shot deviation principle (Remark 1 above) we
know that some player i in the standard repeated game would have an incentive do deviate
in a single period t after some history of play ht . However, given the property of beliefs in the
SE (g, µ, Φ) with Inter-Generational Agreement that we have shown above, this implies that
player hi, ti would have an incentive to deviate at the action stage in the dynastic repeated
game. This of course contradicts the fact that (g, µ, Φ) is an SE of the dynastic repeated
game. Hence the argument is complete. The proof of Theorem 4 that appears in Appendix E
of course does not rely on the two simplifying assumptions we made here. However, modulo
some additional notation and technical issues, the argument presented there runs along the
same lines as the sketch we have given here.
9.

Relation to the Literature

The infinitely repeated game model is a widely used construct in economics. Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986), Aumann (1981), and Pearce (1992) are all standard references for the
benchmark model.31 The prevailing view is that this benchmark model, which consists of a
repeated stage game played by infinitely lived agents with perfect monitoring, is outcomeequivalent to a dynastic model in which short-lived individuals are replaced by their heirs in
the game.
In one formal sense, this view is correct: when it is assumed that all individuals have
full and direct knowledge of the past history of play, the two models are outcome-equivalent
in subgame perfect equilibria. However, some recent work challenges the underlying “full
memory” assumption. This literature argues that any literal interpretation of dynastic players
entails that new entrants do not typically have direct memory of play prior to their entry. The
question posed then is: to what extent can intergenerational communication substitute for
memory? Recent papers by Anderlini and Lagunoff (2004), Kobayashi (2003), and Lagunoff
and Matsui (2004) all posit dynastic game models to address this question.
31

Pearce (1992) is also an excellent source for further references.
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Among these, Anderlini and Lagunoff (2004) is the closest and, in many ways, the most
direct predecessor of the current paper. Anderlini and Lagunoff (2004) examines this dynastic
model when each player hi, ti receives a public messages from the player hj ∈ I, t − 1i about
the previous history of play. If the public messages from all player in the previous cohort
are simultaneous, then a Folk Theorem in the sense of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) can be
obtained. Namely, if there are three or more players, all individually rational feasible payoffs
can be sustained in Sequential Equilibrium. Intuitively, this is because a version of a well
known “cross-checking” argument that goes back to Maskin (1999) can be applied in this
case.32 By contrast, the present paper studies the model in which private communication
(within each dynasty) may occur. We show that the difference between purely public and
possible private communication is potentially large. Equilibria that sustain payoffs below
some dynasty’s minmax exist, but they require inter-generational “disagreement.”
Kobayashi (2003) and Lagunoff and Matsui (2004) examine dynastic OLG games. As
in Anderlini and Lagunoff (2004), these models assume entrants have no prior memory, and
they also allow for communication across generations. Though substantive differences exist
between each of the models, they both prove standard (for OLG games) Folk Theorems.33
Interestingly, both Folk Theorems make use of intra-generational disagreement of beliefs in
the equilibrium continuations following deviations. Nevertheless, the constructed equilibria
in both papers leave no room for inter-generational disagreement at the message stage.34
The role of public messages has been studied in other repeated game contexts such as
in games with private monitoring. Models of Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996), Compte
(1998), and Kandori and Matsushima (1998) all examine communication in repeated games
when players receive private signals of others’ past behavior. As in Anderlini and Lagunoff
(2004), these papers exploit cross-checking arguments to sustain the truthful revelation of
one’s private signal in each stage of the repeated game.
Recent works by Schotter and Sopher (2001a), Schotter and Sopher (2001b), and Chaudhuri, Schotter, and Sopher (2001) examine the role of communication in an experimental
dynastic environment. These papers set up laboratory experiments designed to mimic the
dynastic game. The general conclusion seems to be that the presence of private communication has a significant (if puzzling) effect, even in the full memory game.
32

Baliga, Corchon, and Sjostrom (1997) use a similar type of mechanism in another model of communication
when there are three or more players.
33
Bhaskar (1998) examines a related OLG model with very little, albeit some, direct memory by entrants.
He shows that very limited memory is enough to sustain optimal transfers in a 2-period consumption-loan
smoothing OLG game.
34
In the dynastic model in Lagunoff and Matsui (2004) messages are public as in Anderlini and Lagunoff
(2004). In the Kobayashi (2003) model private messages are admissible, but because that model admits
overlapping structure within, as well as across, dynastic units, in any equilibrium continuation, messages are
correctly interpreted by the subsequent cohort.
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It is also worth noting the similarity between the present model and games with imperfect
recall.35 Each dynastic player could be viewed as an infinitely lived player with imperfect
recall (e.g., the “absent-minded driver” with “multiple selves” in Piccione and Rubinstein
(1993)) who can write messages to his future self at the end of each period.
By contrast, the present model is distinguishable from dynamic models that create memory from a tangible “piece” of history. For instance, Anderlini and Lagunoff (2004) extend
the analysis to the case where history may leave “footprint,” i.e, hard evidence of the past
history of play. In another instance, memory may be created from a tangible but intrinsically worthless asset such as fiat money. A number of contributions in monetary theory
(e.g., Kocherlakota (1998), Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998), Wallace (2001), and Corbae,
Temzelides, and Wright (2001)) have all shown, to varying degrees, the substitutability of
money for memory. In each case, it is clear that inter-generational disagreement of beliefs
that contradicts hard evidence cannot occur.
10.

Concluding Remarks

We began by arguing that the literal interpretation of an infinitely repeated game stretches the
limits of plausibility, and hence that a closer investigation of the dynastic “equivalent” is worth
pursuing. However, once we remove the assumption that players in a dynastic repeated game
observe the history of play that takes place before they are born, the equivalence between
these two models ceases to hold.
We posit a dynastic repeated game populated by one-period-lived individuals who rely
on private messages from their predecessors to fathom the past. The set of equilibrium
payoffs expands dramatically relative to the corresponding standard repeated game. Under
extremely mild conditions, as the dynastic players care more and more about the payoffs of
their successors, all interior payoff vectors that are feasible in the stage game are sustainable
in an SE of the dynastic repeated game.
We are able to characterize entirely, via a property of the players’ beliefs, when an SE
of the dynastic repeated game can yield a payoff vector not sustainable as an SPE of the
standard repeated game: the SE in question must display a failure of what we have termed
Inter-Generational Agreement.
It is natural to ask why we focus on Sequential Equilibria as opposed to other solution
concepts. The answer it two-fold. First the concept of SE is an extremely widely accepted
and used benchmark in the literature. Hence it seems an appropriate point to start. Second,
the surprising features of some of the equilibria of our dynastic repeated game arise from
a failure of Inter-Generational Agreement. Broadly speaking, failures of Inter-Generational
Agreement can be traced back to the fact that, upon receiving an unexpected private message
35

See the Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior (1997) on Games with Imperfect Recall for
extensive references.
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from his predecessor, a player always has to weigh two sets of possibilities. The message he
observes could have been generated by a deviation at the action stage, or it could have been
generated by a deviation at the message stage. The concept of an SE requires all players to
have a complete (and common across players) theory of the mistakes that might have caused
deviations from equilibrium. Therefore, it seems like a prime candidate to require that the
players’ beliefs should be plausible in an intuitive sense in the dynastic repeated game we
analyze.
We leave the analysis of the impact of further equilibrium refinements on the set of
equilibria of the dynastic repeated game for possible future research. However, it is important
to comment here on the relationship between our results and the idea of “neologism-proofness”
that has been put forth in the literature (Farrell 1993, Mattehws, Okuno-Fujiwara, and
Postlewaite 1991, among others). As we mentioned above, at least in its current form,
neologism-proofness simply does not apply to our framework. The reason is simple. Roughly
speaking, neologism-proofness builds into the solution concept the idea that in a senderreceiver game, provided the appropriate incentive-compatibility constraints are satisfied, a
player’s exogenous type (in the standard sense of a “payoff type”) will be able to create
a “neologism” (use an hitherto unused message) to distinguish himself from other types.
The point is that in our dynastic game there are no payoff types for any of the players. It
would therefore be impossible to satisfy any form of incentive-compatibility constraints. The
different “types” of each player in our dynastic repeated game are only distinguished by
their beliefs, which in turn are determined by equilibrium strategies together with a complete
theory of mistakes as in any SE. To see how slippery the logic of neologism-proofness can
become in our context, consider for instance the construction we use to prove Theorem 2
above. Suppose that some player hi, ti deviates so as to trigger the permanent punishment
phase against dynasty i. At the end of period t player hi, ti would like to communicate to
player hi, t + 1i that play is in the permanent punishment phase so that dynasty i can play
a myopic best response to the actions of others from t + 1 onwards. For a “neologism” to
work at this point player hi, t + 1i would have to believe it. He would have to believe what
player hi, ti is saying: I have deviated, therefore respond appropriately; you should believe
me because I am rational (there are no exogenous types to which hi, ti can appeal in his
“speech”). However, the very fact that hi, ti has deviated is an indication that he is not
rational given the original SE strategies. In the SE we construct above, player hi, t + 1i trusts
his complete theory of mistakes more than the “speech” of player hi, ti. This, as we described
above, tells him to believe with positive probability that play is in fact in the equilibrium
phase.
While our results apply only to the actual formal model we have set forth, it is natural
to ask which ones are essential and which ones are not. We have several remarks to make.
As we noted already, the absence of public messages alongside private ones is completely
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inessential to what we do here. Public messages could be added to our model without altering
our results. It is always possible to replicate the SE of this model in another model with public
messages as well; the public messages would be ignored by the players’ equilibrium strategies
and beliefs.
We make explicit use of correlation devices both at the action and at the message stage
of the dynastic repeated game. While the use of two separate devices is not essential for our
results (see footnote 11 above), the use of some correlation device is. This is contrast with the
arguments in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). In the standard repeated game, all individually
rational payoffs can be approximately sustained as SPE even without a correlation device.
The equilibrium path can be constructed so that, as the discount factor approaches one, “time
averaging” across different pure action profiles in each period can (approximately) substitute
for a correlation device. By contrast, in our constructions the correlation device is essential
to merge the “local” part of the argument with the “global” one. We have examples showing
that even without any correlation devices it is possible to display SE that push one or more
dynasties below their minmax value. A full characterization of the set of SE payoffs in this
case is an open question at this point.
We have stipulated a very specific set of “demographics” for our dynastic repeated game:
all players live one period and are replaced by their successor at the end of their lives. We
believe that this is not essential to the qualitative nature of our results, although some features
of the demographic structure of the model play an important role. We conjecture that results
similar to ours would hold in a dynastic repeated game in which all players are simultaneously
replaced by their successors in the same dynasty with positive probability, thus ensuring that
looking forward from any point in time total replacement happens with probability one at
some future date.
The actual history of play leaves no visible trace in our model. To what extent would our
results change if a (noisy or incomplete, or both) “footprint” of the past history of play were
available to the players? Intuitively this would make failures of Inter-Generational Agreement
harder to generate in equilibrium. Does the set of equilibria of the dynastic repeated game
shrink as the direct information about the past history of play that is available to the players
becomes more and more precise? While it seems plausible to conjecture that our results
would change across this range of possibilities, we have no option but to say that the topic
is worthy of future research.
Our Folk Theorems for the dynastic repeated game assume three or more dynasties in one
case, and four or more in another. Is this essential to our results? (It clearly is essential to our
construction in both cases.) It is not hard to construct examples of dynastic repeated games
with two dynasties that admit SE in which the players’ payoffs are below their minmax in the
stage game. Thus, it seems that there is no definite need to have more than two dynasties
to generate SE payoffs in the dynastic repeated game that are not sustainable as SPE of the
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corresponding standard repeated game. Whether and under what conditions a Folk Theorem
like the ones presented here is available for the case of two dynasties is an open question. We
leave the characterization of the equilibrium set in this case for future work.
Lastly, our Folk Theorems for the dynastic repeated game show that, as δ approaches one,
the set of SE payoffs includes “worse” vectors that push some (or even all) players below their
minmax payoffs in the stage game. We do not have a full characterization of the SE payoffs
for the dynastic repeated game when δ is bounded away from one. However, it is possible to
construct examples showing that the set of SE payoffs includes vectors that Pareto-dominate
those on the Pareto-frontier of the set of SPE payoffs in the standard repeated game when δ is
bounded away from one. Intuitively, this is because some “bad” payoff vectors (pushing some
players below the minmax) are sustainable in an SE when δ is bounded away from one. Thus,
“harsher” punishments are available as continuation payoffs in the dynastic repeated game
than in the standard repeated game. Using these punishments, higher payoffs are sustainable
in equilibrium in the dynastic repeated game.
Appendix A: Preliminaries
To ease the burden, we have divided the material that follows into five appendices. This one is devoted to
some preliminaries that are used later on. Each of the next four contains the proof of one of our main results.
A.1.

Notation

Point of Notation A.1: We adopt the standard notational convention by which ||·|| denotes the cardinality
of a set. Given any finite set, we denote by by ν(·) the uniform probability distribution over the set. So, if Z is
a finite set, ν(Z) assigns probability 1/ ||Z|| to every element of Z. Finally, given any probability distribution
P, we denote by Supp (P) the support of P.
Point of Notation A.2: Given a stage game G, for any i ∈ I we let
ui = min ui (a)

(A.1)

ui = max ui (a)

(A.2)

a∈A

and
a∈A

Point of Notation A.3: Abusing the notation we established for the standard repeated game, we adopt
the following notation for continuation payoffs in the dynastic repeated game. Let an assessment (g, µ, Φ) be
given.
We let vit (g, µ|mti , xt , ΦtB
i ) denote the continuation payoff to player hi, ti given the profile (g, µ), after he
has received message mti has observed the realization xt , and given that his beliefs over the n − 1-tuple mt−i
are given by ΦtB
i . In view of our discussion at the beginning of Section 4, it is clear that the only component of
the system of beliefs Φ that is relevant to define this continuation payoff is in fact ΦtB
i . In fact, our discussion
there also implies that the argument mti is in fact redundant once ΦtB
has
been
specified.
We keep it in our
i
notation since it helps streamline some of the arguments below.
We let vit (g, µ|mti , xt , at , y t , ΦtE
i ) denote the continuation payoff (viewed from the beginning of period
t + 1) to player hi, ti given the profile (g, µ), after he has received message mti , has observed the triple
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tE
(xt , at , y t ), and given that his beliefs over the n − 1-tuple mt+1
−i are given by Φi . In view of our discussion
tE
at the beginning of Section 4, it is clear that once Φi has been specified, the arguments (mti , xt , at , y t ) are
redundant in determining the end-of-period continuation payoff to player hi, ti. Whenever this does not cause
t
tE
t
t
t t t
tE
any ambiguity (about ΦtE
i ) we will write vi (g, µ|Φi ) instead of vi (g, µ|mi , x , a , y , Φi ).
As we noted in the text all continuation payoffs clearly depend on δ as well. To keep notation down this
dependence will be omitted whenever possible.
tE
tR
Point of Notation A.4: We will abuse our notation for ΦtB
i , Φi and Φi slightly in the following way.
tE
tR
We will allow events of interest and conditioning events to appear as arguments of ΦtB
i , Φi and Φi , to
indicate their probabilities under these distributions.
t
t
So, for instance when we write ΦtB
i (m−i = (z, . . . , z)|mi ) = c we mean that according to the beginning-ofperiod beliefs of player hi, ti, after observing mti , the probability that mt−i is equal to the n − 1-tuple (z, . . . , z)
is equal to c.

Point of Notation A.5: Whenever the profile (g, µ) is a profile of completely mixed strategies as in DefitE
tR
nition 2, the distributions ΦtB
i , Φi and Φi are of course entirely determined by what player hi, ti observes
and by (g, µ) using Bayes’ rule. In this case, we will allow the pair (g, µ) to appear as a “conditioning event.”
t
t
So, for instance, ΦtB
i (mi | g, µ) is the the probability distribution over possible n − 1-tuples m−i that
t
describes the beliefs of player hi, ti after receiving mi , obtained from the completely mixed profile (g, µ) via
Bayes’ rule. Events may appear as arguments in this case as well, consistently with our Point of Notation
A.4 above.
Moreover, since the completely mixed pair (g, µ) determines the probabilities of all events, concerning
for instance histories, messages of previous cohorts and the like, we will use the notation Pr to indicate such
probabilities, using the pair (g, µ) as a conditioning event.
So, given any two events L and J, the notation Pr(L|J, g, µ) will indicate the probability of event L,
conditional on event J, as determined by the completely mixed pair (g, µ) via Bayes’ rule.
Point of Notation A.6: Recall that for every player hi, ti, both git (mti , xt ) and µti (mti , xt , at , y t ) denote
probability distributions (over actions and messages respectively).
Often, we will construct strategies in which a single action is played with probability one and/or a single
message is sent with probability one. We will abuse notation slightly and we will write git (mti , xt ) = ai to
mean that the distribution git (mti , xt ) assigns probability one to ai . Similarly, we will write µti (mti , xt , at , y t )
= mt+1
to mean that the distribution µti (mti , xt , at , y t ) assigns probability one to mt+1
.
i
i
A.2.

Definitions and Preliminary Results

Definition A.1: Consider the dynastic repeated game described in full in Section 3. Now consider the
dynastic repeated game obtained from this when we restrict the message space of player hi, ti to be Mit+1 ⊆
H t+1 , with all other details unchanged.
We call this the restricted dynastic repeated game with message spaces {Mit }i∈I,t≥1 . For any given
δ ∈ (0, 1), x̃ and ỹ, we denote by G D (δ, x̃, ỹ, {Mit }i∈I,t≥1 ) the set of SE strategy profiles, while we write
E D (δ, x̃, ỹ, {Mit }i∈I,t≥1 ) for the set of SE payoff profiles of this dynastic repeated game with restricted message
spaces.
Lemma A.1: Let any δ ∈ (0, 1), x̃ and ỹ be given. Consider now any restricted dynastic repeated game
with message spaces {Mit }i∈I,t≥1 . Then E D (δ, x̃, ỹ, {Mit }i∈I,t≥1 ) ⊆ E D (δ, x̃, ỹ).
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Proof: Let a profile (g ∗ , µ∗ ) ∈ G D (δ, x̃, ỹ, {Mit }i∈I,t≥1 ) with associated beliefs Φ∗ be given. To prove the
statement, we proceed to construct a new profile (g ∗∗ , µ∗∗ ) ∈ G D (δ, x̃, ỹ) and associated beliefs Φ∗∗ that are
consistent with (g ∗∗ , µ∗∗ ), and which gives every player the same payoff as (g ∗ , µ∗ ).
Denote a generic element of Mit by zit . Since Mit ⊆ H t , we can partition H t into ||Mit || non-empty mutually
exclusive exhaustive subsets, and make each of these subsets correspond to an element zit of Mit . In other
t
t
Ht
t t
t
t
t t0
t t00
words, we can find
S a map tρi : Mi t → 2 such that ρi (zi ) 6= ∅ for all zi ∈ Mi , ρi (zi ) ∩ ρi (zi ) = ∅ whenever
t0
t00
zi 6= zi , and zt ∈M t ρ(zi ) = H .
i
i
We can now describe how the profile (g ∗∗ , µ∗∗ ) is obtained from the given (g ∗ , µ∗ ). We deal first with the
action stage. For any player hi, ti, and any zit ∈ Mit , set
git∗∗ (mti , x) = git∗ (zit , x) ∀ mti ∈ ρti (zit )

(A.3)

t
At the message stage, for any player hi, ti, any (zit , xt , at , y t ), any mti ∈ ρti (zit ), and any zit+1 ∈ Supp(µt∗
i (zi ,
t
t t
x , a , y )), set

1
t+1 t
µt∗
|zi , xt , at , y t ) ∀ mt+1
∈ ρt+1
(zit+1 )
i (zi
i
i
t+1
ρt+1
(z
)
i
i

t+1
µt∗∗
|mti , xt , at , y t ) =
i (mi

(A.4)

Next, we describe Φ∗∗ , starting with the beginning-of-period beliefs. For any player hi, ti, any zit ∈ Mit
t
t
and any z−i
∈ M−i
, set
ΦtB∗∗
(mt−i |mti ) =
i

t
ΦtB∗
(z−i
|zit )
i
Πj6=i ρtj (zjt )

t
∀ mti ∈ ρti (zit ), ∀ mt−i ∈ ρt−i (z−i
)

(A.5)

t+1
t+1
Similarly, concerning the end-of-period beliefs, for any player hi, ti, any (zit , xt , at , y t ) and any z−i
∈ M−i
,
set
t
t t t
ΦitE∗∗ (mt+1
−i |mi , x , a , y ) =
t+1 t
ΦtE∗
(z−i
|zi , xt , at , y t )
i
t+1
Πj6=i ρt+1
)
j (zj

(A.6)
t+1 t+1
∀ mti ∈ ρti (zit ), ∀ mt+1
−i ∈ ρ−i (z−i )

Since the profile (g ∗ , µ∗ ) is sequentially rational given Φ∗ , it is immediate from (A.3), (A.4), (A.5) and
(A.6) that the profile (g ∗∗ , µ∗∗ ) is sequentially rational given Φ∗∗ , and we omit further details of the proof of
this claim.
Of course, it remains to show that (g ∗∗ , µ∗∗ , Φ∗∗ ) is a consistent assessment.
Let (gε∗ , µ∗ε ) be parameterized completely mixed strategies which converge to (g ∗ , µ∗ ) and give rise, in the
limit as ε → 0 to beliefs Φ∗ via Bayes’ rule.
∗
∗
Given any ε > 0, let (gε∗∗ , µ∗∗
ε ) be a profile of completely mixed strategies obtained from (gε , µε ) exactly
as in (A.3) and (A.4).
We start by verifying the consistency of the beginning-of-period beliefs. Observe that for any given z t =
t t
(zi , z−i ), from (A.4) we know that whenever mt = (mti , mt−i ) ∈ ρt (z t )
Pr(mti , mt−i |gε∗∗ , µ∗∗
ε )=

t
Pr(zit , z−i
|gε∗ , µ∗ε )
Πj∈I ρtj (zjt )

(A.7)

Similarly, using (A.4) again we know that whenever mti ∈ ρti (zit )
Pr(mti |gε∗∗ , µ∗∗
ε )=

Pr(zit |gε∗ , µ∗ε )
||ρti (zit )||

(A.8)
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Taking the ratio of (A.7) and (A.8) and taking the limit as ε → 0 now yields that for any any zit ∈ Mit and
t
t
any z−i
∈ M−i
lim ΦtB∗∗
(mt−i |mti , gε∗∗ , µ∗∗
i
ε )=

ε→0

t
ΦtB∗
(z−i
|zit )
i
Πj6=i ρtj (zjt )

t
∀ mti ∈ ρti (zit ), ∀ mt−i ∈ ρt−i (z−i
)

(A.9)

Hence we have shown that the beginning-of-period beliefs as in (A.5) are consistent with (g ∗∗ , µ∗∗ ).
The proof that the end-of-period beliefs as in (A.6) are consistent with (g ∗∗ , µ∗∗ ) runs along exactly the
same lines, and we omit the details.

Appendix B: The Proof of Theorem 1
B.1.

Preliminaries

Lemma B.1: Let (g, µ) be a strategy profile in the dynastic repeated game and assume µ is truthful according
to Definition 5.
Then there exists a system of beliefs Φ that is consistent with (g, µ) and such that for every i ∈ I, t ≥ 0,
mti ∈ H t , xt ∈ X, at ∈ A and y t ∈ Y we have that
t
t
t
t
ΦtB
i [m−i = (mi , . . . , mi ) | mi ] = 1

(B.1)

t
t
t t
t
t t
t
t t t
ΦtE
i [m−i = ((mi , x , a ), . . . , (mi , x , a )) | (mi , x , a , y )] = 1

(B.2)

and

In other words, Φ is such that every player hi, ti at the beginning of the period believes with probability one
that all other players in his cohort have received the same message as he has, and at the end of the period
believes that all other players in his cohort are sending the same (truthful and hence pure) message as he is.
Proof: We construct a sequence of completely mixed strategies in which deviations at the action stage are
much more likely than deviations at the message stage. We parameterize the sequence of perturbations by a
small positive number ε, which will eventually be shrunk to zero.
t
Given ε, the completely mixed strategy for player hi, ti at the action stage is denoted by gi,ε
. Recall that
t
git (mti , xt ) is itself a mixed strategy in ∆(Ai ). Then gi,ε
is given by
1

1

t
gi,ε
(mti , xt ) = (1 − ε (n+1)2t+1 ) git (mti , xt ) + ε (n+1)2t+1 ν(Ai )

(B.3)

Given ε, the completely mixed strategy for player hi, ti at the message stage is denoted by µti,ε . Recall
that µti (mti , xt , at , y t ) is itself a mixed strategy in ∆(H t+1 ). Then µti,ε is given by
µti,ε (mti , xt , at , y t ) = (1 − ε) µti (mti , xt , at , y t ) + ε ν(H t+1 )

(B.4)
1

In words, at the action stage, player hi, ti deviates from git with probability ε (n+1)2t+1 and all deviations
are equally likely. At the message stage, player hi, ti deviates from µti with probability ε, again with all
deviations equally likely. Denote by (gε , µε ) the profile of completely mixed strategies we have just described.
Of course, to prove (B.1) it is enough to show that
t
t
t
t
lim ΦtB
i [m−i = (mi , . . . , mi ) | mi , gε , µε ] = 1

ε→0

(B.5)

Notice now that (B.5) follows almost immediately from the way we have defined the completely mixed
profile (gε , µε ) in (B.3) and (B.4) above.
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To see this, notice if mtj 6= mti for some j 6= i then it must be that at least one player hj ∈ I, τ i with τ
= 0, 1, . . . , t − 1 has “lied” his successor in the same dynasty. Given (B.4) this happens with a probability
that is an infinitesimal in ε of order 1 or higher.36 This needs to be compared with the overall probability of
observing mti . Clearly many paths of play could have generated this outcome. However, one way in which
mti can arise is certainly that the true history ht is equal to mti and that no player has ever deviated from
truth-telling. In the worst case the true history being equal to mti will involve all playersP
hj ∈ I, τ i deviating
t−1
from gjτ in every τ ≤ t − 1. Using (B.3) this is an infinitesimal in ε of order at most n τ =0 1/(n + 1)2τ +1
t
< n/(n + 1). Hence, the overall probability of observing mi cannot be lower than an infinitesimal of order
n/(n + 1). Since 1 > n/(n + 1), equation (B.5) now follows.37
The proof of (B.2) is the exact analogue of the proof of (B.1) we have just given, and hence we omit the
details.
B.2. Proof of the Theorem
Fix a δ ∈ (0, 1), a x̃ and any profile g ∗ ∈ G S (δ, x̃). Then there exists a profile µ∗ of message strategies which
are truthful in the sense of Definition 5 and such that (g ∗ , µ∗ ) ∈ G D (δ, x̃, ỹ) for every finite random variable
ỹ.
Since the strategies µ∗ are truthful, we know from Lemma B.1 that there is a system of beliefs Φ∗ that is
consistent with (g ∗ , µ∗ ) for which (B.1) and (B.2) hold. We will show that beliefs Φ∗ support the strategies
(g ∗ , µ∗ ) as an SE of the dynastic repeated game regardless of ỹ. Indeed, notice that since µt∗
i is truthful for
every player hi, ti, we know from Definition 5 that all players in fact ignore the realization of the message-stage
correlation device. Hence our argument below is trivially valid for any ỹ.
We simply check that no player hi, ti has an incentive to deviate either at the action or at the communication stage.
Consider player hi, ti at the communication stage, after observing (mti , xt , at , y t ). If he sends message
t+1
tE∗
mi = (mti , xt , at ) as prescribed by µt∗
his expected continuation payoff is
i , given that his beliefs are Φi
∗
t
t t
t+1
Ex̃t+1 vi (g |mi , x , a , x̃ ). Notice that by construction we know that this continuation payoff is equal to
Ex̃t+1 vi (g ∗ |ht+1 , x̃t+1 ) when we set ht+1 = (mti , xt , at ), namely the expected continuation payoff to player
i given g ∗ in the standard repeated game after history ht+1 = (mti , xt , at ) has taken place, and before the
realization of x̃t+1 has been observed.
We now need to check that player hi, ti cannot gain by deviating and sending any other (mixed) message
φti ∈ ∆(H t+1 ). Given that the strategies µ∗ are truthful and that his beliefs are ΦtE∗
, his expected contini
∗
uation payoff following such deviation clearly cannot be above maxgi Ex̃t+1 vi (gi , g−i
|ht+1 , x̃t+1 ) when we set
ht+1 = (mti , xt , at ). In other words it cannot exceed the maximum (by choice of gi ) expected continuation
payoff that player i can achieve in the standard repeated game after history ht+1 = (mti , xt , at ) given that all
∗
other players are playing according to g−i
. However, since g ∗ ∈ G S (δ, x̃) we know that Ex̃t+1 vi (g ∗ |ht+1 , x̃t+1 )
∗
t+1
t+1
= maxgi Ex̃t+1 vi (gi , g−i |h , x̃ ). Hence, we can conclude that no player hi, ti cannot gain by deviating in
this way.
Now consider player hi, ti at the action stage, after observing (mti , xt ). If player hi, ti follows the prescription of git∗ given that his beliefs are ΦtE∗
his expected continuation payoff is given by vi (g ∗ |mti , xt ). If he
i
deviates to playing any other σi ∈ ∆(Ai ), given his beliefs, his expected continuation payoff is vi (σi , gi−t ,
∗
g−i
|mti , xt ). Since g ∗ ∈ G S (δ, x̃), by (4) of Remark 1 we can then conclude that he cannot gain by deviating
in this way.
36
Throughout, we use the words “infinitesimal in ε of order z” to indicate any quantity that can be written as a constant
times εz . Similarly, we use the words “infinitesimal of order higher than z” to mean any quantity that can be written as a
0
constant times εz , with z 0 > z.
37
It is instructive to notice essentially the same argument we are following here is enough to show that in fact, upon receiving
mti player hi, ti will assign probability one to the event that the true history of play is equal to mti . Formally this would be
expressed as limε→0 Pr (ht = mti | mti , gε , µε ) = 1.
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Appendix C: The Proof of Theorem 2
C.1. Outline
Our proof is constructive. It runs along the following lines. Given a v ∗ ∈ int(V ) and a δ ∈ (0, 1) we construct
a correlation device x̃, a correlation device ỹ(δ), and an assessment (g, µ, Φδ ), which implements v ∗ , and
which for δ sufficiently large constitutes an SE of the dynastic repeated game.
Notice that the profile (g, µ) is defined independently of δ, as is x̃. On the other hand, the probability
distribution of the message-stage correlation device ỹ(δ) and the system of beliefs Φδ are defined using δ as
a parameter. This is simply a property of our construction.
Given that our task is to show that there exists
S
a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that δ > δ implies v ∗ ∈ E D (δ) = x̃,ỹ E D (δ, x̃, ỹ), if (g, µ) and x̃ were also dependent on δ
this would not matter at all. Sometimes, when it does not cause any ambiguity, δ will be dropped from the
notation for the message-stage correlation device and/or the system of beliefs.
Throughout the argument, we assume that the message space for any player hi, ti consists of three elements
only. Formally, we let Mit = {m∗ , mA , mB }. Since we assume that n ≥ 3 and that ||Ai || ≥ 2 for every i, it is
obvious that ||H t || > 3 for every t ≥ 1. Therefore we can think of each Mit as a “restricted message space”
in the sense of Definition A.1. It then follows from Lemma A.1 that proving the result for these restricted
message spaces is sufficient to prove our claim for the case Mit = H t , as required by the statement of the
theorem.
In Section C.2 we define formally the correlation devices x̃ and ỹ(δ) and the profile (g, µ). In Section C.3
we define formally the system of beliefs Φδ . In Section C.4 we check that the profile (g, µ) satisfies sequential
rationality given Φδ and the correlation devices x̃ and ỹ(δ) when δ is close to one. Finally in Section C.5 we
verify the consistency of the equilibrium beliefs.
Throughout the argument, v ∗ ∈ int(V ) is the vector of payoffs to be sustained as an SE, and a∗ and a0
are two action profiles as in the statement of the theorem.
C.2.

Strategies and Correlation Devices

Definition C.1: Let (a(1), . . . , a(`), . . . , a(||A||)) be a list of all possible outcomes in G. Without loss of
generality assume that the first element of this list is a∗ so that a(1) = a∗ . We can then define a set of
||A||
weights {p (a(`))}`=1 adding up to one and such that
v

∗

=

||A||
X

p (a(`))u(a(`))

(C.1)

`=1

Notice that since v ∗ ∈ int(V ), we can assume that p` > 0 for all ` = 1, . . . , ||A||.
Since it will play a special role, we assign a separate symbol to p(a(1)) (the weight of a∗ in equation
(C.1)). In what follows we set p(a(1)) = q.
Definition C.2. Action-Stage Correlation Device: Given v ∗ , the action-stage correlation device x̃ is defined
as follows. The set X consists of ||A|| elements denoted by (x(1), . . . x(`), . . . x(||A||)). We then set
Pr(x̃ = x(`)) = p (a(`))

(C.2)

where each p (a(`)) is as in Definition C.1.
Lemma C.1: There exists an α ∈ (0, 1) such that38
α <

38

ui

ui (a0 ) − ui (a∗i , a0−i )
− ui (a∗i , a0−i ) + ui − ui

(a0 )

∀i ∈ I

Throughout the rest of the argument, the symbol α is reserved for a fixed number in (0, 1) satisfying (C.3).

(C.3)
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Proof: The claim is a trivial consequence of the fact that ui > ui ,39 and of the assumed properties of a∗ and
a0 .
Definition C.3. Message-Stage Correlation Device: Given δ the message-stage correlation device ỹ(δ) is
defined as follows. The set Y consists of two elements, y(0) and y(1). The probability distribution governing
the realizations of ỹ(δ) is defined as follows.
Let α be as in Lemma C.1 and define
γ(δ) =

(1 − δ) (1 − α)
αδ

(C.4)

Notice that, given α, as δ increases towards one, clearly γ(δ) is between zero and one. We then take it to be
the case that
1 − γ(δ)

Pr[ỹ(δ) = y(0)] =

(C.5)
Pr[ỹ(δ) = y(1)] =

γ(δ)

||A||

Definition C.4. Action-Stage Strategies: Let {a(`)}`=1 be an enumeration of the strategy profiles in G as
in Definition C.1, and let x̃ be as in Definition C.2. Recall that at the beginning of period 0 all players receive
the null message m0i . For all players hi ∈ I, 0i define
gi0 (m0i , x0 ) = ai (`)

if x0 = x(`)

and for any player hi, ti with t ≥ 1 define


a∗i
if mti = m∗ and xt = x(1)





git (mti , xt ) =
a0i
if mti ∈ {mA , mB } and xt = x(1)






ai (`) if xt = x(`) with ` ≥ 2

(C.6)

(C.7)

||A||

Definition C.5. Message-Stage Strategies: Let {a(`)}`=1 be an enumeration of the strategy profiles in G as
in Definition C.1. Let x̃ be as in Definition C.2. Let ỹ be as in Definition C.3, where the dependence on δ
has been suppressed for notational convenience.
To describe the message-stage strategies it is convenient to distinguish between two cases.40
39

See Point of Notation A.2 above.
In the interest of brevity, we avoid writing down the message-stage strategies for players hi ∈ I, 0i separately. Equations
(C.8) and (C.9) that follow can be interpreted as defining the profile µ0 by re-defining m0i to be equal to m∗ for all players
hi ∈ I, 0i.
40
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For any player hi, ti, whenever xt = x(1) let41
 A
m





mA



A

 m
t
t
t t
µi (mi , x(1), a , y ) =
mB



mB




mB


 ∗
m

if y t = y(0) and at = (a0j , a∗−j ) for some j ∈ I
if mt−1
= mA , y t = y(0) and at = a0
i
t−1
if mi = mA , y t = y(0) and at = (a∗j , a0−j ) for some j ∈ I
if mt−1
= mB and at = a0
i
if mt−1
= mB , and at = (a∗j , a0−j ) for some j ∈ I
i
t
if aj 6∈ {a∗j , a0j } for some j ∈ I
otherwise

(C.8)

For any player hi, ti, whenever xt = x(`) with ` ≥ 2 let
 ∗
m


 ∗
m
µti (mti , x(`), at , y t ) =

mA

 B
m

if mt−1
= m∗ , and at = a(`)
i
t−1
if mi = mA , y t = y(1) and at = a(`)
if mt−1
= mA , y t = y(0) and at = a(`)
i
otherwise
C.3.

(C.9)

Beliefs

Definition C.6: Using the notation of Defintion C.1 Let
v̂ =

||A||
1 X
p (a(`))u(a(`))
1−q

(C.10)

`=2

and
v 0 = qu(a0 ) + (1 − q)v̂

(C.11)

Remark C.1: Let v̂ and v 0 be as in Lemma C.6, then
v ∗ = qu(a∗ ) + (1 − q)v̂

(C.12)

v ∗ − v 0 = q[u(a∗ ) − u(a0 )]

(C.13)

and

so that using our assumptions about a∗ and a0
vi∗ − vi0 > 0

∀i ∈ I

(C.14)

Remark C.2: Given that α ∈ (0, 1) is such that such that (C.3) of Lemma C.1 holds, then simple algebra
shows that the interval
!
ui (a0 ) − ui a∗i , a0−i
ui − ui
,
(C.15)
(1 − α) (vi∗ − vi0 )
α (vi∗ − vi0 )
is not empty for every i ∈ I.
41

Notice that to distinguish between the first, the third and last case on the right-hand side of (C.8), player hi, ti must be
able to distinguish between an action profile of the type (a0j , a∗−j ) and an action profile of the type (a∗j , a0−j ). This is always
possible because of our assumption that n ≥ 3, and because our assumptions about a∗ and a0 obviously imply that a∗j 6= a0j for
every j ∈ I.
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Definition C.7: Recall that α ∈ (0, 1) is such that such that (C.3) of Lemma C.1 holds. Using Remark C.2,
for each i ∈ I, define ri to be a number in the interval in (C.15). Moreover, for each i ∈ I define βi (δ) =
(1 − δ)ri . Notice that, given ri , as δ grows towards one, clearly βi (δ) ∈ (0, 1).
Definition C.8. Beginning-of-Period Beliefs: The beginning-of-period beliefs of all players hi ∈ I, 0i are
trivial. Of course, all players believe that all other players have received the null message m0i .
The beginning-of-period beliefs of any other player hi, ti, depending on the message he receives from
player hi, t − 1i are as follows.

if mti = m∗








if mti = mA
tB
t
Φi (mi ) =







 if mti = mB

then mt−i = (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) with probability 1
then mt−i = (mA , . . . , mA ) with probability 1

then

(C.16)

mt−i = (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) with probability βi (δ)
mt−i = (mB , . . . , mB ) with probability 1 − βi (δ)

Definition C.9. End-of-Period Beliefs: For ease of notation, we divide our description of the end-of-period
beliefs of player hi, ti into two cases: xt = x(1), and xt = x(`) with ` ≥ 2.42
t
t t
43
For any player hi, ti, whenever xt = x(1), let ΦtE
i (mi , x(1), a , y ) be as follows
if at = (a0j , a∗−j ) and y t = y(0)

A
A
then mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1

if mti = mA , at = (a∗j , a0−j ) and y t = y(0)

A
A
then mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1

if mti = mA , at = a0 and y t = y(0)

A
A
then mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1

if mti = mB and at = a0

B
B
then mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1

if mti = mB and at = (a∗j , a0−j )

B
B
then mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1

if atj 6∈ {a∗j , a0j } for some j ∈ I

B
B
then mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1

in all other cases

(C.17)

∗
∗
mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1

42
In the interest of brevity, we avoid writing down the end-of-period beliefs for players hi ∈ I, 0i separately. Equations (C.17)
and (C.18) that follow can be interpreted as defining the end-of-period beliefs of the time 0 players by re-defining m0i to be equal
to m∗ for all players hi ∈ I, 0i.
43
Using a short-hand version of notation established in Defintion C.5, when, for instance, we write at = (a∗j , a0−j ), we mean
that this is the case for some j ∈ I.
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t
t t
For any player hi, ti, whenever xt = x(`) with ` ≥ 2 let ΦtE
i (mi , x(`), a , y ) be as follows

if at = x(`), mti = mA and y t = y(0)

A
A
then mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1

if at 6= x(`)

B
B
then mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1

if at = x(`) and mti = m∗

∗
∗
then mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1

if at = x(`), mti = mA and y t = y(1)

∗
∗
then mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1

if at = x(`) and mt−1
= mB
i

then



C.4.

(C.18)

∗
∗
mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) prob. βi (δ)
t+1
B
m−i = (m , . . . , mB ) prob. 1 − βi (δ)

Sequential Rationality

We begin by checking the sequential rationality of the message strategies we have defined.
Definition C.10: Let IIitE denote the end-of-period-t collection of information sets that belong to player
hi, ti, with typical element IitE .
It is convenient to partition IIitE into four mutually disjoint exhaustive subsets on the basis of the associated beliefs of player hi, ti.
Let IIitE (∗) ⊂ IIitE be the collection of information sets in which player hi, ti believes that mt+1
−i is equal
to (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtE
i (∗). Notice that these information
sets are those in the last case of (C.17) and the third and fourth case of (C.18).
Let IIitE (A) ⊂ IIitE be the collection of information sets in which player hi, ti believes that mt+1
−i is equal to
A
(m , . . . , mA ) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtE
(A).
Notice
that
these
information
i
sets are those in the first three cases of (C.17) and the first case of (C.18).
Let IIitE (B) ⊂ IIitE be the collection of information sets in which player hi, ti believes that mt+1
−i is equal to
B
(m , . . . , mB ) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtE
(B).
Notice
that
these
information
i
sets are those in fourth, fifth and sixth cases of (C.17), and the second case of (C.18).
Finally, let IIitE (∗B) ⊂ IIitE be the collection of information sets in which player hi, ti believes that mt+1
−i
is equal to (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) with probability βi (δ) and to (mB , . . . , mB ) with probability 1 − βi (δ). These beliefs
will be denoted by ΦtE
i (∗B). Notice that these information sets are those in the last case of (C.18).
Definition C.11: Given the strategy profile (g, µ) that we defined in Section C.2 and given Definition C.10,
we can appeal to the stationarity of the game and of (g, µ) to define the following.
With a slight abuse of notation, for any pair of messages m and m̂ both in {m∗ , mA , mB }, we denote by
vi (m, m̂, δ) the end-of-period-t (discounted as of the beginning of period t + 1) payoff to player hi, ti, if he
sends message m, and all other players send message m̂.
Lemma C.2: Let the assessment (g, µ, Φ) described in Section C.2 be given. Then the end-of-period continuation payoffs for any player hi, ti at information sets Iit ∈ {IIitE (∗) ∪ IIitE (A) ∪ IIitE (B)} are as follows.44

44

∗
∗
∗
vit (g, µ|ΦtE
i (∗)) = vi (m , m , δ) = vi

(C.19)

A
A
0
∗
vit (g, µ|ΦtE
i (A)) = vi (m , m , δ) = αvi + (1 − α)vi

(C.20)

See our Point of Notation A.3 above.
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B
0
vit (g, µ|ΦtE
i (B)) = vi (m , m , δ) = vi

44
(C.21)

Proof: The first equalities in equations (C.19), (C.20) and (C.21) are obvious from Definitions C.10 and
C.11.
Equations (C.19), (C.21) are a direct consequence of the way we have defined strategies and beliefs in
Section C.2, and we omit the details. To see that (C.20) holds notice that we can write this continuation
payoff recursively as


vi (mA , mA , δ) = (1 − δ)vi0 + δ γ(δ)vi (m∗ , m∗ , δ) + (1 − γ(δ))vi (mA , mA , δ)
(C.22)
Substituting the definition of γ(δ) given in (C.4), substituting (C.19), and solving for vi (mA , mA , δ) yields
(C.20).
Lemma C.3: Given the beliefs described in Definition C.9, for δ sufficiently close to one, no player hi, ti has
an incentive to deviate from the message strategy described in Definition C.5 at any information set IitE ∈
IIitE (∗).
Proof: From Lemma C.2, if player hi, ti follows the equilibrium message strategy µti , then his continuation
payoff is as in (C.19). If he deviates and sends mA instead of m∗ , we can write his payoff recursively as
follows
vi (mA , m∗ , δ) =



q (1 − δ)ui (a0i , a∗−i ) + δ γ(δ)vi (m∗ , m∗ , δ) + (1 − γ(δ))vi (mA , mA , δ) +

(C.23)




(1 − q) (1 − δ)v̂i + δ γ(δ)vi (m∗ , m∗ , δ) + (1 − γ(δ))vi (mA , m∗ , δ)
Substituting (C.19) and (C.20) and solving for vi (mA , m∗ , δ) yields
1

vi (mA , m∗ , δ) =

1 − (1 − q)δ(1 −

(1 − δ)(1 − α)
)
αδ


v∗
(1 − δ)[qui (a0i , a∗−i ) + (1 − q)v̂i ] + (1 − δ)(1 − α) i +
α
qδ(1 −

(C.24)


(1 − δ)(1 − α)
)(αvi0 + (1 − α)vi∗ )
αδ

From (C.24) we get directly that
lim vi (mA , m∗ , δ) = αvi0 + (1 − α)vi∗

δ→1

(C.25)

and since the right-hand side of (C.25) is obviously less than vi (m∗ , m∗ , δ) = vi∗ , we can conclude that player
hi, ti cannot gain by deviating to sending message mA instead of m∗ when δ is large enough.
If player hi, ti deviates and sends message mB instead of m∗ we can write his payoff recursively as follows
vi (mB , m∗ , δ) =



q (1 − δ)ui (a0i , a∗−i ) + δ γ(δ)vi (m∗ , m∗ , δ) + (1 − γ(δ))vi (mA , mA , δ) +

(1 − q) (1 − δ)v̂i + δvi (mB , m∗ , δ)

(C.26)
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Substituting (C.19) and (C.20) and solving for vi (mB , m∗ , δ) yields
vi (mB , m∗ , δ) =

1
1 − (1 − q)δ


qv ∗
(1 − δ)[qui (a0i , a∗−i ) + (1 − q)v̂i ] + (1 − δ)(1 − α) i +
α
qδ(1 −

(C.27)


(1 − δ)(1 − α)
)(αvi0 + (1 − α)vi∗ )
αδ

As for the previous case, if δ is sufficiently large, the deviation does not pay since from (C.27) we get directly
that
lim vi (mB , m∗ , δ) = αvi0 + (1 − α)vi∗

δ→1

(C.28)

Hence the lemma is proved.
Lemma C.4: Given the beliefs described in Definition C.9, for δ sufficiently close to one, no player hi, ti has
an incentive to deviate from the message strategy described in Definition C.5 at any information set IitE ∈
IIitE (A).
Proof: From Lemma C.2, if player hi, ti follows the equilibrium message strategy µti , then his continuation
payoff is as in (C.20). If he deviates and sends m∗ instead of mA , we can write his payoff recursively as
follows
vi (m∗ , mA , δ) =



q (1 − δ)ui (a∗i , a0−i ) + δ γ(δ)vi (m∗ , m∗ , δ) + (1 − γ(δ))vi (m∗ , mA , δ) +

(C.29)




(1 − q) (1 − δ)v̂i + δ γ(δ)vi (m∗ , m∗ , δ) + (1 − γ(δ))vi (m∗ , mA , δ)
Substituting (C.19) and solving for vi (m∗ , mA , δ) yields


vi (m∗ , mA , δ) = α qui (a∗i , a0−i ) + (1 − q)v̂i + (1 − α)vi∗

(C.30)

and since the right-hand side of (C.30) is obviously less than vi (mA , mA , δ) = αvi0 +(1−α)vi∗ , we can conclude
that player hi, ti cannot gain by deviating to sending message m∗ instead of mA when δ is large enough.
If player hi, ti deviates and sends message mB instead of mA we can write his payoff recursively as follows


vi (mB , mA , δ) = (1 − δ)vi0 + δ γ(δ)vi (mB , m∗ , δ) + (1 − γ(δ))vi (mB , mA , δ)
(C.31)
Solving for vi (mB , mA , δ), using the definition of γ(δ) given in (C.4) yields
vi (mB , mA , δ) = αvi0 + (1 − α)vi (mB , m∗ , δ)

(C.32)

Using (C.28) this is clearly enough to show that for δ high enough player hi, ti cannot gain by deviating in
this way. Hence the lemma is proved.
Lemma C.5: Given the beliefs described in Definition C.9 no player hi, ti has an incentive to deviate from
the message strategy described in Definition C.5 at any information set IitE ∈ IIitE (B).
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Proof: From Lemma C.2, if player hi, ti follows the equilibrium message strategy µti , then his continuation
payoff is as in (C.21). If he deviates and sends m∗ instead of mB , we can write his payoff recursively as
follows


vi (m∗ , mB , δ) = (1 − δ) qui (a∗i , a0−i ) + (1 − q)v̂i + δvi (m∗ , mB , δ)
(C.33)
Solving for vi (m∗ , mB , δ) yields
vi (m∗ , mB , δ) = qui (a∗i , a0−i ) + (1 − q)v̂i

(C.34)

Since the right-hand side of (C.34) is strictly less than vi (mB , mB , δ), this is clearly enough to show that for
δ high enough player hi, ii cannot gain by deviating in this way.
Now suppose that player hi, ti deviates and send message mA instead of mB . Then we can write his
continuation payoff recursively as
vi (mA , mB , δ) =
(C.35)
0



(1 − δ) [qui (a ) + (1 − q)v̂i ] + δ γ(δ)vi (m∗ , mB , δ) + (1 − γ(δ))vi (mA , mB , δ)
Solving for vi (mA , mB , δ) gives us
vi (mA , mB , δ) = αvi0 + (1 − α)vi (m∗ , mB , δ)

(C.36)

Since the right-hand side of (C.36) is strictly less than vi (mB , mB , δ), this is clearly enough to show that
player hi, ii cannot gain by deviating in this way. Hence the lemma is proved.
Lemma C.6: Given the beliefs described in Definition C.9, for δ sufficiently close to one, no player hi, ti has
an incentive to deviate from the message strategy described in Definition C.5 at any information set IitE ∈
IIitE (∗B).
Proof: From Lemma C.2, and the last case in (C.18) if player hi, ti follows the equilibrium message strategy
µti , then his continuation payoff is
(1 − βi (δ))vi (mB , mB , δ) + βi (δ)vi (mB , m∗ , δ)

(C.37)

From Definition C.7 it is clear that limδ→1 βi (δ) = 0. Hence, using (C.21) we can write
lim (1 − βi (δ))vi (mB , mB , δ) + βi (δ)vi (mB , m∗ , δ) = vi0

δ→1

(C.38)

If he deviates and sends message m∗ instead of mB , we can write his continuation payoff as
(1 − βi (δ))vi (m∗ , mB , δ) + βi (δ)vi (m∗ , m∗ , δ)

(C.39)

Using again the fact that limδ→1 βi (δ) = 0 and (C.33) we can write
lim (1 − βi (δ))vi (m∗ , mB , δ) + βi (δ)vi (m∗ , m∗ , δ) = qui (a∗i , a0−i ) + (1 − q)v̂i

δ→1

(C.40)

Since the quantity on the right-hand side of (C.38) is clearly greater than the quantity on the right-hand side
of (C.40) we can then conclude that, for δ close enough to one, player hi, ti cannot gain by deviating in this
way.
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Suppose now that player hi, ti deviates to sending message mA instead of mB . Then we can write his
continuation payoff as
(1 − βi (δ))vi (mA , mB , δ) + βi (δ)vi (mA , m∗ , δ)
Using once more the fact that limδ→1 βi (δ) = 0, (C.36) and (C.34) we can write


lim (1 − βi (δ))vi (mA , mB , δ) + βi (δ)vi (mA , m∗ , δ) = αvi0 + (1 − α) qui (a∗i , a0−i ) + (1 − q)v̂i
δ→1

(C.41)

(C.42)

Since the quantity on the right-hand side of (C.38) is clearly greater than the quantity on the right-hand side
of (C.42) we can then conclude that, for δ close enough to one, player hi, ti cannot gain by deviating in this
way. Hence the lemma is proved.
Remark C.3: From Lemmas C.3, C.4, C.5 and C.6 it is clear that there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that whenever
δ > δ the message strategies of Definition C.5 are sequentially rational given the beliefs of Definition C.9.
We now turn to the sequential rationality of the action strategies we have defined in Section C.2.
Definition C.12: Recall that at the action stage, player hi, ti chooses an action after having received a
message mti and having observed a realization xt of the correlation device x̃t .
Let IIitB denote period-t action-stage collection of information sets that belong to player hi, ti, with typical
element IitB . Clearly, each element of IIitB is identified by a pair (mti , xt ).
It is convenient to partition IIitB into three mutually disjoint exhaustive subsets on the basis of the
message mti received by player hi, ti.45
Let IIitB (∗) ⊂ IIitB be the collection of information sets in which player hi, ti receives message m∗ . Notice
that using Definition C.8 we know that in this case player hi, ti believes that mt−i is equal to (m∗ , . . . , m∗ )
with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtB
i (∗).
Let IIitB (A) ⊂ IIitB be the collection of information sets in which player hi, ti receives message mA . Notice
that using Definition C.8 we know that in this case player hi, ti believes that mt−i is equal to (mA , . . . , mA )
with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtB
i (A).
Finally, let IIitB (B) ⊂ IIitB be the collection of information sets in which player hi, ti receives message
mB . Notice that using Definition C.8 we know that in this case player hi, ti believes that mt−i is equal to
(m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) with probability βi (δ) and to (mB , . . . , mB ) with probability 1 − βi (δ). These beliefs will be
denoted by ΦtB
i (∗B).
Lemma C.7: Given the beliefs described in Definition C.8, for δ sufficiently close to one, no player hi, ti
has an incentive to deviate from the action strategy described in Definition C.4 at any information set IitB ∈
IIitB (∗).

45
In the interest of brevity, we avoid an explicit distinction between the t = 0 players and all others. What follows can be
interpreted as applying to all players re-defining m0i to be equal to m∗ for players hi ∈ I, 0i.
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Proof: Given any xt ∈ X, if player hi, ti follows the equilibrium action strategy he achieves a payoff is that
bounded below by
(1 − δ)ui + δvi∗

(C.43)

Given any xt ∈ X, (using the notation of Definition C.11) following any possible deviation player hi, ti achieves
a payoff that is bounded above by


(C.44)
(1 − δ)ui + δ γ(δ)vi (m∗ , m∗ , δ) + (1 − γ(δ))vi (mA , mA , δ)
Using (C.19), (C.20) and the definition of γ(δ) given in (C.4), we can re-write (C.44) as





(1 − δ)(1 − α)
(1 − δ)(1 − α)
(1 − δ)ui + δαvi0 1 −
+ δvi∗ 1 − α 1 −
δα
δα

(C.45)

Taking the limit of (C.43) as δ → 1 gives vi∗ . Taking the limit of (C.45) as δ → 1 gives αvi0 + (1 − α)vi∗ . Since
vi∗ > αvi0 + (1 − α)vi∗ this is clearly enough to prove the claim.
Lemma C.8: Given the beliefs described in Definition C.8, for δ sufficiently close to one, no player hi, ti
has an incentive to deviate from the action strategy described in Definition C.4 at any information set IitB ∈
IIitB (A).
Proof: We distinguish between the information set in IIitB (A) that has xt = x(1) and those that have xt 6=
x(1). We begin with the information set in which xt = x(1).
After having observed the pair (mA , x(1)), if he follows the equilibrium strategy, player hi, ti achieves a
continuation payoff of


(1 − δ)ui (a0 ) + δ γ(δ)vi (m∗ , m∗ , δ) + (1 − γ(δ))vi (mA , mA , δ)
(C.46)
Now consider a deviation to action a∗i . In this case the continuation payoff is


(1 − δ)ui (a∗i , a0−i ) + δ γ(δ)vi (m∗ , m∗ , δ) + (1 − γ(δ))vi (mA , mA , δ)

(C.47)

Clearly this deviation is not profitable since ui (a∗i , a0−i ) < ui (a0 ).
A deviation to an action ai 6∈ {a0i , a∗i } yields a continuation payoff that is bounded above by
(1 − δ)ui + δvi0

(C.48)

Taking the limit of (C.46) as δ → 1 yields αvi0 + (1 − α)vi . Hence, for δ large enough, the quantity in (C.46)
is greater that the quantity in (C.48). Therefore, for δ close enough to one, this deviation is not profitable
either.
Now consider any information set in IIitB (A) with xt 6= x(1). The continuation payoff to player hi, ti from
following the equilibrium strategy is bounded below by


(C.49)
(1 − δ)ui + δ γ(δ)vi (m∗ , m∗ , δ) + (1 − γ(δ))vi (mA , mA , δ)
The continuation payoff to player hi, ti following any deviation is bounded above by
(1 − δ)ui + δvi0

(C.50)

Taking the limit of (C.49) as δ → 1 yields αvi0 + (1 − α)vi . Hence, for δ large enough, the quantity in (C.49)
is greater that the quantity in (C.50). Therefore, for δ close enough to one, no deviation is profitable at any
information set in IIitB (A) with xt 6= x(1).
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Lemma C.9: Given the beliefs described in Definition C.8, for δ sufficiently close to one, no player hi, ti
has an incentive to deviate from the action strategy described in Definition C.4 at any information set IitB ∈
IIitB (B).
Proof: We distinguish between the information set in IIitB (B) that has xt = x(1) and those that have xt 6=
x(1). We begin with the information set in which xt = x(1).
After having observed the pair (mB , x(1)), if he follows the equilibrium strategy, player hi, ti achieves a
continuation payoff of


A
A
βi (δ) (1 − δ)ui (a0i , a∗−i ) + δ(γ(δ)vi (m∗ , m∗ , δ) + (1 − γ(δ))v
 i (m , m0 , δ)) + B B 
(C.51)
(1 − βi (δ)) (1 − δ)ui (a ) + δvi (m , m , δ)
If on the other hand he deviates to action a∗i his continuation payoff is


βi (δ) [(1 − δ)ui (a∗ ) + δvi (m∗ , m∗ , δ)] + (1 − βi (δ)) (1 − δ)ui (a∗i , a0−i ) + δvi (mB , mB , δ)

(C.52)

Using (C.19) (C.20) (C.21) and Definition C.7, we can now write the equilibrium continuation payoff in (C.51)
minus the deviation continuation payoff in (C.52) as



(1 − δ) ri (1 − δ) ui (a0i , a∗−i ) − ui (a∗ ) +


(C.53)
ri δ(1 − γ(δ))α(vi0 − vi∗ ) + (1 − (1 − δ)ri ) ui (a0 ) − ui (a∗i , a0−i )
Dividing (C.53) by 1 − δ, taking the limit as δ → 1 and using (C.4), yields that (up to a factor 1 − δ) this
difference in payoffs in the limit is equal to
ri α(vi0 − vi∗ ) + ui (a0 ) − ui (a∗i , a0−i )

(C.54)

Notice now that using the (upper) bound on ri given in (C.15) we can verify that the quantity in (C.54) is
positive. Hence we can conclude that deviating to a∗i is in fact not profitable for player hi, ti.
Next, consider a deviation to an action ai 6∈ {a0i , a∗i }. Following this deviation, the continuation payoff to
player hi, ti is bounded above by
(1 − δ)ui + δvi (mB , mB , δ)

(C.55)

Using (C.19), (C.20), (C.21) and Definition C.7, we can now write the equilibrium continuation payoff in
(C.51) minus the deviation continuation payoff in (C.55) as

(C.56)
(1 − δ) δri (1 − α(1 − γ(δ)))(vi∗ − vi0 ) + (1 − δ)ri ui (a0i , a∗−i ) + (1 − (1 − δ)ri )ui (a0 ) − ui
Dividing (C.56) by 1 − δ, taking the limit as δ → 1 and using (C.4) and the fact that βi (δ) = (1 − δ)ri , yields
that (up to a factor 1 − δ) this difference in payoffs in the limit is equal to
ri (1 − α)(vi∗ − vi0 ) + ui (a0 ) − ui

(C.57)

Notice now that using the (lower) bound on ri given in (C.15) we can verify that the quantity in (C.57) is
positive. Hence we can conclude that deviating to ai 6∈ {a0i , a∗i } is in fact not profitable for player hi, ti.
Now consider an information set in IIitB (B) that has xt 6= x(1). If he follows his equilibrium strategy,
player hi, ti achieves a continuation payoff that is bounded below by
(1 − δ)ui + δ[βi (δ)vi (mB , m∗ , δ) + (1 − βi (δ))vi (mB , mB , δ)]

(C.58)
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His continuation payoff following any deviation is bounded above by
(1 − δ)ui + δvi (mB , mB , δ)

(C.59)

Using (C.21) and Definition C.7, we can now write the equilibrium continuation payoff in (C.58) minus the
deviation continuation payoff in (C.59) as

(1 − δ) ui − ui + δri [vi (mB , m∗ , δ) − vi0 ]
(C.60)
Dividing (C.60) by 1 − δ, taking the limit as δ → 1 and using (C.28), yields that (up to a factor 1 − δ) this
difference in payoffs in the limit is equal to
ui − ui + ri (1 − α)(vi∗ − vi0 )

(C.61)

Notice now that using the (lower) bound on ri given in (C.15) we can verify that the quantity in (C.61)
is positive. Hence we can conclude that deviating from the equilibrium strategy at any information set in
IIitB (B) that has xt 6= x(1) is in fact not profitable for player hi, ti. Therefore, the proof is now complete.
Remark C.4: From Lemmas C.7, C.8 and C.9 it is clear that there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that whenever
δ > δ the action strategies of Definition C.4 are sequentially rational given the beliefs of Definition C.8.
C.5.

Consistency of Beliefs

Definition C.13: Throughout this section we let ε denote a small positive number, which parameterizes
the completely mixed strategies that we construct. It should be understood that our construction of beliefs
involves the limit ε → 0.
Moreover, for every t ≥ 0, given ε we define
1

εt = ε n2t
For every i ∈ I, it will also be convenient to define
P
(1 − δ)ri j∈I (||Aj || − 1 − q)
ψi (δ) =
1 − (1 − δ)ri

(C.62)

(C.63)

where q is as in Definition C.1, and ri is as in Definition C.7.
Remark C.5: For δ sufficiently close to 1, it is clear that the ψi (δ) of equation (C.63) is greater than zero.
Definition C.14. Completely Mixed Action Strategies: Given ε, the completely mixed strategies for all playt
ers hi, ti at the action stage are denoted by gi,ε
and are defined as follows.
0
After receiving message mi and observing the realization xt of the action-stage correlation device any
player hi, 0i plays the action prescribed by the proposed equilibrium strategy described in (C.6) with probability 1 − εt (||Ai || − 1) and plays all other actions in Ai with probability εt each.
After receiving message m∗i and observing the realization xt of the action-stage correlation device any
player hi, ti plays the action prescribed by the proposed equilibrium strategy described in (C.7) with probability 1 − εt (||Ai || − 1) and plays all other actions in Ai with probability εt each.
After receiving any message mti 6= m∗i and observing the realization xt of the action-stage correlation
device any player hi, ti plays the action prescribed by the proposed equilibrium strategy described in (C.7)
√
√
with probability 1 − εt (||Ai || − 1) and plays all other actions in Ai with probability εt each.
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Definition C.15. Completely Mixed Message Strategies: Given ε, the completely mixed strategies for all
players hi, ti at the message stage are denoted by µti,ε and are defined as follows.46
Suppose that player hi, ti receives message m∗i and that after observing (xt , at , y t ) the proposed equilibrium
strategy described in Definition C.5 prescribes that he should send message m∗ . Then player hi, ti sends
message m∗ with probability 1 − ε2t − ψi (δ)εt , sends message mA with probability ε2t , and sends message mB
with probability ψi (δ)εt .
Suppose that player hi, ti receives message m∗i and that after observing (xt , at , y t ) the proposed equilibrium
strategy described in Definition C.5 prescribes that he should send message mA . Then player hi, ti sends
message mA with probability 1 − εt − ε2t , sends message m∗ with probability εt , and sends message mB with
probability ε2t .
Suppose that player hi, ti receives message m∗i and that after observing (xt , at , y t ) the proposed equilibrium
strategy described in Definition C.5 prescribes that he should send message mB . Then player hi, ti sends
message mA with probability 1 − εt − ε2t , sends message m∗ with probability εt , and sends message mA with
probability ε2t .
Finally, after receiving any message mti 6= m∗ and observing (xt , at , y t ), player hi, ti sends the message
prescribed by the equilibrium strategy described in Definition C.5 with probability 1 − 2εt , and sends each
of the other two messages with probability εt .
Remark C.6: Let (gε , µε ) be the completely mixed strategy profile of Definitions C.14 and C.15. It is
then straightforward to check that as ε → 0 the profile (gε , µε ) converges to the equilibrium strategy profile
described in Definitions C.4 and C.5, as required by Definition 3 of consistent beliefs.
Lemma C.10. Stationary Beliefs: Let (gε , µε ) be the completely mixed strategy profile of Definitions C.14
and C.15. Let any t ≥ 2 and any quadruple of the type (mti , xt , at , y t ) be given.47
Then48
lim Pr [mt−1 = (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) | mti , xt , at , y t , gε , µε ] = 1

ε→0

(C.64)

Proof: In order for mt−1 6= (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) to occur it is necessary that at least one player has deviated from
the equilibrium strategy in some period τ ≤ t − 2, either at the action or at the message stage (or both).
Given the completely mixed strategy profile of Definitions C.14 and C.15 and given that from (C.62) we
know that trembles become more likely as t increases, we then know that the probability of event mt−1 6=
(m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) is an infinitesimal in εt−2 of order no lower than 1/2.49 Hence, using (C.62) the probability of
mt−1 6= (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) is an infinitesimal in ε of order no lower than 1/2n2(t−2) .
The probability of mt−1 6= (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) needs to be compared with the probability of the quadruple
t
(mi , xt , at , y t ). Depending on the particular quadruple (mti , xt , at , y t ), it is possible that many paths of play
could have generated this outcome. However, a lower bound on this probability can be computed as follows.
Assume no deviations up to and including period t − 2. From Definition C.15 the probability that message
mti is sent by player hi, ti is at least (if a deviation is required) an infinitesimal in εt−1 of order 2. From
Definition C.14, the probability of any profile at (depending on the number of deviations required; clearly no
more than n) is at least an infinitesimal in εt of order n. Hence, using (C.62), the probability of the quadruple
(mti , xt , at , y t ) is no smaller than an infinitesimal in ε of order 2/n2(t−1) + 1/n2t−1 .
46
In the interest of brevity, we avoid an explicit distinction between the t = 0 players and all others. What follows can be
interpreted as applying to all players re-defining m0i to be equal to m∗ for players hi ∈ I, 0i.
47
The reason we require that t ≥ 2 in (C.64) below is that of course all players hi ∈ I, 0i receive message m0i for sure.
48
See our point of notation A.5 above.
49
See footnote 36 for an explicit statement of our (standard) terminology concerning infinitesimals.
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Since n ≥ 3 it is straightforward to check that 1/2n2(t−2) > 2/n2(t−1) + 1/n2t−1 . Hence equation (C.64)
now follows and the proof is complete.50
Lemma C.11: Let (gε , µε ) be the completely mixed strategy profile of Definitions C.14 and C.15. Let
any t ≥ 2 and any quadruple of the type (mti , xt , at , y t ) be given.51 Fix also any array m̂−i = (m̂1 , . . . ,
m̂i−1 , m̂i+1 , . . . , m̂n ).
Then
lim Pr [mt−i = m̂−i | mti , xt , at , y t , gε , µε ] =

ε→0

lim Pr [mt−i = m̂−i | mti , xt , at , y t , mt−1 = (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ), gε , µε ]

(C.65)

ε→0

Proof: A routine application of Bayes’ rule yields
Pr [mt−i = m̂−i | mti , xt , at , y t , gε , µε ] =
Pr [mt−i = m̂−i | mti , xt , at , y t , mt−1 = (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ), gε , µε ]
Pr [mt−1 = (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) | mti , xt , at , y t , gε , µε ]+
X
t
Pr [m−i = m̂−i | mti , xt , at , y t , mt−1 = m, gε , µε ]Pr (mt−1 = m | mti , xt , at , y t , gε , µε )

(C.66)

m6=(m∗ ,...,m∗ )

Now take the limit as ε → 0 on both sides of (C.66). Next, observe that by Lemma C.10 all terms in the
summation sign must converge to zero and the second term on the right-hand-side of (C.66) must converge
to one. Hence (C.65) follows and the proof is now complete.
Lemma C.12: The strategy profile (g, µ) described in Definitions C.4 and C.5 and the beginning-of-period
beliefs described in Definition C.8 are consistent.
Proof: For the players hi ∈ I, 0i there is nothing to prove. When t = 1, clearly all players hi ∈ I, 1i believe
that all preceding players received their respective m0i . When t ≥ 2, given Lemma C.11 we can reason taking
it as given that all players hi ∈ I, ti believe that all players hi ∈ I, t − 1i received message m∗ . Given this
observation the claim for period t follows easily by a case-by-case examination, comparing the likelihood of
deviations in period t − 1 (orders of infinitesimals in εt−1 ). We omit the details entirely for the first two cases
of (C.16) (in which messages m∗ and mA are received).
To see the consistency of the beliefs postulated in the third case of (C.16) (when message mB is received)
observe the following. According to Definition C.14 deviations at the action stage of period t−1 after receiving
message m∗ have probability εt−1 . Moreover, according to Definition C.15 after receiving message m∗ player
hi, t − 1i sends message mB when the equilibrium strategy prescribes to send message m∗ with probability
ψi (δ) εt−1 . Using Lemma C.11, (C.63) and Definition C.7 it is then immediate to see that Definitions C.14
and C.15 yield
t
∗
∗
t
B
lim ΦtB
i [m−i = (mi , . . . , mi ) | mi = m , gε , µε ] =
ψ (δ)
P i
= (1 − δ)ri = βi (δ)
ψi (δ) + j∈I (||Aj || − 1 − q)

ε→0

(C.67)

50
It is worth pointing out that the bounds on probabilities that we have used in this argument are not “tight.” We have
used the ones above simply because they facilitate the exposition. Any tight bounds would necessarily involve a case-by-case
treatment according to what the equilibrium strategies prescribe, the particular message vector mt−1 6= (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) and the
particular quadruple (mti , xt , at , y t ).
51
The reason we require that t ≥ 2 in (C.64) below is that of course all players hi ∈ I, 0i receive message m0i for sure.
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and
t
B
B
t
B
lim ΦtB
i [m−i = (mi , . . . , mi ) | mi = m , gε , µε ] =
P
j∈I (||Aj || − 1 − q)
P
= 1 − (1 − δ)ri = 1 − βi (δ)
ψi (δ) + j∈I (||Aj || − 1 − q)

ε→0

(C.68)

as required.
Lemma C.13: The strategy profile (g, µ) described in Definitions C.4 and C.5 and the end-of-period beliefs
described in Definition C.9 are consistent in the sense of Definition 3, as required for a Sequential Equilibrium.
Proof: When t = 0 all players receive message m0i . When t = 1 the beliefs of the players about the messages
received by the previous cohort are trivial. When t ≥ 2, given Lemma C.11 we can reason taking it as given
that all players hi ∈ I, ti believe that all players hi ∈ I, t − 1i received message m∗ . Given this observation the
claim for period t follows easily by a case-by-case examination, comparing the likelihood of possible deviations
in periods t − 1 and t (orders of infinitesimals in εt−1 and εt ). For the sake of brevity we omit most of the
details, and we simply draw attention to the following facts.
The beliefs of player hi, ti after any realization xt = x(`) with ` ≥ 2 can be seen to be consistent in the
following way. In period t, either no deviation from the prescription of the action-stage equilibrium strategies
is observed or some deviation is observed. When there are no deviations, the revised end-of-period beliefs ΦtR
i
of player hi, ti are of course the same as the beginning of period beliefs ΦtB
i . Therefore, using Lemma C.11
the claim in this case can be verified simply checking that the beliefs described in (C.18) correspond to the
prescriptions of the strategies described in (C.9) in the appropriate way. In the case in which some deviations
occur, observe that the strategies in (C.9) prescribe that all players should send message mB , regardless of
the message they received, which corresponds to the beliefs described in (C.18) as required.
Now consider the case in which the realization of the action-stage correlation device is xt = x(1). Next
distinguish further between two cases. First, the action profile at is neither equal to a0 nor is of the type
(a∗j , a0−j ) for some j ∈ I. In this case, from the strategies described in (C.8) it is immediate to check that
the message sent by any player hi, ti does not depend on the message mti he received. Therefore, the claim in
this case follows immediately from the message-stage strategies described in (C.8).
On the other hand, from the strategies described in (C.8) it is immediate to check that when at is either
equal to a0 or is of the type (a∗j , a0−j ) for some j ∈ I the message sent by player hi, ti does depend on the
message mti he received.
Using the completely mixed strategies described in Definition C.14 it is easy to check that for all m ∈
{m∗ , mA , mB } and for all y t ∈ Y , whenever at is either equal to a0 or is of the type (a∗j , a0−j ) for some j ∈ I
it must be that
t
t
t t
lim ΦtR
i [m−i = (m, . . . , m) | mi = m, x(1), a , y , gε , µε ] = 1

ε→0

(C.69)

Given (C.69), the claim in this case can now be verified simply checking that the beliefs described in
(C.17) correspond to the prescriptions of the strategies described in (C.8) in the appropriate way.
C.6. Proof of the Theorem
Given any v ∈ int(V ) and any δ ∈ (0, 1), the strategies and correlation devices described in Definitions C.2,
C.3, C.4 and C.5 clearly implement the payoff vector v ∗ .
From Remarks C.3 and C.4, we know that there exists a δ such that whenever δ > δ each strategy in the
profile described in Definitions C.4 and C.5 is sequentially rational given the beliefs described in Definitions
C.8 and C.9.
∗
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From Lemmas C.12 and C.13 we know that the strategy profile described in Definitions C.4 and C.5 and
the beliefs described in Definitions C.8 and C.9 are consistent in the sense of Definition 3, as required by
Definition 4 of a Sequential Equilibrium.
Hence, using Lemma A.1, the proof of Theorem 2 is now complete.

Appendix D: The Proof of Theorem 3
D.1. Outline
Once again, our proof is constructive. It runs along the following lines. Given a v ∗ ∈ int(V ), we construct
a correlation device x̃, a correlation device ỹ, and an assessment (g, µ, Φ), which implements the vector of
payoffs v ∗ , and which for δ sufficiently large constitutes an SE of the dynastic repeated game.
Notice that all the elements of our construction are defined independently of δ. The sequential rationality
of the strategy profile given the postulated beliefs holds when δ is sufficiently close to one.
Throughout the argument, we assume that the message space for any player hi, ti consists of a set smaller
than the set H t . Therefore we can think of each Mit as a “restricted message space” in the sense of Definition
A.1. It then follows from Lemma A.1 that proving the result for these restricted message spaces is sufficient
to prove our claim for the case Mit = H t , as required by the statement of the theorem.
In Section D.2 we define formally the correlation devices x̃ and ỹ, the players’ message spaces Mit and
the profile (g, µ). In Section D.3 we define formally the system of beliefs Φ. In Section D.4 we check that
the profile (g, µ) satisfies sequential rationality given Φ and the correlation devices x̃ and ỹ when δ is close
to one. Finally in Section D.5 we verify the consistency of the equilibrium beliefs.
In what follows, v ∗ ∈ int(V ) is the vector of payoffs to be sustained as an SE as in the statement of the
theorem. Throughout the argument, Ã is a product set and v̂ and v 1 through v n are vectors of payoffs as in
the statement of the theorem. Of course, these are fixed throughout the proof.
D.2.

Strategies, Correlation Devices and Message Spaces

Definition D.1: As in Definition C.1, let (a(1), . . . , a(`), . . . , a(||A||)) be a list of all possible outcomes in
G. Without loss of generality, assume that the first ||Ã|| ≤ ||A|| elements in this enumeration are the strategy
profiles in the product set Ã. This enumeration will be taken as fixed throughout the rest of the argument.
Remark D.1: From Definition 6, for each i ∈ I we can find a set of of profiles of actions Ãi ⊂ Ã corresponding
to a set of indices (i1 , . . . , i` , . . . , i||Ãi || ) in the enumeration of Definition D.1, and a set of positive weights
||Ãi ||

{pi (a(i` ))}`=1 adding up to one and such that
||Ãi ||

ω i (Ã) = max

ai ∈Ãi

X

||Ãi ||
i

p (a(i` ))ui (ai , a−i (i` )) =

`=1

X

pi (a(i` ))ui (a(i` ))

(D.1)

`=1

Without loss of generality, we can take it to be the case that for every i` , ai (i` ) is the same action in Ãi . We
denote this by aii so that ai (i` ) = aii for ` = 1, . . . , ||Ãi ||.
For convenience, since Ã is fixed throughout the argument, in what follows we will use the following
||Ãj ||
notation for the payoffs of each i corresponding to the weights {pj (a(j` ))}`=1 .
||Ãj ||

ω ji

=

X
`=1

Of course, we have that ω ii = ω i (Ã).

pj (a(j` ))ui (a(j` ))

(D.2)
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Definition D.2: Let Ãi be as in Remark D.1. For each i ∈ I and for each element a(i` ) of Ãi , construct a
new action profile ăi (i` ) as follows. For all j 6= i, set ăij (i` ) to satisfy ăij (i` ) 6= aj (i` ) and ăij (i` ) ∈ Ãj . Notice
that this is always possible since, by assumption, Ãj contains at least two elements for every j ∈ I. Finally,
set ăii (i` ) = aii (i` ) = aii .
In what follows, for every i and j in I we will let
||Ãj ||

ŭji

=

X

pj (a(j` ))ui (ăj (j` ))

(D.3)

`=1

Remark D.2: Since each of the payoff vectors v j must only satisfy strong inequalities (see (iii) of the
statement of the theorem), without loss of generality we can take it to be the case that v j ∈ int(V (Ã)), for
||Ã||

each j ∈ I. It then follows that for every j ∈ I we can find a set of positive weights {pj (a(`))}`=1 adding up
to one and such that for every i ∈ I
v ji

=

||Ã||
X

pj (a(`))ui (a(`))

(D.4)

`=1

Remark D.3: Since the payoff vector v̂ is in int(V (Ã)), we can find a real number η > 0 and a set of positive
||Ã||

weights {p̂ (a(`))}`=1 adding up to one and such that for every i ∈ I
v̂i = (1 − η)

||Ã||
X

n

p̂ (a(`))ui (a(`)) +

`=1

ηX j
ŭ
n j=1 i

(D.5)

Definition D.3: Throughout the rest of the argument we let
||Ã||
X

v̂ˆ i =

p̂ (a(`))ui (a(`))

(D.6)

`=1
||Ã||

where the weights {p̂ (a(`))}`=1 are as in Remark D.3.
Remark D.4: Since the payoff vector v ∗ is in int(V ), we can find a real number q > 0 and a set of positive
||A||
weights {p∗ (a(`))}`=1 adding up to one and such that for every i ∈ I
vi∗ = (1 − q)

||A||
X

p∗ (a(`))ui (a(`)) + q v̂i

(D.7)

`=1

In what follows we will let zi =

P||A||

`=1

p∗ (a(`))ui (a(`)).

Remark D.5: Recall that by assumption the payoff vector v ∗ is in int(V ). Therefore, we can find a set of
||A||
positive weights {p0 (a(`))}`=1 adding up to one and such that for every i ∈ I
vi∗

=

||A||
X
`=1

p0 (a(`))ui (a(`))

(D.8)
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Definition D.4. Action-stage Correlation Device: The action stage correlation device x̃ is defined as follows.
Q
2
The set X consists of ||A|| ||Ã||n+1 i∈I ||Ãi || + ||A|| elements.
Q
Let (x(1), . . . , x(κ), . . . , x(||X||) be an enumeration of the elements of X, and let κ = ||A|| ||Ã||n+1 i∈I ||Ãi ||.
Each of the first κ elements of X can be identified by a string of 1 + (n + 1) + n = 2n + 2 indices as
ˆ `1 , . . . , `n , 1` , . . . , i` , . . . , n` )
follows. With a slight abuse of notation, for κ ≤ κ, we will write x(κ) = x(`0 , `,
ˆ
with `0 running from 1 to ||A||, ` and and each of the indices `1 through `n running from 1 to ||Ã||, and each
of the indices i` for i = 1, . . . n running from 1 to ||Ãi ||. Obviously, the last ||X|| − κ elements of X can be
identified by a pair of indices `00 and `∗ both running from 1 to ||A||. In this case, with a slight abuse of
notation again, we will write x(κ) = x(`00 , `∗ ).
We are now ready to define the probability distribution governing the realization of x̃. For κ ≤ κ let
ˆ `1 , . . . , `n , 1` , . . . , i` , . . . , n` )) =
Pr(x̃ = hx(`0 , `,
i
ˆ p1 (a(`1 )) · · · pn (a(`n )) p1 (a(1` )) · · · pi (a(i` )) · · · pn (a(n` ))
q p0 (a(`0 )) p̂(a(`))

(D.9)

and for κ = κ + 1, . . . , ||X|| let


Pr(x̃ = x(`00 , `∗ )) = (1 − q) p0 (a(`00 ))p∗ (a(`∗ ))

(D.10)

Definition D.5. Message-Stage Correlation Device: The message stage correlation device ỹ is defined as
follows. The set Y consists of n + 1 elements, which we denote (y(0), y(1), . . . , y(n)). The random variable ỹ
takes value y(0) with probability 1 − η, and each of the other possible values with probability η/n.
Definition D.6: Throughout the rest of the argument, we let T be an integer sufficiently large so as to
guarantee that the following inequality is satisfied for all i ∈ I.
T (v ii − ω ii ) > ui − ui

(D.11)

Definition D.7. Message Spaces: For each j ∈ I and each t = 1, . . . , T let
M (j, t) = {mj,T −t+1 , mj,T −t+2 , . . . , mj,T }

(D.12)

M (j, t) = M (j, T ) = {mj,1 , . . . , mj,T }

(D.13)

and for every t ≥ T + 1 let

Define also M = {m1 , . . . , mn }, and M̆ = {m̆1 , . . . , m̆n }, and recall that according to our notational convention
when we write M̆−i we mean {m̆1 , . . . , m̆i−1 , m̆i+1 , m̆n }.
Recall that Mit denotes the set of messages that a player hi, t − 1i can send to player hi, ti. For any t =
1, . . . , T let
Mit = {m∗ } ∪ M̆−i ∪ M (1, t) ∪ . . . ∪ M (n, t)

(D.14)

Mit = {m∗ } ∪ M̆−i ∪ M (1, t) ∪ . . . ∪ M (n, t) ∪ M

(D.15)

For any t ≥ T + 1 let

Definition D.8. Action-Stage Strategies: Let k be an element of I, and j be an element of I not equal to i.
Let (x(1), . . . , x(κ), . . . , x(||X||)) be the enumeration of the elements of X of Definition D.1 and consider
the indexation of the elements of X in Definition D.4, according to whether x(κ) has κ ≤ κ or not.
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Recall that at the beginning of period 0 all players hi ∈ I, 0i receive message m0i = ∅. For all players
hi ∈ I, 0i then define
gi0 (m0i , x0 ) =



ai (`0 ) if x0 = x(`0 , · · ·)
ai (`00 ) if x0 = x(`00 , ·)

(D.16)

Now consider any player hi, ti with t ≥ 1. It is convenient to distinguish between the two cases xt = x(κ)
with κ ≤ κ and with κ > κ.
For any i ∈ I and t ≥ 1 whenever xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ define52

ˆ
ˆ · · ·)

ai (`)
if mti = m∗
and xt = x(·, `,


 j
if mti = m̆j
and xt = x(· · ·, j` , · · ·)
ăi (j` )
git (mti , xt ) =
(D.17)
k
t

and xt = x(· · ·, `k , · · ·)
ai (`k )
if mi = m


 a (k )
if mti ∈ M (k, t)
and xt = x(· · ·, k` , · · ·)
i `
For any i ∈ I, t ≥ 1 and mti , whenever xt = x(κ) with κ > κ define
git (mti , xt ) = ai (`∗ ) if xt = x(·, `∗ )

(D.18)

Definition D.9. Message-Stage Strategies: Let k be any element of I, and j be any element of I not equal
to i.
We begin with period t = 0. Recall that m0i = ∅ for all i ∈ I. Let also g0 (m0 , x0 ) = (g10 (m01 , x0 ), . . . ,
0
0
gn (m0n , x0 )), and define g−k
(m0 , x0 ) in the obvious way.
We let
 j
m̆
if a0 = g 0 (m0 , x0 )
and y 0 = y(j)


 i,T
0
0
0
0
m
if a = g (m , x )
and y 0 = y(i)
µ0i (m0i , x0 , a0 , y 0 ) =
(D.19)
0

mk,T if a0−k = g−k
(m0 , x0 ) and a0k 6= gk0 (m0 , x0 )

 ∗
m
otherwise
For the periods t ≥ 1 it is convenient to distinguish between several cases. Assume first that xt = xt (κ)
with κ > κ. Let
 t
if xt = x(·, `∗ )
and at = a(`∗ )
 mi
t
t
t t t
k,T
t
∗
t
∗
µi (mi , x , a , y ) =
(D.20)
if x = x(·, ` ), a−k = a−k (` ) and atk 6= ak (`∗ )
m
 ∗
m
otherwise
Now consider the case xt = xt (κ) with κ ≤ κ. We divide this case into several subcases, according to
which message player hi, ti has received. We begin with mti = m∗ . Let53

ˆ · · ·), at = a(`)
ˆ

m̆j
if xt = x(·, `,
and y t = y(j)



t
t
ˆ
ˆ
ν(M (i, t + 1)) if x = x(·, `, · · ·), a = a(`)
and y t = y(i)
µti (m∗ , xt , at , y t ) =
(D.21)
ˆ · · ·), at = a−k (`)
ˆ
ˆ

mk,T
ifxt = x(·, `,
and atk 6= ak (`)

−k
 ∗

m
otherwise
Our next subcase of κ ≤ κ is that of mti = m̆j . With the understanding that j 0 is any element of I not equal
52
53

Notice that the third case in (D.17) can only possibly apply when t ≥ T + 1.
See our Point of Notation A.1 above for the meaning of ν(·).
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to i, we let

0

m̆j
if xt = x(· · ·, j` , · · ·), at = ăj (j` )
and y t = y(j 0 )



t
t
j
and y t = y(i)
ν(M (i, t + 1)) if x = x(· · ·, j` , · · ·), a = ă (j` )
µti (m̆j , xt , at , y t )=
j
k,T
t
t

m
if x = x(· · ·, j` , · · ·), a−k = ă−k (j` ) and atk =
6 ăjk (j` )


 m∗
otherwise

(D.22)

Still assuming κ ≤ κ we now deal with the subcase mti ∈ M (i, t). For any mi,τ ∈ M (i, t), we let









t
t t t
i,τ
µi (m , x , a , y )=









m̆j
ν(M (i, t + 1))
mk,T
mk,T
mi,τ −1
m∗

if
if
if
if
if

xt
xt
xt
xt
xt

= x(· · ·, j` , · · ·),
= x(· · ·, j` , · · ·),
= x(· · ·, j` , · · ·),
= x(· · ·, j` , · · ·),
= x(· · ·, j` , · · ·)

at = ăi (i` )
and y t = y(j)
t
i
a = ă (i` )
and y t = y(i)
t
i
a−k = ă−k (i` ) and atk =
6 ăik (i` )
at−k = ai−k (i` ) and atk =
6 aik (i` )
t
and a = a(i` )
otherwise

(D.23)

where we set mi,0 = mi . Notice that player hi, ti may need to distinguish between the third and fourth cases
of (D.23) since clearly they may be generated by different values of the index k ∈ I. To verify that this
distinction is always feasible, recall that, by construction (see Definition D.2), ă−i (i` ) differs from a−i (i` ) in
every component, and that of course n ≥ 4.
The next subcase of κ ≤ κ we consider is that of mti ∈ M (j, t). For any mj,τ ∈ M (j, t), we let
 j,τ −1
 m
µti (mj,τ , xt , at , y t ) =
mk,T
 ∗
m

if xt = x(· · ·, j` , · · ·)
if xt = x(· · ·, j` , · · ·), at−k = a−k (j` )

and at = a(j` )
and atk 6= ak (j` )
otherwise

(D.24)

where we set mj,0 = mj .
0
Finally, still assuming that κ ≤ κ, we consider the case in which mti = mk for some k 0 ∈ I. We let

k0

if xt = x(· · ·, `k0 , · · ·)
and at = a(`k0 )
 m
0
t
k
t t t
k,T
t
t
µi (m , x , a , y ) =
(D.25)
if x = x(· · ·, `k0 , · · ·), a−k = a−k (`k0 ) and atk 6= ak (`k0 )
m

 m∗
otherwise
D.3.

Beliefs

Definition D.10. Beginning-of-Period Beliefs: Let k be any element of I, and j be any element of I not
equal to i.
The beginning-of-period beliefs of all players hi ∈ I, 0i are trivial. Of course, all players believe that all
other players have received the null message m0i = ∅.
The beginning-of-period beliefs of any other player hi, ti, depending on the message he receives from
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player hi, t − 1i are as follows.54

if mti = m∗ then mt−i = (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) with probability 1


 t

j
j


 m−i−j = (m̆ , . . . , m̆ ) with pr. 1



t
j
t

with pr. 1
 if mi = m̆ then  mj ∈ M (j, t)
t
t
j,τ
ΦtB
(m
)
=
Pr(m
=
m
)
>
0
∀ mj,τ ∈ M (j, t)
i
i
j



if mti = mj,τ then mt−i = (mj,τ , . . . , mj,τ ) with probability 1




if mti = mi,τ then mt−i = (m̆i , . . . , m̆i ) with probability 1



if mti = mk then mt−i = (mk , . . . , mk ) with probability 1

(D.26)

Definition D.11. End-of-Period Beliefs: Let k be any element of I, and j be any element of I not equal to
i.
We begin with period t = 0. Recall that m0i = ∅ for all i ∈ I. As before, let also g0 (m0 , x0 ) =
0
0
(g1 (m01 , x0 ), . . . , gn0 (m0n , x0 )), and define g−k
(m0 , x0 ) in the obvious way.
0 0 0
0
0E
Let Φi (mi , x , a , y ) be as follows
if a0 = g 0 (m0 , x0 ) and y 0 = y(j)
then m1−i−j = (m̆j , . . . , m̆j ), m1j = mj,T with pr. 1
if a0 = g 0 (m0 , x0 ) and y 0 = y(i)
then m1−i = (m̆i , . . . , m̆i ) with probability 1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
if a−k = g−k (m , x ) and ak 6= gk (mk , x ) then m1−i = (mk,T , . . . , mk,T ) with prob. 1
otherwise
m1−i = (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) with probability 1

(D.27)

Our next case is t ≥ 1 and xt = x(κ) with κ > κ. Let x(`00 , `∗ ) denote the realization of xt . For any
t
∗
t t
55
player hi, ti, let ΦtE
i (mi , x(`00 , ` ), a , y ) be as follows

t+1
j
j

 m−i−j = (m̆ , . . . , m̆ ) with pr. 1
t+1
t
∗
t
j
if a = a(` ) and mi = m̆
then
mj ∈ M (j, t)
with pr. 1

 Pr(mt+1= mj,τ ) > 0
∀
mj,τ ∈ M (j, t)
j
j,τ
if at = a(`∗ ) and mti = mj,τ
then mt+1
, . . . , mj,τ ) with probability 1
−i = (m
(D.28)
t+1
t
∗
t
i,τ
i
if a = a(` ) and mi = m
then m−i = (m̆ , . . . , m̆i ) with probability 1
k
k
then mt+1
if at = a(`∗ ) and mti = mk
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1
t+1
t
∗
t
∗
k,T
if a−k = a−k (` ) and ak 6= ak (` ) then m−i = (m , . . . , mk,T ) with probability 1
∗
∗
otherwise
mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1
We divide the case of t ≥ 1 and xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ into several subcases, according to which message
ˆ · · ·) denote the realization of xt . For any player
player hi, ti has received. We begin with mti = m∗ . Let x(·, `,
j,τ
∗
t t
ˆ
hi, ti, with the understanding that m is a generic element of M (j, t + 1), let ΦtE
i (m , x(·, `, · · ·), a , y ) be
54
Notice that the second line of (D.26) does not fully specify the probability distribution over the component mtj of the beliefs
of player hi, ti. For the rest of the argument, what matters is only that all elements of M (j, t) have positive probability, and that
no message outside this set has positive probability. The distribution can be computed using Bayes’ rule from the equilibrium
strategies described in Definitions D.8 and D.9 above. We omit the details for the sake of brevity.
55
Similarly to (D.26), the first line of (D.28) does not fully specify the probability distribution over the component mt+1
of
j
the beliefs of player hi, ti. For the rest of the argument, what matters is only that all elements of M (j, t) have positive probability,
and that no message outside this set has positive probability. The distribution can be computed using Bayes’ rule from the
equilibrium strategies described in Definitions D.8 and D.9 above. We omit the details for the sake of brevity.
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as follows
(
ˆ and y t = y(j)
if a = a(`)
t

then

j
j
mt+1
−i−j = (m̆ , . . . , m̆ )
t+1
mj = mj,τ

with pr.

1
||M (j, t + 1)||

i
i
ˆ and y t = y(i)
if at = a(`)
then mt+1
−i = (m̆ , . . . , m̆ ) with probability 1
ˆ and at 6= ak (`)
ˆ then mt+1 = (mk,T , . . . , mk,T ) with probability 1
if at−k = a−k (`)
−i
k
∗
∗
otherwise
mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1

(D.29)

The next subcase is that of mti = m̆j . Let x(· · ·, j` , · · ·) denote the realization of xt . With the understanding
0
j
that j 0 is an element of I not equal to i and that mj ,τ is a generic element of M (j 0 , t + 1), let ΦtE
i (m̆ , x(· ·
·, j` , · · ·), at , y t ) be as follows
(
j0
j0
1
mt+1
−i−j = (m̆ , . . . , m̆ )
t
j
t
0
if a = ă (j` ) and y = y(j )
then
with pr.
0
j ,τ
0 , t + 1)||
mt+1
=
m
||M
(j
j0
(D.30)
if at = ăj (j` ) and y t = y(i)
then mt+1
=
(m̆i , . . . , m̆i ) with probability 1
−i
j
j
t+1
t
t
if a−k = ă−k (j` ) and ak 6= ăk (j` ) then m−i = (mk,T , . . . , mk,T ) with probability 1
∗
∗
otherwise
mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1
The next subcase is that of mti = mi,τ ∈ M (i, t). Let x(· · ·, i` , · · ·) denote the realization of xt . With the
i,τ
t t
understanding that mj,τ is a generic element of M (j, t + 1), let ΦtE
i (m , x(· · ·, i` , · · ·), a , y ) be as follows
(

t

i

t

if a = ă (i` ) and y = y(j)

then

if at = ăi (i` ) and y t = y(i)
if at−k = ăi−k (i` ) and atk 6= ăik (i` )
if at−k = a−k (i` ) and atk 6= ak (i` )
if at = a(i` )
otherwise

then
then
then
then

j
j
1
mt+1
−i−j = (m̆ , . . . , m̆ )
with pr.
t+1
j,τ
mj = m
||M (j, t + 1)||
i
i
mt+1
=
(
m̆
,
.
.
.
,
m̆
)
with
probability
1
−i
t+1
k,T
k,T
m−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1
k,T
, . . . , mk,T ) with probability 1
mt+1
−i = (m
t+1
i,τ −1
m−i = (m
, . . . , mi,τ −1 ) with probability 1
t+1
m−i = (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) with probability 1

(D.31)

where we set mi,0 = mi .
The next subcase of t ≥ 1 and xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ that we consider is that of mti = mj,τ ∈ M (j, t).
j,τ
Let x(· · ·, j` , · · ·) denote the realization of xt . Let ΦtE
, x(· · ·, j` , · · ·), at , y t ) be as follows
i (m
j,τ −1
, . . . , mj,τ −1 ) with probability 1
if at = a(j` )
then mt+1
−i = (m
k,T
if at−k = a−k (j` ) and atk 6= ak (j` ) then mt+1
, . . . , mk,T ) with probability 1
−i = (m
t+1
∗
otherwise
m−i = (m , . . . , m∗ ) with probability 1

(D.32)

where we set mj,0 = mj .
0
The final subcase to consider is that of mti = mk for some k 0 ∈ I. Let x(· · ·, `k0 , · · ·) denote the realization
0
k
t t
of xt . Let ΦtE
i (m , x(· · ·, `k0 , · · ·), a , y ) be as follows
0

0

k
k
if at = a(`k0 )
then mt+1
−i = (m , . . . m ) with probability 1
t+1
t
t
k,T
if a−k = a−k (`k0 ) and ak 6= ak (`k0 ) then m−i = (m , . . . , mk,T ) with probability 1
∗
∗
otherwise
mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ) with probability 1

D.4.
IIitE

(D.33)

Sequential Rationality

Definition D.12: Let
denote the end-of-period-t collection of information sets that belong to player
hi, ti, with typical element IitE .
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It is convenient to partition IIitE into mutually disjoint exhaustive subsets on the basis of the associated
beliefs of player hi, ti. The fact that they exhaust IIitE can be checked directly from Definition D.11 above.
Let IIitE (∗) ⊂ IIitE be the collection of information sets in which player hi, ti believes that mt+1
−i is equal
∗
∗
tE
to (m , . . . , m ) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by Φi (∗).
Let IIitE ( ˘i) ⊂ IIitE be the collection of information sets in which player hi, ti believes that mt+1
−i is equal
to (m̆i , . . . , m̆i ) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtE
(
i).
i
˘
For every j ∈ I not equal to i, let IIitE ( ˘ j, t) ⊂ IIitE be the collection of information sets in which
t+1
j
j
player hi, ti believes that mt+1
= mj,τ ) > 0 ∀
−i−j is equal to (m̆ , . . . , m̆ ) with probability one, that Pr(mj
t+1
mj,τ ∈ M (j, t), and that Pr(mj ∈ M (j, t)) = 1.56 These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtE
i ( ˘j, t).
For every j ∈ I not equal to i, let IIitE ( ˘ j, t + 1) ⊂ IIitE be the collection of information sets in which
t+1
j
j
player hi, ti believes that mt+1
= mj,τ ) =
−i−j is equal to (m̆ , . . . , m̆ ) with probability one, that Pr(mj
−1
||M (j, t + 1)|| ∀ mj,τ ∈ M (j, t + 1). These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtE
i ( ˘j, t + 1).
tE
tE
For every k ∈ I, let IIi (k) ⊂ IIi be the collection of information sets in which player hi, ti believes that
k
k
tE
mt+1
−i is equal to (m , . . . , m ) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by Φi (k).
tE
tE
For every k ∈ I, and every τ = max{T − t, 1}, . . . , T let IIi (k, τ ) ⊂ IIi be the collection of information
k,τ
sets in which player hi, ti believes that mt+1
, . . . , mk,τ ) with probability one. These beliefs
−i is equal to (m
tE
will be denoted by Φi (k, τ ).
Definition D.13: Let the strategy profile (g, µ) described in Definitions D.8 and D.9 be given. Fix a period
t+1
t+1
∈ Mkt+1 for every k ∈ I.
t and an n-tuple of messages mt+1 = (mt+1
1 , . . . , mn ), with mk
Clearly, the profile (g, µ) together with mt+1 uniquely determine a probability distribution over action
profiles over all future periods, beginning with t + 1.
Therefore, we can define the expected discounted (from the beginning of period t + 1) payoff to player
hi, ti, given (g, µ) and mt+1 in the obvious way. This will be denoted by v̈it (mt+1 ). Moreover, since the play
a special role in some of the computations that follow, we reserve two pieces of notation for two particular
instances of mt+1 . The expression v̈it (∗) stands for v̈it (mt+1 ) when mt+1 = (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ). Moreover, for any
t+1
k
k
k ∈ I, the expression v̈it (k, τ ) stands for v̈it (mt+1 ) when mt+1
= mk,τ ∈ M (k, t + 1).
−k = (m̆ , . . . m̆ ) and mk
Lemma D.1: For any i ∈ I, any k ∈ I, any t, and any τ = max{T − t, 1}, . . . , T , we have that
h
i
(1 − δ) q v̂ˆ i + (1 − q) zi + δ q vi∗
v̈it (∗) =
1 − δ (1 − q)

(D.34)

and
v̈it (k, τ ) =



(1 − δ) q ŭki + (1 − q) zi + δ q vi∗
1 − δ (1 − q)

(D.35)

where v̈it (∗) and v̈it (k, τ ) are as in Definition D.13, v̂ˆ i is as in (D.6), zi is as in Remark D.4, vi∗ is as in the
statement of the Theorem, and ŭki is as in (D.3).

56

See footnote 55 above.
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Proof: Assume first that t ≥ T . Using Definitions D.8 and D.9 we can write v̈it (∗) and v̈it (k, τ ) recursively as
(
v̈it (∗) = q

"

(1 − δ)v̂ˆ i + δ (1 −

η)v̈it+1 (∗)

#)
T
η X X v̈it+1 (k 0 , τ )
+
+
n 0 τ =1
T
k ∈I


(1 − q) (1 − δ)zi + δv̈it+1 (∗)

(D.36)

and
(
v̈it (k, τ )

=q

"

(1 −

δ)ŭki

+ δ (1 −

η)v̈it+1 (∗)

#)
T
η X X v̈it+1 (k 0 , τ )
+
+
n 0 τ =1
T
k ∈I


(1 − q) (1 − δ)zi + δv̈it+1 (k, τ )

(D.37)

Since the strategy profile (g, µ) described in Definitions D.8 and D.9 is stationary for t ≥ T , we immediately have that v̈it (∗) = v̈it+1 (∗) and, for any k ∈ I and any τ = 1, . . . , T , v̈it (k, τ ) = v̈it+1 (k, τ ). Hence we can
solve (D.36) and (D.37) simultaneously for the N T + 1 variables v̈it (∗) and v̈it (k, τ ) (k ∈ I and τ = 1, . . . , T ).
Using (D.7) this immediately gives (D.34) and (D.35), as required.
Proceeding by induction backwards from t = T , it is also immediate to verify that the statement holds
for any t < T . The details are omitted for the sake of brevity.
Lemma D.2: Let the strategy profile (g, µ) and system of beliefs Φ described in Definitions D.8, D.9, D.10
and D.11 be given. Then the end-of-period continuation payoffs for any player hi, ti (discounted as of the
beginning of period t + 1) at any information set Iit ∈ IIitE (as categorized in Definition D.12) are as follows.57
vit (g, µ|ΦtE
i (∗)) =

vit (g, µ|ΦtE
i ( ˘i))

h
i
(1 − δ) q v̂ˆ i + (1 − q) zi + δ q vi∗

(D.38)

1 − δ (1 − q)



(1 − δ) q ŭii + (1 − q) zi + δ q vi∗
=
1 − δ (1 − q)

t
tE
vit (g, µ|ΦtE
i ( ˘j, t)) = vi (g, µ|Φi ( ˘j, t + 1)) =

h
i
(1 − δ) q ŭji + (1 − q) zi + δ q vi∗
1 − δ (1 − q)

k
vit (g, µ|ΦtE
i (k)) = q v i + (1 − q)zi

(D.39)

∀j 6= i

∀k ∈ I



τ 
 k

δq
vit (g, µ|ΦtE
(k,
τ
))
=
1
−
qω i + (1 − q)zi +
i

τ 1 − δ(1 − q)
 k

δq
qv i + (1 − q)zi
∀ k ∈ I ∀ τ = max{T − t, 1}, . . . , T
1 − δ(1 − q)

(D.40)

(D.41)

(D.42)

where v̂ˆ i is as in (D.6), zi is as in Remark D.4, vi∗ is as in the statement of the Theorem, ŭki is as in (D.3),
and ω ki is as in (D.2).

57

See our Point of Notation A.3 above.
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Proof: Equations (D.38), (D.39) and (D.40) are a direct consequence of Definition D.12 and Lemma D.1.
Equation (D.41) follows directly from Definition D.12 and the description of the profile (g, µ) in Definitions
D.8 and D.9.
Using the notation established in Definition D.13, consider the quantity v̈it (mk,τ , . . . , mk,τ ). Given the
strategies described in Definitions D.8 and D.9 it is evident that this quantity does not depend on t. Therefore,
for any k ∈ I and τ = max{T − t, 1}, . . . , T , we can let v̈i (k, τ ) = v̈it (mk,τ , . . . , mk,τ ), for all t. Clearly, using
Definition D.12, we have that for all k, τ and t, vit (g, µ|ΦtE
i (k, τ )) = v̈i (k, τ ).
From the description of (g, µ) in Definitions D.8 and D.9, for any k ∈ I and for any τ = 2, . . . , T , the
quantity v̈i (k, τ ) obeys a difference equation as follows.


v̈i (k, τ ) = q (1 − δ)ω ki + δv̈i (k, τ − 1) + (1 − q) [(1 − δ)zi + δv̈i (k, τ )]
(D.43)
Using again Definitions D.8 and D.9, the terminal condition for (D.43) is


v̈i (k, 1) = q (1 − δ)ω ki + δ[qv ki + (1 − q)zi ] + (1 − q) [(1 − δ)zi + δv̈i (k, 1)]

(D.44)

Solving (D.43) and imposing the terminal condition (D.44) now yields (D.42), as required.
Purely for expositional convenience, before completing the proof of sequential rationality at the message
stage, we now proceed with the argument that establishes sequential rationality at the action stage.
Definition D.14: Recall that at the action stage, player hi, ti chooses an action after having received a
message mti and having observed a realization xt of the correlation device x̃t .
Let IIitB denote period-t action-stage collection of information sets that belong to player hi, ti, with typical
element IitB . Clearly, each element of IIitB is identified by a pair (mti , xt ).
It is convenient to partition IIitB into mutually disjoint exhaustive subsets. The fact that they exhaust
tB
IIi can be checked directly from Definition D.10 above.
Let IIitB (∗) ⊂ IIitB be the collection of information sets in which player hi, ti believes that mt−i is equal
to (m∗ , . . . , m∗ ) with probability one.58 These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtB
i (∗).
Let IIitB ( ˘i) ⊂ IIitB be the collection of information sets in which player hi, ti believes that mt−i is equal
to (m̆i , . . . , m̆i ) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtB
i ( ˘i).
tB
tB
For every j ∈ I not equal to i, let IIi ( ˘j) ⊂ IIi be the collection of information sets in which player hi, ti
believes that mt−i−j is equal to (m̆j , . . . , m̆j ) with probability one, that Pr(mtj = mj,τ ) > 0 ∀ mj,τ ∈ M (j, t),
and that Pr(mtj ∈ M (j, t)) = 1.59 These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtB
i ( ˘j).
For every j ∈ I not equal to i, and every τ = max{T −t+1, 1}, . . . , T let IIitB (j, τ ) ⊂ IIitB be the collection
of information sets in which player hi, ti believes that mt−i is equal to (mj,τ , . . . , mj,τ ) with probability one.
These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtB
i (j, τ ).
For every k ∈ I, let IIitB (k) ⊂ IIitB be the collection of information sets in which player hi, ti believes that
mt−i is equal to (mk , . . . , mk ) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtE
i (k).
Lemma D.3: There exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that whenever δ > δ the action-stage strategies described in
Definition D.8 are sequentially rational given the beliefs described in Definition D.10 for every player hi, ti.60

58
In the interest of brevity, we avoid an explicit distinction between the t = 0 players and all others. What follows can be
interpreted as applying to all players re-defining m0i to be equal to m∗ for players hi ∈ I, 0i.
59
See footnote 54.
60
It should be understood that we are, for now, taking it as given that each player hi, ti follows the prescriptions of the
message-stage strategies described in Definition D.9. Of course, we have not demonstrated yet that this is in fact sequentially
rational given the beliefs described in Definition D.11. We will come back to this immediately after the current lemma is proved.
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Proof: Consider any information set IitB ∈ {IIitB (∗) ∪ IIitB ( ˘i) ∪ IIitB ( ˘j)}.61
Using Definition D.8, Lemma D.2 and Definition D.14, it is immediate to check that, as δ → 1, the limit
expected continuation payoff to player hi, ti from following the action-stage strategies described in Definition
D.8 at any of these information sets is
vi∗ = qv̂i + (1 − q)zi

(D.45)

In the same way, it can be checked that, as δ → 1, the limit expected continuation payoff to player hi, ti from
deviating at any of these information sets is
qv ii + (1 − q)zi

(D.46)

Since by assumption v̂i > v ii this is of course sufficient to prove our claim for any information set IitB ∈
{IIitB (∗) ∪ IIitB ( ˘i) ∪ IIitB ( ˘j)}.
Now consider any information set IitB either in IIitB (j, τ ) or in IIitB (j) (with j 6= i).
Using Definition D.8, Lemma D.2 and Definition D.14, it is immediate to check that, as δ → 1, the limit
expected continuation payoff to player hi, ti from following the action-stage strategies described in Definition
D.8 at any of these information sets is
qv ji + (1 − q)zi

(D.47)

In the same way, it can be checked that, as δ → 1, the limit expected continuation payoff to player hi, ti from
deviating at any of these information sets is exactly as in (D.46).
Since by assumption for any j 6= i we have that v ji > v ii this is of course sufficient to prove our claim for
any of these information sets.
To conclude the proof of the lemma, we now consider any information set IitB ∈ IIitB (i). Using Definition
D.8, Lemma D.2 and Definition D.14, it can be checked that the expected continuation payoff to player
hi, ti from following the action-stage strategies described in Definition D.8 at any of these information sets is
bounded below by


(D.48)
(1 − δ)ui + δ qv ii + (1 − q)zi
In the same way it can be readily seen that the expected continuation payoff to player hi, ti from deviating
at any of these information sets is bounded above by
("

T #
 i

δq
(1 − δ)ui + δ
1−
qω i + (1 − q) zi +
1 − δ (1 − q)
)
(D.49)

T
 i

δq
qv i + (1 − q) zi
1 − δ (1 − q)
The difference given by (D.48) minus (D.49) can be written as

 "
T #




δq


i
i


vi − ωi



 δq 1 − 1 − δ (1 − q)
− (ui − ui )
(1 − δ)


(1 − δ)








61

See Definition D.14.

(D.50)
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Consider now the term inside the curly brackets in (D.50). We have that
"

T #

δq
δq 1 −
v ii − ω ii
1 − δ (1 − q)
lim
− (ui − ui ) = T (v ii − ω ii ) − (ui − ui )
δ→1
(1 − δ)

(D.51)

Using (D.11), we know that the quantity on the right-hand side of (D.51) is strictly positive. Hence we can
conclude our claim is valid at any information set IitB ∈ IIitB (i).
Lemma D.4: Consider the notation we established in Definition D.13. For any given t and τ = max{T −
t, 1}, . . . , T let v̈it (m, mi,τ ) denote v̈it (mt+1 ) when the vector mt+1 has the i-th component equal to a generic
i,τ
i,τ
t
i,τ
i,τ
m ∈ Mit+1 and mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ). As in the proof of Lemma D.2, let v̈i (i, τ ) = v̈i (m , . . . , m ).
t+1
Then there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that whenever δ > δ for every player hi, ti, for every m ∈ Mi , and
for every τ = max{T − t, 1}, . . . , T
v̈i (i, τ ) ≥ v̈it (m, mi,τ )

(D.52)

Proof: We prove the claim for the case t ≥ T . The treatment of t < T has some completely non-essential
complications due to the fact that the players’ message spaces increase in size for the first T periods. The
details are are omitted for the sake of brevity.
We now introduce a new random random variable w̃, independent of x̃ and ỹ (see Definitions D.4 and
D.5), and uniformly distributed over the finite set {1, . . . , T }. This will be used in the rest of the proof of
the lemma to keep track of the “private” randomization across messages that members of dynasty i may be
required to perform (see Definition D.9). Just as we did for the action-stage and the message-stage correlation
devices, we consider countably many independent “copies” of w̃, one for each time period, denoted by w̃t ,
with typical realization wt .
To keep track of all “future randomness” looking ahead for t0 = 1, 2, . . . periods from t, it will also be
0
convenient to define the random vectors s̃t,t
0

0

0

0

s̃t,t = [(x̃t+1 , ỹ t+1 , w̃t+1 ), . . . , (x̃t+t , ỹ t+t , w̃t+t )]
0

0

(D.53)
0

0

0

A typical realization of s̃t,t will be denoted by st,t = [(xt+1 , y t+1 , wt+1 ), . . . , (xt+t , y t+t , wt+t )]. The set of
0
0
all possible realizations of s̃t,t (which obviously does not depend on t) is denoted by S t .
Recall that the profile (g, µ) described in Definitions D.8 and D.9 is taken as given throughout. Now
i,τ
i,τ
suppose that in period t, player hi, ti sends a generic message m ∈ Mit+1 and that mt+1
−i = (m , . . . , m ).
t,t0
Then, given any realization s we can compute the actual action profile played by all players hk ∈ I, t + t0 i.
0
0
0
This will be denoted by at+t (m, mi,τ , st,t ). Similarly, we can compute the profile of messages mt+t
−i received
0
0
by all players hj 6= i, t + t0 i. This n − 1-tuple will be denoted by mt+t (m, mi,τ , st,t ).
Recall that the messages received by all time-t + t0 players are the result of choices and random draws
0
that take place on or before period t + t0 − 1. Therefore it is clear that if we are given two realizations ŝt,t
0
0
0
0
t,t
t+t
t+t
0
0
0
0
0
ˆ t+t )], then it must be that
= [st,t −1 , (x̂t+t , ŷ t+t , ŵt+t )] and ŝˆ
= [st,t −1 , (x̂ˆ
, ŷˆ
, ŵ
0

0
0
0
t,t
mt+t (m, mi,τ , ŝt,t ) = mt+t (m, mi,τ , ŝˆ )

(D.54)

Notice next that from the description of the profile (g, µ) in Definitions D.8 and D.9 it is also immediate
0
0
0
to check that for any t0 , any m ∈ Mit+1 and any realization st,t the message profile mt+t (m, mi,τ , st,t ) can
0
0
only take one out of two possible forms. Either we have mt+t (m, mi,τ , st,t ) = (mi , . . . , mi ) or it must be
0
0
0
0
that mt+t (m, mi,τ , st,t ) = (mi,τ , . . . , mi,τ ) for some τ 0 = 1, . . . , T .

66

The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games
Lastly, notice that, given an arbitrary message m ∈ Mit+1 we can write
v̈it (m, mi,τ ) = (1 − δ)

∞
X

0

0

X

δ t −1

0

0

0

Pr(s̃t,t = st,t )ui [at+t (m, mi,τ , st,t )]

(D.55)

st,t0 ∈S t0

t0 =1

Since the strategies described in Definitions D.8 and D.9 are stationary for t ≥ T , and the distribution
0
of s̃t,t is independent of t, it is evident from (D.55) that v̈it (m, mi,τ ) does not depend on t. From now on we
drop the superscript and write v̈i (m, mi,τ ).
We now proceed with the proof of inequality (D.52) of the statement of the lemma. In order to do so,
from now on we fix a particular t = t̂, m = m̂ and τ = τ̂ , and we prove (D.52) for these fixed values of t m
and τ . Since the lower bound on δ that we will find will clearly not depend on t, and since there are finitely
many values that m and τ can take, this will be sufficient to prove the claim.
Inequality (D.52) in the statement of the lemma is trivially satisfied (as an equality) if m = mi,τ . From
now on assume that m̂ and τ̂ are such that m̂ 6= mi,τ̂ .
0
Given any t0 = 1, 2, . . ., we now partition the set of realizations S t into five disjoint exhaustive subsets;
t0
t0
t0
t0
t0
S1 , S2 , S3 , S4 and S5 . This will allow us to decompose the right-hand side of (D.55) in a way that will
make possible the comparison with (a similar decomposition of) the left-hand side of (D.52) as required to
prove the lemma.
Let
0

0

0

0

0

0

S1t = {st̂,t | mt̂+t (mi,τ̂ , mi,τ̂ , st̂,t ) = (mi,τ , . . . , mi,τ ) for some τ 0 = 1, . . . , τ̂ }
0

(D.56)

0

and notice that if t0 ≤ τ̂ then S1t = S t .
Assume now that t0 > τ̂ and let
0

0

0

0

S2t = {st̂,t | mt̂+t (m̂, mi,τ̂ , st̂,t ) = (mi , . . . , mi ) and
0
0
0
0
ui (at̂+t (m̂, mi,τ̂ , st̂,t )) ≤ ui (at̂+t (mi,τ̂ , mi,τ̂ , st̂,t ))}

(D.57)

and
0

0

0

0

S3t = {st̂,t | mt̂+t (m̂, mi,τ̂ , st̂,t ) = (mi , . . . , mi ) and
0
0
0
0
ui (at̂+t (m̂, mi,τ̂ , st̂,t )) > ui (at̂+t (mi,τ̂ , mi,τ̂ , st̂,t ))}
0

(D.58)

0

0

Notice that if the first condition in (D.57) holds, then mt̂+t (mi,τ̂ , mi,τ̂ , st̂,t ) = (mi , . . . , mi ). Therefore, S1t
0
0
and S2t and S3t are disjoint.
00
00
Next, let any st̂,t ∈ S3t with t00 < t0 be given and define
0

00

0

0

00

00

0

00

0

S4t (st̂,t ) = {st̂,t | st̂,t = (st̂,t , st ,t ) for some st ,t and
||{t ∈ (t00 + 1, . . . , t0 − 1) | xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ}|| ≤ T − 1}

(D.59)

Now let
0

S4t =

0

[
00

00

S4t (st̂,t )

(D.60)

0

t <t
00

00

st̂,t ∈S3t

0

0

0

From the strategies described in Definitions D.8 and D.9 it can be checked that if st̂,t ∈ S4t then mt̂+t (m̂,
0
0
0
0
0
mi,τ̂ , st̂,t ) = (mi,τ , . . . , mi,τ ) for some τ 0 and mt̂+t (mi,τ̂ , mi,τ̂ , st̂,t ) = (mi , . . . , mi ). Therefore, it is clear
0
0
0
0
that S4t is disjoint from S1t , S2t and S3t .
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0

The last set in the partition of S t is defined as the residual of the previous four.
0

0

0

0

0

0

S5t = S t /{S1t ∪ S2t ∪ S3t ∪ S4t }

(D.61)

Using (D.55), we can now proceed to compare the two sides of inequality (D.52) of the statement of the
0
0
0
0
0
lemma for the five distinct (conditional) cases st̂,t ∈ S1t through st̂,t ∈ S5t . Notice first of all that when st̂,t
t0
∈ S2 , we know immediately from (D.57) that there is nothing to prove.
0
0
0
0
We begin with st̂,t ∈ S1t . Notice first of all that if we fix any st̂,t ∈ S1t , then it follows from (D.54) and
0
0
0
0
0
0
(D.56) that any st̂,t of the form [st̂,t −1 , st −1,t ] (where st̂,t −1 are the first t0 − 1 triples of st̂,t ) is in fact in
t0
S1 .
Using, (D.56) and Definitions 6, D.8 and D.9 we get
X
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Pr(s̃t −1,t = st −1,t ) ui (at̂+t (mi,τ̂ , mi,τ̂ , [st̂,t −1 , st −1,t ])) = qω ii + (1 − q)zi ≥
st0 −1,t0 ∈S 1

X

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Pr(s̃t −1,t = st −1,t ) ui (at̂+t (m̂, mi,τ̂ , [st̂,t −1 , st −1,t ]))

(D.62)

st0 −1,t0 ∈S 1
0

0

Therefore, since the st̂,t that we fixed is an arbitrary element of S1t , we can now conclude that
X
X
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Pr(s̃t̂,t = st̂,t ) ui (at̂,t (mi,τ̂ , mi,τ̂ , st̂,t )) ≥
Pr(s̃t̂,t = st̂,t ) ui (at̂,t (m̂, mi,τ̂ , st̂,t ))
0
st̂,t0 ∈S1t

(D.63)

0
st̂,t0 ∈S1t
0

0

Now fix any st̂,t ∈ S3t . Using, (D.58), (D.59) and (D.60), and Definitions D.8 and D.9 we get that the
difference given by
0

0

0

0

Pr(s̃t̂,t = st̂,t )ui (at̂+t (mi,τ̂ , mi,τ̂ , st̂,t ))+
∞
X
X
00
0
00
00
00
00
δ (t −t )
Pr(s̃t̂,t = st̂,t )ui (at̂+t (mi,τ̂ , mi,τ̂ , st̂,t ))
t00 =t0 +1

(D.64)

00
0
st̂,t00 ∈S4t (st̂,t )

minus
0

0

0

0

Pr(s̃t̂,t = st̂,t )ui (at̂+t (m̂, mi,τ̂ , st̂,t ))+
∞
X
X
00
00
00
00
00
0
Pr(s̃t̂,t = st̂,t )ui (at̂+t (m̂, mi,τ̂ , st̂,t ))
δ (t −t )
t00 =t0 +1

(D.65)

00
0
st̂,t00 ∈S4t (st̂,t )

is greater or equal to

0

0

Pr(s̃t̂,t = st̂,t )

 "

T #


δq

i
i

v
δq
1
−
−
ω

i
i

1 − δ (1 − q)






(1 − δ)







− (ui − ui )






(D.66)

Notice now that we know that the quantity in (D.66) is in fact positive for δ sufficiently close to 1. This is
simply because the term in curly brackets in (D.66) is the same as the right-hand side of (D.51). Therefore,
0
0
00
0
we have dealt with any st̂,t ∈ S3t and with all its relevant “successors” of the form S4t (st̂,t ). Since t0 is
0
0
arbitrary, by (D.60), this exhausts S3t and S4t for all possible values of t0 .
0
0
0
0
Finally, we deal with st̂,t ∈ S5t . Notice first of all that if we fix any st̂,t ∈ S5t , then it follows from (D.54)
0
0
0
0
0
0
and (D.61) that any st̂,t of the form [st̂,t −1 , st −1,t ] (where st̂,t −1 are the first t0 − 1 triples of st̂,t ) is in fact
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in S5t .
Using, (D.61) and Definitions D.8 and D.9 we get
X
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Pr(s̃t −1,t = st −1,t ) ui (at̂+t (mi,τ̂ , mi,τ̂ , [st̂,t −1 , st −1,t ])) = qv ii + (1 − q)zi >
st0 −1,t0 ∈S 1

qω ii + (1 − q)zi ≥

X

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Pr(s̃t −1,t = st −1,t ) ui (at̂+t (m̂, mi,τ̂ , [st̂,t −1 , st −1,t ]))

(D.67)

st0 −1,t0 ∈S 1
0

0

Therefore, since the st̂,t that we fixed is an arbitrary element of S5t , we can now conclude that
X
X
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Pr(s̃t̂,t = st̂,t ) ui (at̂,t (mi,τ̂ , mi,τ̂ , st̂,t )) ≥
Pr(s̃t̂,t = st̂,t ) ui (at̂,t (m̂, mi,τ̂ , st̂,t ))

(D.68)

0
st̂,t0 ∈S5t

0
st̂,t0 ∈S5t

Hence, the proof of the lemma is now complete.
Remark D.6: Let the strategy profile (g, µ) described in Definitions D.8 and D.9 be given. Consider a
0
player hi, ti, and a realization of future uncertainty st,t as defined in the proof of Lemma D.4.
Let any message m ∈ Mit+1 be given, and fix any information set IitE and associated beliefs ΦtE
i (·).
It is then clear from Definitions D.8 and D.9 and D.12, that for any t0 the action that player hi, ti expects
0
player hi, t + t0 i to take is uniquely determined by m, st,t and IitE .
0
0
For the rest of the argument we will denote this by at+t
(m, st,t , IitE ).
i
Lemma D.5: There exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that whenever δ > δ the message-stage strategies described in
Definition D.9 are sequentially rational given the beliefs described in Definition D.11 for every player hi, ti.
Proof: Consider any information set IitE ∈ IIitE (i, τ ), where IIitE (i, τ ) is as in Definition D.12. It is then
evident from Lemma D.4 and from the beliefs ΦtE
i (i, τ ) described in Definition D.12 that for δ sufficiently
close to 1, the message strategies described in Definition D.9 are sequentially rational at any such information
set.
From now on, consider any information set IitE 6∈ IIitE (i, τ ). Let m ∈ Mit+1 be the message that player
hi, ti should send according to the strategy µti , and let m̂ be any other message in Mit+1 . Consider a particular
0
00
0
realization st,t , and for any t00 ∈ {1, . . . , t0 − 1}, let st,t denote the first t00 triples of st,t .
0
0
0
0
(m̂, st,t , IitE ), and that either t0 = 1, or alternatively that
Next, assume that ait+t (m, st,t , IitE ) 6= at+t
i
00
00
00
00
at+t
(m, st,t , IitE ) = ait+t (m̂, st,t , IitE ) for every t00 ∈ {1, . . . , t0 − 1}.
i
00
Clearly, in periods {t + 1, . . . , t0 − 1}, conditional on st,t , the payoff to player hi, ti is unaffected by the
00
deviation to m̂. Now consider the payoff to player hi, ti, conditional on st,t , from the beginning of period t0
on, for simplicity discounted from the beginning of period t0 . If player hi, ti sends message m as prescribed
by µti , and δ is close enough to 1, the payoff in question is bounded below by
(1 − δ)ui + δ(qv ii + (1 − q)zi )

(D.69)
00

Now consider the payoff to player hi, ti if he sends message m̂, conditional on st,t , from the beginning of
period t0 on, for simplicity discounted from the beginning of period t0 . In period t0 the action played cannot
yield him more than ui . From Lemma D.4, we know that, for δ close enough to 1, from the beginning of
period t0 + 1 the payoff is bounded above by v̈i (i, T ). Hence, for δ close enough to 1, using (D.42) the payoff
in question is bounded above by
("
)
T #
T


 i

 i

δq
δq
δui + (1 − δ) 1 −
qω i + (1 − q)zi +
qv i + (1 − q)zi
(D.70)
1 − δ(1 − q)
1 − δ(1 − q)
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Notice now that the quantity in (D.69) is the same as the quantity in (D.48), and the quantity in (D.70) is
in fact the same as the quantity in (D.49). Hence, exactly as in the proof of Lemma D.3, we know that, for
δ sufficiently close to 1, the quantity in (D.69) is greater than the quantity in (D.70). This is clearly enough
to conclude the proof.
D.5.

Consistency of Beliefs

Definition D.15: Throughout this section we let ε denote a small positive number, which parameterizes
the completely mixed strategies that we construct. It should be understood that our construction of beliefs
involves the limit ε → 0.
Definition D.16. Completely Mixed Action Strategies: Given ε, the completely mixed strategies for all playt
ers hi, ti at the action stage are denoted by gi,ε
and are defined as follows.62
After receiving a message m ∈ {m∗ } ∪ M̆−i ∪ M (i, t) and observing the realization xt of the actionstage correlation device, any player hi, ti plays the action prescribed by the action-stage strategy described
in Definition D.8 with probability 1 − ε2 (||A||i − 1) and plays all other actions in Ai with probability ε2 each.
After receiving any message m 6∈ {m∗ } ∪ M̆−i ∪ M (i, t) and observing the realization xt of the actionstage correlation device, any player hi, ti plays the action prescribed by the action-stage strategy described
in Definition D.8 with probability 1 − ε(||A||i − 1) and plays all other actions in Ai with probability ε each.
Definition D.17. Completely Mixed Message Strategies: Given ε, the completely mixed strategies for all
players hi, ti at the message stage are denoted by µti,ε and are defined as follows.
Player < i, t > sends the message prescribed by the message-stage strategy described in Definition D.9
with probability 1 − ε2n+1 (||Mit+1 || − 1) and sends all other messages in Mit+1 with probability ε2n+1 each.
Remark D.7: Let (gε , µε ) be the completely mixed strategy profile of Definitions D.16 and D.17. It is
then straightforward to check that as ε → 0 the profile (gε , µε ) converges to the equilibrium strategy profile
described in Definitions D.8 and D.9.
Lemma D.6: The strategy profile (g, µ) described in Definitions D.8 and D.9 and the beginning-of-period
beliefs described in Definition D.10 are consistent.
Proof: When t = 0, there is nothing to prove. Assume t ≥ 1. We consider two cases. First assume that
player hi, ti receives message m ∈ {m∗ } ∪ M̆−i ∪ M (i, t). Clearly, this is on the equilibrium path generated
by the profile of strategies (g, µ) described in Definitions D.8 and D.9. Therefore, consistency in this case
simply requires checking that the beginning-of-period beliefs described in Definition D.10 are obtained via
Bayes’ rule from the profile (g, µ). This is a routine exercise, and we omit the details.
Now assume that player hi, ti receives message m 6∈ {m∗ } ∪ M̆−i ∪ M (i, t). From Definition D.10 it is
immediate to check that in this case player hi, ti assigns probability one to the event that mt−i = (m, . . . , m).
Given (g, µ), this event may of course have been generated by several possible histories. Notice however, that
the profile (g, µ) is such that a single deviation by one player at the action stage is sufficient to generate the
message profile mt = (m, . . . , m). Therefore, upon observing m 6∈ {m∗ } ∪ M̆−i ∪ M (i, t) the probability that
mt−i = (m, . . . , m) is an infinitesimal in ε of order no higher than 2.63 This needs to be compared with the
probability that mt−i 6= (m, . . . , m) and mti = m. The latter event is impossible given the profile (g, µ) unless
a deviation at the message stage has occurred at some point. Therefore its probability is an infinitesimal in
ε of order no lower than 2n + 1. This is obviously enough to prove the claim.
62
In the interest of brevity, we avoid an explicit distinction between the t = 0 players and all others. What follows can be
interpreted as applying to all players re-defining m0i to be equal to m∗ for players hi ∈ I, 0i.
63
See footnote 36 above for a specification of our (standard) use of terminology concerning the orders of infinitesimals.
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Lemma D.7: The strategy profile (g, µ) described in Definitions D.8 and D.9 and the end-of-period beliefs
described in Definition D.11 are consistent.
Proof: The case t = 0 is trivial. Assume t ≥ 1, and consider any player hi, ti after having observed
(mti , xt , at , y t ).
We deal first with the case in which xt = x(κ) with κ > κ. Let x(`00 , `∗ ) denote the realization xt .
In this case, the action-stage strategies described in Definition D.8 prescribe that every player hk ∈ I, ti
should play atk (`∗ ). Therefore, if the observed action profile at is equal to a(`∗ ), player hi, ti does not revise
his beginning-of-period beliefs during period t. Hence consistency in this case follows immediately from the
profile µ and from the consistency of beginning-of-period beliefs, which of course was proved in Lemma D.6.
Notice now that if at 6= a(`∗ ), then the message strategies described in Definition D.9 prescribe that each
player hk ∈ I, ti should send a message that does not depend on the message mtk he received. Hence, in this
case consistency is immediate from Definition D.11 and the profile µ.
We now turn to the case in which xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ. Here, it is necessary to consider several subcases,
depending on the message m received by player hi, ti. Assume first that m 6∈ M̆−i ∪ M (i, t). Then for any
possible triple (xt , at , y t ) we have that
lim Pr(mt−i = (m, . . . , m) | mti = m, xt , at , gε , µε ) = 1

ε→0

(D.71)

ˆ · · ·), and at = (a1 (`),
ˆ . . . , an (`)).
ˆ
To see this consider two sets of possibilities. First, m = m∗ , xt = x(·, `,
Then play is as prescribed by the equilibrium path generated by the profile (g, µ), and from Definitions D.8
and D.9 there is nothing more to prove. For all other possibilities, notice that the event mt = (m, . . . , m) is
consistent with any at together with n deviations at the action stage of the second type described in Definition
D.16. Therefore, for any at , the probability of mt = (m, . . . , m) and at is an infinitesimal in ε of order no
higher than 2n. On the other hand, from Definition D.17 it is immediate that the probability that mt−i 6=
(m, . . . , m) (since it requires at least one deviation at the message stage) is an infinitesimal in ε of order no
lower than 2n + 1. Hence (D.71) follows. From (D.71) it is a matter of routine to check the consistency of
end-of-period beliefs from using the profile (g, µ). We omit the details.
Still assuming that xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ, now consider the case m = m̆j ∈ M̆−i . In this case we can
show that
lim Pr(mt−i−j = (m̆j , . . . , m̆j ) and mtj ∈ M (j, t) | mti = m̆j , xt , at , gε , µε ) = 1

ε→0

(D.72)

using an argument completely analogous to the one we used for (D.71). The details are omitted. As in the
previous case, from (D.72) it is a matter of routine to check the consistency of end-of-period beliefs from
using the profile (g, µ).
The last case remaining is xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ and m = mi,τ . In this case we have that
lim Pr(mt−i = (m̆i , . . . , m̆i ) | mti = mi,τ , xt , at , gε , µε )+

ε→0

lim Pr(mt−i = (mi,τ , . . . , mi,τ ) | mti = mi,τ , xt , at , gε , µε ) = 1

(D.73)

ε→0

Again, the argument is completely analogous to the one used for (D.71) and (D.72), and the details are
omitted. Now take (D.73) as given and let xt = x(· · ·, i` , · · ·).
Suppose next that at−i = ăi−i (i` ). Then player hi, ti does not revise his beginning-of-period beliefs, and
hence, using the profile µ and Lemma D.6 it is immediate to check that his end-of-period beliefs are consistent
in this case.
Now suppose that for some j 6= i we have that atj 6= ăij (i` ) and at−i−j = ăi−i−j (i` ). Consistency of beliefs
in this case requires showing that the first element in the sum in (D.73) is equal to 1. Of course given (D.73)
it suffices to compare the probabilities of the two events mt−i = (m̆i , . . . , m̆i ) and mt−i = (mi,τ , . . . , mi,τ ).
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The first is compatible with a single deviation at the action stage on the part of player hj, ti. Therefore its
probability is an infinitesimal in ε of order no higher than 2. The latter requires an action-stage deviation
in some period t0 < t (order 2 in ε), and n − 2 action-stage deviations in period t (order 1 each). Hence,
player hi, ti has consistent beliefs if he assigns probability 1 to mt−i = (m̆i , . . . , m̆i ). The consistency of his
end-of-period beliefs can then be checked from the profile µ.
Now suppose that for some j 6= i we have that atj 6= aij (i` ) and at−i−j = ai−i−j (i` ). Consistency of beliefs in
this case requires showing that the second element in the sum in (D.73) is equal to 1. Of course given (D.73)
it suffices to compare the probabilities of the two events mt−i = (m̆i , . . . , m̆i ) and mt−i = (mi,τ , . . . , mi,τ ).
The first requires (n − 2) deviations at the action-stage of period t, each of order 2 in ε. Since n ≥ 4, this is
therefore an infinitesimal in ε of order no lower than 4. The second is consistent with a deviation of order 2
in ε at the action-stage of some period t0 < t, together with a deviation of order 1 in ε at the action stage of
period t. Therefore its probability is an infinitesimal in ε of order no higher than 3. Hence, player hi, ti has
consistent beliefs if he assigns probability 1 to mt−i = (mi,τ , . . . , mi,τ ). The consistency of his end-of-period
beliefs can then be checked from the profile µ. The same argument applies to show the consistency of his
end-of-period beliefs when at−i = ai−i (i` ). We omit the details.
In all other possible cases for at , the messages sent by all players hj 6= i, ti do not in fact depend on at ,
provided that mtj is either m̆i or mi,τ . Given (D.73), the consistency of the end-of-period beliefs of player
hi, ti can then be checked directly from the profile µ.
D.6. Proof of the Theorem
Given any v ∈ int(V ) and any δ ∈ (0, 1), using (D.8), (D.7) and the strategies and correlation devices
described in Definitions D.4, D.5, D.8 and D.9 clearly implement the payoff vector v ∗ .
From Lemmas D.3 and D.5 we know that there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that whenever δ > δ each strategy
in the profile described in Definitions D.8 and D.9 is sequentially rational given the beliefs described in
Definitions D.10 and D.11.
From Lemmas D.6 and D.7 we know that the strategy profile described in Definitions D.8 and D.9 and
the beliefs described in Definitions D.10 and D.11 are consistent.
Hence, using Lemma A.1, the proof of Theorem 3 is now complete.
∗

Appendix E: The Proof of Theorem 4
Definition E.1: Let a profile of message strategies µ be given. Fix an “augmented history” κt = (x0 , a0 , y 0 ,
. . . , xt−1 , at−1 , y t−1 ). In other words, fix a history ht , together with a sequence of realizations of the messagestage correlation device (y 0 , . . . , y t−1 ). In what follows, κ0 will denote the null history ∅, and for any τ ≤ t,
κτ will denote the appropriate subset of κt .
For every i ∈ I let M0i (m0i |κ0 , µi ) = 1. Then, recursively forward, define
X
Mti (mti |κt , µi ) =
µt−1
(mti |mt−1
, xt−1 , at−1 , y t−1 ) Mt−1
(mt−1
|κt−1 , µi )
(E.1)
i
i
i
i
mit−1 ∈H t−1

So that Mti (mti |κt , µi ) is the probability that player hi, t − 1i sends message mti given κt and the profile µi .
We also let Mt−i (mt−i |κt , µ−i ) = Mt−i ((mti , . . . , mti−1 , mti+1 , . . . , mtn )|κt , µ−i ) = Πj6=i Mtj (mtj |κt , µj ).
Lemma E.1: Fix any δ ∈ (0, 1), any x̃ and any ỹ. Fix any SE of the dynastic repeated game, (g, µ, Φ).
Assume that it displays Inter-Generational Agreement as in Definition 7.
Let any augmented history κt as in Definition E.1 be given. Let also any i ∈ I and any mti such that
Mti (mti |κt , µi ) > 0 be given.
Then for any mt−i
t
t
t
t
t
ΦtB
i (m−i |mi ) = M−i (m−i |κ , µ−i )

(E.2)
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Proof: We proceed by induction. Given the fixed κt , let κ0 = ∅ and κτ with τ = 1, . . . , t be the augmented
histories comprising the first three components (x0 , a0 , y 0 ) of κt , the first six components (x0 , a0 , y 0 , x1 , a1 , y 1 )
of κt and so on. First of all notice that setting τ = 0 yields
0
0
1
0
0
Φ1B
i (m−i |mi ) = M−i (m−i |κ , µ−i ) = 1

(E.3)

which is trivially true given that all players hi ∈ I, 0i receive the null message by construction.
Our working hypothesis is now that the claim is true for an arbitrary τ − 1 < t − 1, and our task is to
show that it holds for τ .
Consider any message mτi in Supp (Mτi (·|κτ , µi )). Then there must exist a message mτi −1 such that
µτi −1 (mτi |mτi −1 , xτ −1 , aτ −1 , y τ −1 )Mτi −1 (mτi −1 |κτ −1 , µi ) > 0

(E.4)

Therefore, using (9) we can write
Φτi B (mτ−i |mτi ) = Φτi −1E (mτ−i |mτi −1 , xτ −1 , aτ −1 , y τ −1 )
Notice that in any SE it must be the case that the right-hand side of (E.5) is equal to


Y
X
Φτi −1R (mτ−i−1 |mτi −1 , xτ −1 , aτ −1 , y τ −1 )  µτj −1 (mτj |mτj −1 , xτ −1 , aτ −1 , y τ −1 )
−1
mτ−i

(E.5)

(E.6)

j6=i

Using (8), we know that (E.6) is equal to
X



Y
Φτi −1B (mτ−i−1 |mτi −1 )  µτj −1 (mτj |mτj −1 , xτ −1 , aτ −1 , y τ −1 )

−1
mτ−i

Our working hypothesis can now be used to assert that (E.7) is in turn equal to


X
Y
Mτ−i−1 (mτ−i−1 |κτ −1 , µ−i )  µτj −1 (mτj |mτj −1 , xτ −1 , aτ −1 , y τ −1 )
−1
mτ−i

(E.8)

j6=i

Rearranging terms (E.8) we find that it can also be written as


Y X

Mτj −1 (mτj −1 |κτ −1 , µj )µτj −1 (mτj |mτj −1 , xτ −1 , aτ −1 , y τ −1 )

j6=i

(E.7)

j6=i

(E.9)

mτj −1

Using now (E.1), it is immediate that (E.9) is equal to
Y
Mτj (mτj |κτ , µj ) = Mτ−i (mτ−i |κτ , µ−i )

(E.10)

j6=i

and hence the claim is proved.
Definition E.2: Fix any δ ∈ (0, 1), any x̃ and any ỹ. Fix any strategy profile, (g, µ), for the dynastic
repeated game.
Consider the standard repeated game with the same common discount factor δ, and with the following
ˆ The random variable x̃
ˆ takes values in the finite set Y ×X (the sets in which
action-stage correlation device x̃.
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ˆ is equal to x̂ = (y, x) is Pr(ỹ = y) Pr(x̃ = x).
ỹ and x̃ take values respectively), and the probability that x̃
t
ˆ t by the pair (y t−1 , xt ).
For notational convenience we will denote the realization x̂ of x̃
ˆ is an object of the type ht =
Recall that a history in the standard repeated game with correlation device x̃
0 0
t−1 t−1
(x̂ , a , . . . , x̂ , a ). Therefore, using our notational convention about time superscripts of the realizations
ˆ t we have that any pair (ht , x̂t ) can be written as a triple (y −1 , κt , xt ), where κt corresponds to ht in the
of x̃
obvious way.
ˆ is derived
We say that the strategy profile g ∗ for the standard repeated game with correlation device x̃
from the dynastic repeated game profile (g, µ) as above if and only if it is defined as follows.

git∗ (ht , x̂t ) = git∗ (y −1 , κt , xt ) =

X

Mti (mti |κt , µi )git (mti , xt )

(E.11)

mti

Lemma E.2: Fix any δ ∈ (0, 1), any x̃ and any ỹ. Consider any SE, (g, µ), of the dynastic repeated game
that displays Inter-Generational Agreement as in Definition 7.
ˆ that is
Now consider the strategy profile g ∗ for the standard repeated game with correlation device x̃
derived from (g, µ) as in Definition E.2.
Given g ∗ , fix any pair (ht , x̂t ) representing a history and realized correlation device for the standard
repeated game. For any at−i ∈ A−i , let Pg∗ |ht ,x̂t (at−i ) be the probability that the realized action profile for
all players but i at time t is at−i .
Given the pair (ht , x̂t ), consider the corresponding triple (y −1 , κt , xt ) as in Definition E.2. Given the last
two elements of this triple (κt , xt ), now use (E.1) and the strategy profile g t to find an array mt−i such that
Mt−i (mt−i |κt , µ−i ) > 0.
Then



Y X
Pg∗ |ht ,x̂t (at−i ) =
Mtj (mtj |κt , µj ) gjt (atj |mtj , xt )
(E.12)
 t

j6=i

mj

Proof: The claim is a direct consequence of (E.11) of Definition E.2.
Lemma E.3: Fix any δ ∈ (0, 1), any x̃ and any ỹ. Consider any SE (g, µ, Φ) of the dynastic repeated game
that displays Inter-Generational Agreement as in Definition 7.
Fix any pair (ht , x̂t ) representing a history and realized correlation device for the standard repeated game.
Given the pair (ht , x̂t ), consider the corresponding triple (y −1 , κt , xt ) as in Definition E.2. Given the last two
elements of this triple (κt , xt ), now use (E.1) to find a message mti such that Mti (mti |κt , µi ) > 0.
Finally, consider the following alternative action-stage and message-stage strategies (g ti , µti ) for player
hi, ti. Whenever mti 6= mti , set g ti = git and µti = µti . Then define
X
g ti (mti , xt ) =
Mti (mti |κt , µi )git (mti , xt )
(E.13)
mti

and
µti (mti , xt , at , y t ) =

X

Mti (mti |κt , µi )µti (mti , xt , at , y t )

(E.14)

mti

Then
−t
t t −t
t
t
t
tB
vit (g, µ|mti , xt , ΦtB
i ) = vi (g i , gi , g−i , µi , µi , µ−i |mi , x , Φi )

(E.15)
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Proof: The claim is a direct consequence of Lemma E.1 and of (8) of Definition 7. The details are omitted
for the sake of brevity.
E.1. Proof of the Theorem
Fix any δ ∈ (0, 1), any x̃ and any ỹ. Consider any SE triple (g, µ, Φ) for the dynastic repeated game. Assume
that this SE displays Inter-Generational Agreement as in Definition 7.
Now consider the strategy profile g ∗ for the standard repeated game with common discount δ and correˆ that is derived from (g, µ) as in Definition E.2.
lation device x̃
Since (g, µ) and g ∗ obviously give rise to the same payoff vector, to prove the claim it is enough to show
ˆ By way of contradiction, suppose that g ∗ 6∈ G S (δ, x̃).
ˆ
that g ∗ ∈ G S (δ, x̃).
By Remark 1 (One-Shot Deviation Principle) this implies that there exist an i, an ht , an x̂t and a σi such
that
∗
vi (σi , gi−t∗ , g−i
|ht , x̂t ) > vi (g ∗ |ht , x̂t )

(E.16)

Given the pair (ht , x̂t ), consider the corresponding triple (y −1 , κt , xt ) as in Definition E.2. Given the last
two elements of this triple (κt , xt ), now use (E.1) to find a message mti such that Mti (mti |κt , µi ) > 0.
Using Lemmas E.1 and E.2 we can now conclude that (E.16) implies that
−t
t
t
tB
t t −t
t
t
t
tB
vit (σi , gi−t , g−i , µti , µ−t
i , µ−i |mi , x , Φi ) > vi (g i , gi , g−i , µi , µi , µ−i |mi , x , Φi )

(E.17)

where σi is the profitable deviation identified in (E.16) and g ti and µti are the alternative action-stage and
message-stage strategies of Lemma E.3.
However, using (E.15) of Lemma E.3, the inequality in (E.17) clearly implies that
t
t
tB
t
t
t
tB
vit (σi , gi−t , g−i , µti , µ−t
i , µ−i |mi , x , Φi ) > vi (g, µ|mi , x , Φi )

(E.18)

But since (E.18) contradicts the fact that (g, µ, Φ) is an SE of the dynastic repeated game, the proof is now
complete.
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